Terrell Wayne Rogers v. The State of Texas--Appeal from 230th District Court of Harris County

IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-92-066-CR

No. 10-92-067-CR

No. 10-92-068-CR

TERRELL WAYNE ROGERS,

Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

Appellee

From the 230th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Nos. 601-024, 602,685 & 602,684

O P I N I O N

The above three cases against Appellant Terrell Wayne Rogers were tried before the trial court without a jury. Appellant was indicted in two cases for aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon and in one case for burglary of a habitation. He pleaded guilty to one case of aggravated robbery and to burglary of a habitation, whereupon the trial court assessed his punishment at 25 years in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, in each case. He pleaded not guilty to one case of aggravated robbery, but the trial court found him guilty and assessed his punishment at 25 years in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division.

In the two causes in which Appellant pleaded guilty, he did so without an agreed recommendation and judicially confessed to committing the crimes alleged against him in those cases.

Since Appellant raises no points of error that impact the validity of his convictions in these two cases in which he pleaded guilty, we hereby affirm the trial court's judgments in these two cases.

Appellant asserts two points of error only to the remaining case in which he entered a plea of not guilty, to-wit: Appellate Cause No. 10-92-068-CR, same being Trial Court No. 602684, wherein he is charged with aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon against Norman Langeland.

The two points of error asserted by Appellant in the case involving Norman Langeland are as follows:

Point One: This case must be reversed or abated for the failure of the trial court to file findings of fact and conclusions of law to support the trial court's verdict of guilty.

Point Two: The evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to sustain the verdict of the trial court of Appellant's guilt for the felony offense of aggravated robbery.

We overrule both of the above points of error and affirm the trial court's judgment.

As stated, in his first point of error, Appellant contends the trial court erred in failing to find findings of fact and conclusions of law to support the guilty verdict in the aggravated robbery case against Norman Langeland. Appellant cites no authority to support this point of error, neither any specific constitutional provision, statutory authority, or case law to support this contention. For this reason we consider this point of error to be inadequately briefed and will not address it. Vuong v. State, 830 S.W.2d 929, 940 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). A brief which is conclusory only and cites no authority presents nothing for review. Cureton v. State, 800 S.W.2d 259, 261 (Tex. App. Houston [14th Dist] 1990, no pet.).

We are aware of no law in this State requiring trial courts to enter findings of fact in support of their verdicts. Instead, to the contrary, is Article 37.07, Section 1(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure which specifically provides that the verdict in every criminal action must be general. The two cases cited by Appellant in this connection are Simpson v. State, 603 S.W.2d 862 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980), and Lacca v. State, 696 S.W.2d 645 (Tex. App. Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, pet. ref'd). Both Simpson and Lacca deal with the question of necessity of findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning the voluntariness of an accused's confession under Article 38.22 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and, in our opinion, neither of said cases has any application to the problem in the case at bar. We, therefore, overrule Appellant's first point of error.

Appellant by his second point of error contends that the evidence is legally insufficient to prove that he (Appellant) had committed the aggravated robbery against Norman Langeland. The main thrust of Appellant's insufficient argument is that the identification testimony was too weak to support the guilty verdict. We do not agree.

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, the appellate court must determine, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979).

Norman Langeland, the complainant, testified that on May 31, 1991, he had just exited a Jack-in-the-Box restaurant when Appellant approached him, demanded his watch, and pulled a .38-caliber pistol from his pocket. As Langeland was turning to flee, Appellant shot him twice. Appellant ran, stopped, turned back toward Langeland and shot at him four more times before finally leaving.

Langeland came to court for a prior appearance in this case and saw Appellant in the courtroom. When the court took a recess, Langeland approached him in the hallway. Without any prompting, Appellant said to Langeland: "I didn't shoot anybody."

Jeffrey O'Neil testified that he was managing the Jack-in-the-Box when Langeland was shot. On prior occasions, O'Neil had noticed that when Langeland left the restaurant, Appellant followed him out. On this particular occasion and night in question, Appellant again followed Langeland out of the restaurant and moments later, O'Neil heard gunshots. O'Neil ran out outside and saw Langeland kneeling down and Appellant running away with a gun in hand.

Fredon Amanji owns a business near the Jack-in-the--Box where Langeland was shot. On May 31, 1991, Amanji was in his shop when he heard gunfire. Amanji ran outside and saw Appellant running away. Amanji chased him, but Appellant eventually scaled a fence and escaped in a waiting car.

In short, the complainant identified Appellant as the person who shot him; O'Neil identified Appellant as the person fleeing the scene with a gun immediately after he heard gunfire, and Amanji identified Appellant as the person fleeing the scene immediately after he heard gunfire. Applying the Jackson v. Virginia rule hereinabove stated, a rational fact finder could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the Appellant committed the offense.

Appellant sought to establish an alibi and to discredit the identification evidence above pointed out; however, the trial court was free to reject that evidence and to rely on the evidence outlined above in reaching his decision. Appellant's second point of error is, therefore, overruled.

Judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

JAMES A. JAMES, JR.

Justice (Retired)

Before Justice Cummings,

Justice Vance and

Justice James (Retired)

Affirmed

Opinion delivered and filed January 20, 1993

Do not publish