Alvin Lee Harrison v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice, et al--Appeal from 52nd District Court of Coryell County

IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-92-214-CV

ALVIN LEE HARRISON,

Appellant

v.

TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL

JUSTICE, ET AL.,

Appellees

From the 52nd District Court

Coryell County, Texas

Trial Court # 26,554

O P I N I O N

This is an appeal from the dismissal of in informa pauperis prisoner's suit. Alvin Lee Harrison, a prisoner in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, filed suit against the Department and one of its employees, Robert Morris, alleging that the defendants unlawfully confiscated and then destroyed two items of his personal property: a mirror and a prayer rug. He sought to recover the value of the items by alleging a cause of action under the Tort Claims Act for the negligent destruction of the property. He also alleged that the defendants' actions violated the "Fourteenth Amendment of Texas and U.S. Constitution." The Court, however, dismissed his suit as frivolous on the ground that it had no arguable basis in law or fact. Harrison then filed a motion to amend his pleading, followed by a motion to reinstate the case. He alleges that the court denied both motions, but that is not reflected by the record. His sole point of error is that the court abused its discretion when it dismissed the suit as frivolous and refused to reinstate the cause and allow him to amend his pleading. We affirm.

Harrison sued the Department and Morris, an employee in the property room at the Hughes Unit. He alleged that Morris confiscated several items of his personal property as contraband when he (Harrison) was transferred to the Hughes Unit from the Wynne Unit. All of the confiscated items were subsequently returned to him, he asserts in his pleading, except a mirror he had purchased through the prison system's commissary and a religious prayer rug. Apparently, according to an attachment to his pleading, the mirror and prayer rug were later destroyed when he did not mail them home. He alleged that these two items are not considered contraband but are allowed to general-population prisoners on all prison units. Harrison sought the "replacement" of the items, plus court costs, and "due process provided before destruction of personal property through an appeal." On March 12, the court summarily dismissed his suit as frivolous for having no arguable basis in law or fact. On March 16, Harrison filed a motion in the dismissed cause seeking permission to amend his petition and, on March 19, also filed a motion to reinstate the suit. The record does not reflect, however, that the court ever ruled on these motions.

The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure allow an indigent person to file an in forma pauperis suit. Tex. R. Civ. P. 145. This type of suit can be dismissed, however, under section 13.001(a)(2) of the Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code if the action is frivolous or malicious. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 13.001(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1993). The trial court has broad discretion under this section. See McDonald v. Houston Dairy, 813 S.W.2d 238, 239 (Tex. App. Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ). Among the factors it can consider is whether the suit has no arguable basis in law or fact. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 13.001(b)(2). Because pro se prisoner complaints are notoriously difficult to decipher, we must liberally interpret Harrison's pleading. See Spellmon v. Sweeney, 819 S.W.2d 206, 209 (Tex. App. Waco 1991, no writ) (citing Green v. McKaskle, 788 F.2d 1116, 1119 (5th Cir. 1986)).

NEGLIGENCE

Harrison did not allege any facts that would entitle him to recover under the Texas Tort Claims Act, which requires a governmental unit's liability for property damage to result either from the operation or use of a motor-driven vehicle or equipment or to be caused by a condition or use of tangible real or personal property. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 101.021 (Vernon 1986). He made no such allegations. Accordingly, the prison system is protected by governmental immunity from the negligence claim. See Wheat v. Texas Dept. of Corrections, 715 S.W.2d 362, 363 (Tex. App. Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Likewise, Morris is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity against the negligence claim. See Birdo v. Ament, 814 S.W.2d 808, 810 (Tex. App. Waco 1991, writ denied). Thus, the claim based on the negligent destruction of the property had no basis in law or fact.

DUE PROCESS

In his original petition, Harrison alleged that the defendants' actions violated the "Fourteenth Amendment of Texas and U.S. Constitution." We interpret this as an allegation that the defendants' action violated the due-process clauses of the state and federal constitutions. He attached to his pleading certain exhibits reflecting that he had tried to recover the mirror and prayer rug through the prison's administrative grievance procedure. His general grievance, as reflected by the exhibits, was that he had purchased the mirror at the Wynne Unit's commissary, that any item purchased through the prison commissary was not considered contraband under prison rules and regulations, and that Muslim prisoners were allowed to have prayer rugs for religious practices. Moreover, he alleged that administrative-segregated and general-population prisoners were allowed to have these two items and that the items were thus not contraband. This notation appears at the bottom of Form "I-60" attached to the petition: "No, Prayer rugs & mirrors are contraband." Above this notation appear the initials "RM," apparently those of defendant Robert Morris. Another exhibit "Contraband Material Disposition Report" reflects that the reason the religious rug and mirror were confiscated as contraband was because they were "metal." The Disposition Report advised Harrison of two options: (1) he could mail the items to anyone on his visiting list at his expense, or (2) the items would be destroyed within thirty days. He apparently chose, by "checking" the box by the second option, to have the items destroyed.

Prison inmates are protected by due process. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 525, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 3198, 82 L. Ed. 2d 393 (1984). However, allegations by a prisoner that he has been deprived of his personal property without just compensation by the negligent or intentional acts of prison employees or officials do not state a due-process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, provided the state makes available to the inmate a meaningful postdeprivation remedy. Id. 104 S. Ct. at 3203. Thus, the pivotal question is whether the State provides Harrison an adequate, meaningful remedy for the alleged improper destruction of his personalty.

The State provided Harrison not only with an inmate-grievance procedure, which he has apparently used and exhausted, but with a claim procedure that authorizes the institutional division of the Department of Criminal Justice to pay inmates for property lost or damaged by the division up to a limit of $500. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. 501.007, 501.008 (Vernon Supp. 1993). These are meaningful, adequate postdeprivation remedies. Accordingly, his allegation of either an intentional or negligent destruction of his property would provide no arguable basis in law or fact for a constitutional claim of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3203.

"No citizen of this State shall be deprived of life, liberty, property, privileges or immunities, or in any other manner disfranchised, except by the due course of the law of the land." Tex. Const. art. I, 19. This is the due-process clause of the Texas Constitution, the equivalent of the Fourteenth Amendment's due-process clause. Id. (commentary). Procedurally, it requires reasonable notice of the claim or charge and the relief sought, a fair and impartial hearing, an opportunity to be heard, and a reasonable opportunity to prepare for the hearing. Id. The inmate-grievance procedure and the claim procedure for inmates to recover the value of property wrongfully destroyed by prison officials provide Harrison procedural due process. The due-course-of-law clause does not substantively restrict the exercise of the state's legitimate police powers, as long as the enactments affecting liberty or property interests relate to public health, safety, and welfare. Id. A court, therefore, must balance the gain to the public welfare and safety resulting from the legislation against the severity of its effect upon personal rights. Id. Public welfare and safety demand the security of penal institutions. Hudson, 104 S. Ct. at 3201. Thus, the curtailment of some constitutional rights of inmates is necessary to accommodate the institutional needs and objectives of penal institutions, such as internal security. Id. at 3199. Although an inmate cannot rely on the Fourth Amendment to protect his property from unreasonable search and seizure, he nevertheless is entitled to procedural and substantive due process. Id.

We hold that any allegations by Harrison that the defendants negligently and intentionally destroyed his property did not raise a constitutional question under the due-course-of-law clause of the Texas constitution. This holding is forced by the same logic underlying the holding under the Fourteenth Amendment: "The state can no more anticipate and control in advance the random and unauthorized intentional conduct of its employees than it can anticipate similar negligent conduct." See id. at 3203. Accordingly, the question devolves to whether the state provides Harrison with meaningful postdeprivation remedies. Considering the procedural safeguards provided him through the grievance and claim procedure, and balancing the gain to the public good from rules and regulations restricting an inmate's right to possess certain types of personalty inside the institution with the restriction on property rights, we likewise hold that he is provided postdeprivation procedural and substantive due process through meaningful state remedies. See id. at 3204.

Giving Harrison's original petition its most liberal construction, we hold that he failed to allege an arguable basis in law or fact for a cause of action against either the Department or Morris under the Tort Claims Act or a due-process claim under the state or federal constitutions, the only causes of action pled. Thus, the court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed the suit on that basis under section 13.001. Judgment affirmed.

BOB L. THOMAS

Chief Justice

Before Chief Justice Thomas,

Justice Cummings, and

Justice Vance

Affirmed

Opinion delivered and filed February 10, 1993

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