Charles Young v. Jack M. Garner, et al.--Appeal from 52nd District Court of Coryell County

IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-94-331-CV

CHARLES YOUNG,

Appellant

v.

JACK M. GARNER, ET AL.,

Appellees

From the 52nd District Court

Coryell County, Texas

Trial Court # 28,293

O P I N I O N

Charles Young, a prison inmate, brings this appeal from the dismissal of an in forma pauperis action filed against six employees of the Hughes Unit, Texas Department of Criminal Justice Institutional Division (TDCJ-ID). See Tex. R. Civ. P. 145. The court dismissed the action as frivolous and malicious because the claim had no arguable basis in law or in fact. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 13.001(a)(2), (b)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1995). In seven points, Young argues that the court dismissed his case in an abuse of its discretion. We will affirm the judgment.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Young's original petition asserts four claims under section 1983 of title 42 of the United States Code. 42 U.S.C. 1983 (1981). The first alleges an excessive use of force arising from a February 17, 1992, incident in which Young allegedly tried to steal an extra piece of chicken in the "chow" line and claimed that Gary Saint, a TDCJ-ID guard, cut two of Young's fingers with a spatula. Young's second claim alleges a deliberate indifference to his medical needs arising from a March 7 incident in which he claims that his toes were bruised through his "soft shoes" when Timothy Eary, a TDCJ-ID field official, made him perform job assignments that required steel-toed boots against doctor's orders. His third claim alleges that Eary "retaliated" against him on January 9 by making him work in the field after he complained about calluses and sore feet. Young's final claim alleges a denial of due process in a January 12 disciplinary proceeding held because he allegedly failed to obey Eary's orders.

Young filed his petition on January 13, 1994, seeking compensatory and punitive damages against Appellees under section 1983. The court dismissed his suit as having no arguable basis in law or in fact, stating, the "[s]tatute of limitations has run on all causes of action which appear to be alleged." See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 13.001(a)(2), (b)(2). Young now appeals, claiming that the court abused its discretion by dismissing his case.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Young argues in all seven of his points that the court abused its discretion by dismissing his case because it failed to address his allegations, failed to afford him a hearing, failed to consider Appellees' "continued patterns of misconduct," and failed to appoint counsel to "further investigate, gather evidence, and assist" him.

Trial courts have great discretion in dismissing frivolous or malicious in forma pauperis claims. See Johnson v. Lynaugh, 766 S.W.2d 393, 394 (Tex. App. Tyler 1989), writ denied per curiam, 796 S.W.2d 705 (Tex. 1990). An abuse of discretion occurs when the court acts "without reference to any guiding rules and principles." See Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1159, 106 S. Ct. 2279, 90 L. Ed. 2d 721 (1986). A corollary principle is that the court of appeals may not reverse for an abuse of discretion merely because it disagrees with a decision by the trial court, if that decision was within the trial court's discretionary authority. See Beaumont Bank, N.A. v. Buller, 806 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Tex. 1991); Downer, 701 S.W.2d at 242.

The trial court may dismiss an action as frivolous or malicious at any time. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 13.001(c); Kendrick v. Lynaugh, 804 S.W.2d 153, 154-55 (Tex. App. Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no writ). It may also dismiss an action without a hearing. See id. at 155-56. An exception is when the court's dismissal for having no arguable basis in fact requires a fact-finding. See Thomas v. Holder, 836 S.W.2d 351, 352 (Tex. App. Tyler 1992, no writ); McDonald v. Houston Dairy, 813 S.W.2d 238, 239 (Tex. App. Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ). Because the court was considering whether Young's case had an arguable basis in law, he was not entitled to a hearing.

ANALYSIS

There is no federal statute of limitations for section 1983 actions; thus, Texas statutes of limitations are utilized. Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50, 109 S. Ct. 573, 582, 102 L. Ed. 2d 594 (1989); Jackson v. Johnson, 950 F.2d 263, 265 (5th Cir. 1992). Our statute of limitations for personal injury is two years. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 16.003(a) (Vernon 1986). Under Texas law, imprisonment is no longer considered a disability which tolls the statutes of limitation; thus, an inmate's section 1983 action begins to run when the cause of action accrues. See Jackson, 950 F.2d at 265; Henson-El v. Rogers, 923 F.2d 51, 52 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1235, 111 S. Ct. 2863, 115 L. Ed. 2d 1030 (1991); White v. Cole, 880 S.W.2d 292, 295 (Tex. App. Beaumont 1994, writ denied). Although Texas law governs the limitations period and the tolling exceptions, federal law governs when the cause of action accrues. See Jackson, 950 F.2d at 265; Burrell v. Newsome, 883 F.2d 416, 418 (5th Cir. 1989). Under federal law, a cause of action arises "when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action." Id. (both quoting Lavellee v. Listi, 611 F.2d 1129, 1131 (5th Cir. 1980)).

Young's four causes of action arose on the respective dates of the incidents. The claims alleged in causes of action three and four arose from incidents which occurred on January 9 and January 12, 1992, respectively. Because Young filed his petition on January 13, 1994, more than two years after each of those incidents, causes three and four are barred by the statute of limitations. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 16.003(a).

Causes one and two arose from incidents which occurred on February 17 and March 7, 1992, respectively. Thus, they are not barred by limitations, and could not be properly dismissed by the court for that reason. However, we still must determine whether the court properly dismissed the claim as having no basis in law. See id. 13.001(a)(2), (b)(2).

Appellees assert the affirmative defense of qualified immunity. Government officers have a common-law immunity from personal liability while performing discretionary duties in good faith within the scope of their authority. Campbell v. Jones, 153 Tex. 101, 264 S.W.2d 425, 427 (1954); Wyse v. Dep't of Public Safety, 733 S.W.2d 224, 227 (Tex. App. Waco 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.). This immunity shields a state official from liability for damages unless his conduct violates "clearly established statutory or constitutional right of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1982).

With the possible exception of Saint, who was never served and was not a party to the action, Young has failed to establish the violation of any statutory or constitutional right and has failed to overcome Appellees' qualified immunity. None of the Appellees were involved in the alleged use-of-force incident between Saint and Young. Although Young claims that they were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs, he failed to demonstrate the violation of any clearly established law. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639-40, 107 S. Ct. 3034, 3038-39, 97 L. Ed. 2d 523 (1987); Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818, 102 S. Ct. at 2738. Young also failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.

Therefore, the court properly dismissed the claim as having no basis in law, and we overrule all points. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 13.001(a)(2), (b)(2).

CONCLUSION

We conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the action because the claims had no arguable basis in law or in fact. See id. We affirm the judgment dismissing Young's claims against Appellees.

BILL VANCE

Justice

Before Chief Justice Thomas,

Justice Cummings, and

Justice Vance

Affirmed

Opinion delivered and filed August 31, 1995

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