PEDRO ROJAS v. THE STATE OF TEXAS--Appeal from 347th District Court of Nueces County

NUMBER 13-02-122-CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI

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  PEDRO ROJAS, Appellant,

v.

 THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

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On appeal from the 347th District Court

of Nueces County, Texas.

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O P I N I O N

Before Justices Dorsey, Hinojosa, and Rodriguez

Opinion by Justice Rodriguez

In February 2002, pursuant to a plea agreement, appellant, Pedro Rojas, pled guilty to the offense of burglary of a habitation with intent to commit theft. The trial court accepted appellant=s plea and, in accordance with the plea agreement, sentenced appellant to two years in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice.

Appellant=s counsel has filed a brief in which he concluded this appeal is wholly frivolous and without merit. The brief meets the requirements of Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), as it presents a professional evaluation of why there are no arguable grounds for advancing an appeal. See Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 510 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 812 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978). Counsel certifies in his brief that he served appellant with a copy of the brief and informed appellant of his right to examine the appellate record and to file a pro se brief. No such brief has been filed.

Upon receiving an Anders brief, an appellate court must conduct Aa full examination of all proceedings to decide whether the case is wholly frivolous.@ Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988). We have carefully reviewed the record in this appeal and, finding nothing that would arguably support an appeal in this cause, agree that this appeal is wholly frivolous and without merit. See Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 511.

Furthermore, because the trial court sentenced appellant in accordance with a plea bargain agreement, appellant was required to comply with the additional notice requirements of rule 25.2(b)(3). Rule 25.2(b)(3) requires a defendant, appealing from a plea bargained conviction, to file a notice of appeal stating the appeal is for a jurisdictional defect, from a ruling on a pre-trial motion, or show that the trial court granted appellant permission to appeal. Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(b)(3); White v. State, 61 S.W.3d 424, 428 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). Appellant=s notice of appeal did not allege any of the additional notice requirements of rule 25.2(b)(3).

We conclude we are without jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(b)(3); White, 61 S.W.3d at 428. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction.

NELDA V. RODRIGUEZ

Justice

Do not publish.

Tex. R. App. P.47.3.

Opinion delivered and filed

this 29th day of August, 2002.