JERROD WAYNE STANDEFER v. THE STATE OF TEXAS--Appeal from County Criminal Court at Law No 10 of Harris County

 NUMBER 13-03-00227-CR

 COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI  B EDINBURG

JERROD WAYNE STANDEFER, Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

 On appeal from the County Criminal Court at Law No. 10

of Harris County, Texas.

 MEMORANDUM OPINION

 Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Hinojosa and Rodriguez

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Hinojosa

A jury found appellant, Jerrod Wayne Standefer, guilty of the offense of reckless driving,[1] and the trial court assessed his punishment at thirty days= confinement in the county jail and a $200 fine. The trial court has certified that this Ais not a plea-bargain case, and [appellant] has the right of appeal.@ See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2). By two points of error, appellant contends the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support his conviction for reckless driving. We affirm.

Because all issues of law presented by this case are well settled and the parties are familiar with the facts, we will not recite the law and the facts here except as necessary to advise the parties of our decision and the basic reasons for it. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.

The standard of review for challenges to the legal and factual sufficiency of evidence is well settled. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (legal sufficiency); Young v. State, 14 S.W.3d 748, 753 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (legal sufficiency); Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (factual sufficiency); Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (legal and factual sufficiency). A person commits the offense of reckless driving if that person Adrives a vehicle in wilful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property.@ Tex. Transp. Code Ann. ' 545.401 (Vernon 1999). The information alleged that appellant wilfully and wantonly disregarded the safety of persons and property by recklessly driving his motor vehicle at a high rate of speed and causing it to collide with another motor vehicle.

Jesus Rodarte was driving a Ford F-250 pickup truck northbound on Shadowdale Drive in Houston at approximately fifteen to twenty miles per hour, and was preparing to make a left-hand turn. As Rodarte started to turn, a Chevrolet S-10 pickup truck driven by appellant moved into the southbound lane and attempted to pass Rodarte=s truck. Appellant=s truck hit the F-250 and pushed it at a diagonal angle for thirty-six feet, where it hit a curb and flipped on its side. The F-250 was then pushed another six feet by appellant=s truck until it hit a telephone pole. The impact with the telephone pole crushed the cab of the truck, pinning Rodarte.

Two eyewitnesses testified that before the collision, they heard loud engine noises which attracted their attention. Both said they saw two vehicles traveling at a high rate of speed, in excess of the thirty mile per hour speed limit, approaching the F-250. They estimated the Chevrolet S-10 pickup truck driven by appellant was traveling at between forty and fifty miles per hour at the time of impact. Both admitted that due to the location from where they observed the collision, they could not tell if Rodarte had used a turn signal.

Officer Cary Spears, an investigator with the Houston Police Department Accident Division, testified that by using a point of impact estimated from debris and witness statements, the distance the F-250 was pushed as a result of the collision, and the amount of damage that resulted, he estimated the S-10 was traveling at approximately fifty miles per hour at the point of impact. A high rate of speed and high velocity was necessary for the lighter S-10 to push the much heavier F-250 a distance of forty-two feet. Officer Spears said that if the S-10 had been traveling at thirty to thirty-five miles per hour, the F-250 would not have been flipped on its side when it hit the curb, and significantly less damage would have resulted. The fact the F-250 was pushed an additional six feet after flipping on its side further indicated the S-10 was traveling at a very high rate of speed. Officer Spears opined the cause of the accident was excess rate of speed in a residential neighborhood.

Rodarte testified that he recalled putting on his left-turn signal approximately thirty feet before the intersection; he always uses his turn signal before making a turn. Rodarte said that because there was no other vehicle in front of him, he slowed down gradually instead of braking to turn. When he looked in his rear-view mirror prior to turning, he saw one vehicle far behind him, but did not see appellant=s S-10 pickup truck.

Adrian Moseley, the driver of the second truck observed by the eyewitnesses, and Eric Mika, the passenger in the S-10, testified that they never saw a turn signal on the F-250. Moseley testified he did not believe he and appellant were traveling at an excessive rate of speed, and that he had a AFlowmaster@ muffler on his truck that made it sound louder than normal. Mika estimated that the S-10 accelerated from thirty-five to about forty miles per hour at the time of impact, however, he did not look at the speedometer.

Appellant testified that he and Moseley were not racing, though Moseley may have revved his engine to catch up to appellant. Appellant turned northbound onto Shadowdale Drive behind the F-250 and decided to pass because Rodarte was driving very slowly. He said he would have slowed down and waited if he had seen a turn signal. He thought the speed limit was thirty-five miles per hour and did not think he was driving Apretty fast.@

We conclude that any rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant committed the offense of reckless driving by operating his vehicle at a high rate of speed. Accordingly, we hold the evidence is legally sufficient to support appellant=s conviction for reckless driving. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Young, 14 S.W.3d at 753.

Appellant also contends the evidence is legally insufficient because there is a fatal variance between the manner and means alleged in the information and the evidence actually presented. See generally Gollihar v. State, 46 S.W.3d 243, 254, 257-58 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). However, because we have held that the evidence is legally sufficient to support the conviction based on the manner and means alleged in the information, we need not address the variance issue. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1. Appellant=s first issue is overruled.

While the evidence presented offers conflicting estimates regarding the speed and manner which the S-10 was traveling, the introduction of conflicting evidence is not enough to render the evidence insufficient as a whole. See State v. Turro, 867 S.W.2d 43, 47 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). We must assume that the fact finder resolved conflicts in the evidence in favor of the verdict and must defer to that resolution. Id. (citing Matson v. State, 819 S.W.2d 839, 846 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)).

After reviewing all the evidence, we conclude that the evidence is not so weak as to be clearly wrong and manifestly unjust and the verdict is not against the great weight of the evidence. Accordingly, we hold the evidence is factually sufficient to support appellant=s conviction. Appellant=s second issue is overruled.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

FEDERICO G. HINOJOSA

Justice

Do not publish. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).

Memorandum Opinion delivered and filed this

the 21st day of July, 2005.

[1] See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. ' 545.401 (Vernon 1999).