Walter Wilson v. The Attorney General of Texas--Appeal from 13th District Court of Navarro County

IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-95-079-CV

WALTER WILSON,

Appellant

v.

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS,

Appellee

From the 13th District Court

Navarro County, Texas

Trial Court # 538-80

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Walter Wilson attempts to appeal from an order dismissing his appeal of a family law master's child-support findings to the district court. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. 54.012 (Vernon 1988). By a motion to dismiss, the Attorney General argues that we do not have jurisdiction over Wilson's appeal because there is no final judgment in this cause. Tex. R. App. P. 60(a)(1), 72. Agreeing with the Attorney General's contention, we will dismiss this cause for want of jurisdiction.

On June 27, 1994, the family law master signed a report on the Attorney General's motion to modify Wilson's child-support obligation for transmittal to the district court. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. 54.010(a). Wilson attempted to appeal the master's findings to the court by filing a notice of appeal within three days. Id. 54.012(a). Wilson's appeal remained pending until the Attorney General filed a motion to dismiss for want of prosecution in January 1995. After a hearing, the court dismissed the appeal on February 27, 1995. The court stayed its order "to give [Wilson] time in which to perfect and prosecute an appeal of this case to the Tenth Court of Civil Appeals in Waco, Texas." The court did not, however, sign an order or decree conforming to the master's report. Id. 54.013.

The master's findings become the decree or order of the court "only on the referring court's signing an order or decree conforming to the master's report." Id. (emphasis added). Thus, because the court has not yet either signed a decree conforming to the master's report or rendered judgment otherwise, there is no final judgment in this cause. Id. 54.011, 54.012(j), 54.013. Until the court signs such a decree or judgment it may "adopt, approve, or reject the master's report, hear further evidence, or recommit the matter for further proceedings" as the court deems proper. Id. 54.011. The court's order merely dismissing Wilson's appeal does not finally dispose of all the issues in the cause and is, therefore, interlocutory. See Speer v. Stover, 711 S.W.2d 730, 734 (Tex. App. San Antonio 1986, no writ).

Absent a statue making an interlocutory order appealable, a final judgment is necessary to our jurisdiction. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 51.012 (Vernon 1986); New York Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Sanchez, 799 S.W.2d 677, 678-79 (Tex. 1990). Neither the provisions governing the procedures relating to a family law master nor the general provision governing interlocutory appeals makes an order dismissing an appeal from the master's findings to the referring court appealable. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. 54.012(j); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 51.014 (Vernon Supp. 1995). Thus, we do not have jurisdiction over Wilson's appeal. New York Underwriters, 799 S.W.2d at 678-79.

The Attorney General's motion to dismiss is granted and this cause is dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

PER CURIAM

Before Chief Justice Thomas,

Justice Cummings, and

Justice Vance

Dismissed for want of jurisdiction

Opinion delivered and filed September 13, 1995

Do not publish