Dennis Mizell v. M.R. Champion, et al--Appeal from 12th District Court of Leon County

IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-91-204-CV

DENNIS MIZELL,

Appellant

v.

M.R. CHAMPION, ET AL.,

Appellees

From the 12th District Court

Leon County, Texas

Trial Court # 9839

OPINION ON REHEARING

Who is entitled to a judgment on the verdict?

We held on original submission that the findings establishing a violation of the Statute of Frauds and a dissolution of the partnership were immaterial and should have been disregarded by the trial court. In discussing the materiality of the dissolution finding, we interpreted Champion's overall contention as being that a dissolution of the partnership in January 1987 "wiped out any fiduciary duty between him and Mizell and barred all causes of action for breach of that duty back to the inception of their partnership in 1985." He insists that we misinterpreted his argument.

On rehearing, Champion's contentions relating to the legal effect of the dissolution finding can be fairly characterized in this manner. Dissolution of the partnership in January 1987 ended the only special relationship that would support a fiduciary duty between the parties, and thereby ended any fiduciary duty on his part to solicit business opportunities only for the partnership rather than for himself. Thereafter, he could obtain for M.R. Champion, Inc., his own corporation, a three-year contract with Northwestern Resources for the years 1988 through 1990. Champion also contends Mizell stipulated that his damage claim related only to the partnership's loss of the three-year contract. Thus, Champion insists that he is entitled to a take-nothing judgment as a matter of law because the dissolution finding and the undisputed evidence conclusively established that Mizell was not entitled to recover damages for breach of a nonexistent fiduciary duty relating to the three-year contract.

The findings on which Mizell relies for a judgment i.e., partnership, breach of fiduciary duty, and damages are not referable to time. They do not ask the jury when the partnership began, whether Champion breached a fiduciary duty before or after January 1987, or limit damages to the partnership's loss of the three-year contract. Because neither party attacks the sufficiency of the evidence supporting any of the findings, we are necessarily bound by them on appeal. See D.T. Carroll Corp. v. Carroll, 256 S.W.2d 429, 432 (Tex. Civ. App. San Antonio 1953, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

Findings establishing the existence of a partnership, the breach of a fiduciary duty, and the amount of damages caused by the breach are all material to Mizell's right of recovery. Consequently, unless one of these findings can be ignored, Mizell is entitled to a judgment on the verdict as a matter of law. See Williams v. Wyrick, 151 Tex. 40, 245 S.W.2d 961, 962 (1925) (holding that a court has a ministerial duty to enter judgment in harmony with the verdict when the findings conclusively establish a party's right to judgment).

In entering a judgment on the verdict, a court can disregard an immaterial finding. C. & R. Transport, Inc. v. Campbell, 406 S.W.2d 191, 194 (Tex. 1966). A finding is immaterial when it should not have been submitted or, if properly submitted, has been rendered immaterial by other findings. Id. A finding is material and cannot be ignored, however, if it otherwise affects the legal significance of the verdict and the judgment to be entered. Id. All three findings relied on by Mizell affect the legal significance of the verdict and are therefore material.

Furthermore, a finding that the partnership dissolved in January 1987 did not render immaterial any of the findings material to Mizell's recovery. Even if there were an apparent conflict between the dissolution finding and Mizell's favorable findings, our duty would be to reconcile those findings, if possible. See id. at 195. When the jury found that Champion breached his fiduciary duty to Mizell, it necessarily found that the breach occurred during the partnership's existence; otherwise, there would have been no duty to breach. See Wilson v. Auer, 5 S.W.2d 160, 162 (Tex. Civ. App. Eastland 1928, no writ). Finally, even if asked to, the trial court and this court could not look to the dissolution finding to determine whether Mizell's findings could be ignored because they had no evidentiary support. See Campbell, 406 S.W.2d at 195. The trial court could not treat Mizell's findings as immaterial, and thus it could not disregard them.

We deny the motion for a rehearing.

However, a clarification of the rendition of judgment is in order. We render judgment in favor of Mizell for $150,000, jointly and severally, against the Estate of M.R. Champion, Deceased, M.R. Champion, Inc., and Barbara Champion, in her representative capacity as Independent Executrix of the Estate of M.R. Champion, Deceased. The cause is remanded for entry of judgment in accordance with the opinion.

BOB L. THOMAS

Chief Justice

Before Chief Justice Thomas,

Justice Cummings, and

Justice Vance

Motion for rehearing denied

Opinion delivered and filed August 4, 1993

Do not publish Released for publication April 11, 1995. See Rule 90(h) Tex. R. App. P.