DANIEL CHAPA v. THE STATE OF TEXAS--Appeal from 156th District Court of Bee County

NUMBER 13-01-701-CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI  BEDINBURG

DANIEL CHAPA,   Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

On appeal from the 156th District Court

of Dallas County, Texas.

  O P I N I O N

Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Dorsey and Rodriguez

Opinion by Chief Justice Valdez

Appellant, Daniel Chapa, appeals the trial court=s judgment revoking his probation and sentencing him to six years confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. We affirm the trial court=s judgment.

Introduction

On April 15, 1999, appellant pleaded guilty to a four-count indictment alleging the felony offense of burglary of a habitation. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. ' 30.02 (Vernon Supp. 2002). The trial court assessed punishment at imprisonment for seven years, awarded community supervision for seven years, and assessed a fine of $2,500.00.

In June of 2001, the State filed a motion to revoke appellant=s community supervision on grounds that appellant (1) caused bodily injury to another, (2) failed to complete the Treatment Associates Outpatient AfterCare Program, (3) failed to pay his supervisory fees, and (4) failed to pay his fine and court costs.

On September 20, 2001, the trial court held a hearing on the State=s motion to revoke. The State abandoned all allegations in the motion to revoke except for the allegation that appellant failed to complete the Treatment Associates Outpatient AfterCare Program. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found that appellant had failed to complete the Treatment Associates Outpatient AfterCare Program, revoked appellant=s community supervision, and sentenced appellant to six years confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice.

Terms of Probation

In his first issue, appellant complains that the trial court erred in revoking his community supervision because he was not given adequate notice of the terms of probation, thus violating his due process rights.

A trial court has broad discretion to impose conditions of probation. Greathouse v. State, 33 S.W.3d 455, 459 (Tex. App.BHouston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. ref=d). The conditions of probation must be reasonable and must be designed to protect or restore the community, protect or restore the victim, or punish, rehabilitate, or reform the defendant. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12, ' 11(a) (Vernon Supp. 2002). The conditions must be clear, explicit, and unambiguous so that the probationer understands what is expected of him. Greathouse, 33 S.W.3d at 459; Todd v. State, 911 S.W.2d 807, 817 (Tex. App.BEl Paso 1995, no pet.).

The failure to timely appeal from a conviction resulting in community supervision waives the right to appeal. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12, ' 23(b) (Vernon Supp. 2002); Satterwhite v. State, 36 S.W.3d 145, 149 (Tex. App.BHouston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. ref=d). No appeal may be taken from the trial court=s determination to proceed with adjudication of guilt on the original charge. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12, ' 5 (Vernon Supp. 2002); Olowosuko v. State, 826 S.W.2d 940, 942 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). Moreover, a defendant placed on deferred adjudication probation may raise issues relating to the original plea proceedings only in appeals taken when deferred adjudication probation is first imposed. See Manuelv. State, 994 S.W.2d 658, 661-62 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).

Allegations that the conditions of probation are vague concern appellant=s conviction, and thus, should be raised by timely appeal when appellant is placed on supervision rather than after the revocation of appellant=s supervision. Olowosuko, 826 S.W.2d at 942; Anthony v. State, 962 S.W.2d 242, 246 (Tex. App.BFort Worth 1998, no pet.); Abdallah v. State, 924 S.W.2d 751, 754-55 (Tex. App.BFort Worth 1996, pet. ref=d); see Kirtley v. State, 56 S.W.3d 48, 50-51 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (appellant may not challenge trial court=s decision to adjudicate guilt, but may challenge aspects of Asecond phase to determine punishment@). Because appellant did not appeal his conviction on the basis that the terms and conditions of probation were vague and ambiguous when probation was originally imposed, he may not complain that the conditions are vague and ambiguous for the first time on appeal from revocation of his probation. Olowosuko, 826 S.W.2d at 942; Anthony, 962 S.W.2d at 246; Abdallah, 924 S.W.2d at 754-55.

We overrule appellant=s first issue.

Legal and Factual Sufficiency of the Evidence

By his second issue appellant argues that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the revocation of his community supervision.

We review the trial court=s decision to revoke an order of community supervision under an abuse of discretion standard. Cardona v. State, 665 S.W.2d 492, 493-94 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). An abuse of discretion occurs only when the trial court=s decision was Aso clearly wrong as to lie outside that zone within which reasonable persons might disagree.@ Cantu v. State, 842 S.W.2d 667, 682 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).

In a revocation proceeding, the State must prove that appellant violated a condition of community supervision by the preponderance of the evidence. Cobb v. State, 851 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). Proof of a single violation is sufficient to support the revocation of community supervision. O=Neal v. State, 623 S.W.2d 660, 661 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981). A plea of true, standing alone, is also sufficient to support the trial court=s revocation order. Moses v. State, 590 S.W.2d 469, 470 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); Brooks v. State, 995 S.W.2d 762, 763 (Tex. App.BSan Antonio 1999, no pet.). In determining the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a probation revocation, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court=s ruling. Jones v. State, 589 S.W.2d 419, 421 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1979).

In the case at hand, appellant pleaded true to the allegations in the State=s motion to revoke. His plea is reflected in a written Aplea of true@ filed with the court. The appellant also verbally pleaded guilty to the allegation in open court. Through questioning at the hearing on the motion to revoke, the trial court ascertained that appellant=s plea was made because the allegations were true, that his plea was not forced or coerced, and that his plea was made freely and voluntarily. The trial court also found that appellant was competent to make the plea of guilty.

Once appellant pleaded true, he was precluded from challenging the sufficiency of the evidence against him. See Brooks, 995 S.W.2d at 763. The plea of true, standing alone, adequately supports the trial court=s determination that appellant violated a condition of his probation. Moses, 590 S.W.2d at 470.

Moreover, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court=s ruling, there is sufficient evidence to show that appellant violated the terms of his probation by failing to successfully complete the Treatment Associates Outpatient AfterCare Program as required by his terms of probation. See Jones, 589 S.W.2d at 421. In response to questioning by the State, appellant admitted that he had failed to attend the AfterCare meetings.

We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking appellant=s community supervision.

Conclusion

Having overruled each of appellant=s issues on appeal, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

ROGELIO VALDEZ

Chief Justice

Do not publish.

Tex. R. App. P. 47.3.

Opinion delivered and filed

this20th day of June, 2002.