Allen Dewayne Farris v. The State of Texas--Appeal from 402nd Judicial District Court of Wood County

In The
Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
______________________________
No. 06-07-00013-CR
______________________________
ALLEN DEWAYNE FARRIS, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 402nd Judicial District Court
Wood County, Texas
Trial Court No. 19,477-2006
Before Morriss, C.J., Carter and Moseley, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Carter
MEMORANDUM OPINION

A Wood County jury convicted Allen Dewayne Farris of possession of methamphetamine. The jury then assessed punishment at twenty years' confinement and a $10,000.00 fine. On appeal, Farris challenges only the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction, contending that there are insufficient links to connect him to the contraband discovered in the car he was driving.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

State Trooper Brandon Owens was on patrol outside Alba on the night of February 3, 2006, when he noticed an "old junky car" near the intersection of State Highway 69 and F.M. 17 and decided to run a license check on the car. When the check indicated that the car was stolen, Owens decided to stop the vehicle and turned on his lights. According to Owens, the driver took "a little longer" to pull over than does the usual driver. After Owens approached the stopped vehicle, he also noticed that the registration sticker, although current, belonged to another vehicle. Three people occupied the car.

When Owens asked the driver for his license and proof of insurance, the driver responded that he had no license and had borrowed the car. The driver identified himself as Acey Joe Farris, born February 2, 1962. However, one of the occupants, Melissa Taylor, identified the driver as Allen Dewayne Farris. At that point, Owens arrested Farris for failure to present a driver's license. Owens patted down Farris and discovered an empty syringe in Farris' shirt pocket. After Owens gave Farris his Miranda (1) warnings and while still at the scene, Farris explained that he had used the syringe to use methamphetamine. Owens then secured Farris, removed the two passengers from the stopped vehicle, and performed a search of that vehicle. During the search, Owens found a small cylindrical tin containing three small baggies. In those baggies was a substance that appeared to Owens to be methamphetamine. The tin was sitting "right by the driver's seat," according to Owens, easily within reach of the driver, but also probably accessible by the two passengers as well. Owens further explained that the tin was located between the console and the driver's seat. He also discovered little baggies in Farris' wallet, which Farris explained were for packaging his costume jewelry.

II. APPLICABLE LAW

A. Standard of Review

When deciding whether evidence is legally sufficient to support a conviction, a reviewing court must assess all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Poindexter v. State, 153 S.W.3d 402, 405 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).

B. Links to the Contraband

To establish guilt, the State must prove both that the accused had control over the contraband and that the accused had knowledge of its existence and character. Poindexter, 153 S.W.3d at 405. When an accused is not in exclusive possession of the place where contraband is found, we cannot conclude he or she had knowledge or control over the contraband unless there are additional independent facts and circumstances which link the accused to the contraband. Id. at 406.

There is no set formula of facts that dictates a finding of links sufficient to support an inference of knowing possession of contraband. Porter v. State, 873 S.W.2d 729, 732 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1994, pet. ref'd). However, there are several recognized factors to consider: whether (1) the contraband was in plain view or recovered from an enclosed place; (2) the accused was the owner of the premises or the place where the contraband was found; (3) the accused was found with a large amount of cash; (4) the contraband was conveniently accessible to the accused; (5) the contraband was found in close proximity to the accused; (6) a strong residual odor of the contraband was present; (7) the accused possessed other contraband when arrested; (8) paraphernalia to use the contraband was in view, or found on the accused; (9) the physical condition of the accused indicated recent consumption of the contraband in question; (10) conduct by the accused indicated a consciousness of guilt; (11) the accused attempted to flee; (12) the accused made furtive gestures; (13) the accused had a special connection to the contraband; (14) the occupants of the premises gave conflicting statements about relevant matters; (15) the accused made incriminating statements connecting himself or herself to the contraband; (16) the quantity of the contraband; and (17) the accused was observed in a suspicious area under suspicious circumstances. Washington v. State, 215 S.W.3d 551, 554 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 2007, no pet.).

Mere presence at the location where drugs are found is thus insufficient, by itself, to establish actual care, custody, or control of those drugs. Evans v. State, 202 S.W.3d 158, 162 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). However, presence or proximity, when combined with other evidence, either direct or circumstantial, may well be sufficient to establish that element beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. The links must establish, to the requisite level of confidence, that the accused's connection with the drug was more than just fortuitous. Poindexter, 153 S.W.3d at 406.

It is not the number of links that is dispositive, but rather the logical force of all of the evidence, direct and circumstantial. Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 162. Further, control over the contraband need not be exclusive, but can be jointly exercised by more than one person. See McGoldrick v. State, 682 S.W.2d 573, 578 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985); Gant v. State, 116 S.W.3d 124, 131 (Tex. App.--Tyler 2003, pet. ref'd).

III. ANALYSIS

In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we first note that Trooper Owens testified that the tin containing the methamphetamine was located in close proximity to Farris. Owens explained that the tin was located between the console and the driver's seat in which Farris was sitting. Owens later explained that, although the other passengers could have reached the tin, Farris had only to place his arm down at his side to be able to reach the tin. So from that testimony, we learn that the methamphetamine was recovered from an enclosed place, was conveniently accessible to Farris, and was in close proximity to Farris. The record also shows that Farris had in his wallet baggies similar to the baggies contained in the tin containing methamphetamine. Further, Farris had in his shirt pocket a syringe which he admitted using to inject methamphetamine. This evidence connects Farris to the methamphetamine by showing that Farris was also in possession of paraphernalia to use the methamphetamine, consistent with factor number eight. Owens also testified that Farris initially gave him the false name of Acey Joe Farris and that passenger Taylor provided Owens with Farris' real name, showing that Farris demonstrated some consciousness of guilt and also that the occupants' stories were inconsistent. We also note that the record shows that Farris was driving the vehicle. Although Farris claims to have borrowed the car, we also note that the car was confirmed as stolen. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict, we see the fact that Farris operated the vehicle as further connection to the contraband. Additionally, the record provides evidence of suspicious circumstances. Owens testified that the license plates had expired and that he became very suspicious when he noticed that the current registration sticker displayed a different vehicle identification number.

We reiterate that we are to assess the logical force of the evidence as it relates to the relevant considerations tending to show that the accused knowingly possessed the controlled substance. Viewing the above-detailed evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that the evidence here is legally sufficient and that the logical force of the evidence is such that the jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Farris knowingly possessed the methamphetamine.

 

Accordingly, we overrule Farris' point of error and affirm the trial court's judgment.

 

Jack Carter

Justice

 

Date Submitted: August 15, 2007

Date Decided: August 17, 2007

 

Do Not Publish

 

1. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).