Carl Oneal Coffelt, Jr. v. The State of Texas--Appeal from 336th District Court of Fannin County

In The
Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
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No. 06-07-00014-CR
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CARL O'NEAL COFFELT, JR., Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 336th Judicial District Court
Fannin County, Texas
Trial Court No. 21639
Before Morriss, C.J., Carter and Moseley, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Carter
MEMORANDUM OPINION

Carl O'Neal Coffelt, Jr., appeals from his conviction by a jury for possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver. The jury assessed his punishment at twenty years' imprisonment and a $10,000.00 fine. (1) On appeal, he contests the sufficiency of the evidence.

Coffelt was stopped by Officer Josh Walker for driving in a car with expired tags. William Harrington was a passenger. Walker called for assistance, and both he and Officer Mike Stevens questioned Coffelt and Harrington. The officers asked for permission to search the automobile, which Coffelt granted. In the car, Walker found a pink Clinique makeup bag containing nine syringes, a black digital scale, and a cigarette package with eight baggies containing what was later determined to be methamphetamine.

At the scene, both Coffelt and Harrington denied ownership of the bag, and Officer Walker testified Harrington stated that he and Coffelt were going to Denison to purchase a half-ounce of methamphetamine.

In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).

In a factual sufficiency review, we also view all the evidence, but do so in a neutral light and determine whether the evidence supporting the verdict is so weak or so outweighed by the great weight and preponderance of the evidence that the jury's verdict is clearly wrong or manifestly unjust. Roberts v. State, 220 S.W.3d 521, 524 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Marshall v. State, 210 S.W.3d 618, 625 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Watson v. State, 204 S.W.3d 404, 414-15 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 134 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). In this review, we are to afford "due deference" to the jury's determinations. Marshall, 210 S.W.3d at 625.

When an accused is not in exclusive possession of the place where contraband is found, it cannot be concluded he or she had knowledge or control over the contraband unless there are additional independent facts and circumstances that link the accused to the contraband. Poindexter v. State, 153 S.W.3d 402 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). These "links" may be either direct or circumstantial and must establish, to the requisite level of confidence, that the accused's connection with the drug was more than just fortuitous.

The number of links present is not as important as the degree to which they tend to link the defendant to the controlled substance. Washington v. State, 215 S.W.3d 551, 555 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 2007, no pet.); Taylor v. State, 106 S.W.3d 827, 831 (Tex. App.--Dallas 2003, no pet.). There is no set formula that will dictate a conclusion that links exist sufficient to support an inference that a defendant knowingly possesses contraband. Id.; Porter v. State, 873 S.W.2d 729, 732 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1994, pet. ref'd).

However, a number of recognized factors include whether: (1) the contraband was in plain view or recovered from an enclosed place; (2) the accused was the owner of the premises or the place where the contraband was found; (3) the accused was found with a large amount of cash; (4) the contraband was conveniently accessible to the accused; (5) the contraband was found in close proximity to the accused; (6) a strong residual odor of the contraband was present; (7) the accused possessed other contraband when arrested; (8) paraphernalia to use the contraband was in view, or found on the accused; (9) the physical condition of the accused indicated recent consumption of the contraband in question; (10) conduct by the accused indicated a consciousness of guilt; (11) the accused attempted to flee; (12) the accused made furtive gestures; (13) the accused had a special connection to the contraband; (14) the occupants of the premises gave conflicting statements about relevant matters; (15) the accused made incriminating statements connecting himself or herself to the contraband; (16) the quantity of the contraband; and (17) the accused was observed in a suspicious area under suspicious circumstances. See Lassaint v. State, 79 S.W.3d 736, 740-41 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.); Kyte v. State, 944 S.W.2d 29, 31-32 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 1997, no pet.).

It is the logical force the factors have in establishing the elements of the offense, not the number of them, that is important. In other words, we ask if there is evidence of circumstances, in addition to mere presence, that adequately justifies the conclusion that the defendant knowingly possessed the substance. Evans v. State, 202 S.W.3d 158, 162 n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); see generally King v. State, 895 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995).

Coffelt argues that the evidence does not show he exercised care, custody, or control over the items and that the evidence showed strongly to the contrary: i.e., Harrington pled guilty to the crime himself, thus it would not be logical to likewise find Coffelt guilty of the same offense.

As is usual in a case of this nature, there is no direct evidence of possession by either of the occupants of the automobile--except for Harrington's current protestation that the bag and its contents belonged to him. At trial, Harrington told the jury that he had purchased the methamphetamine in Denison the day before and that everything in the Clinique bag belonged to him. The officer found the bag inside the truck, behind the driver's seat, on the floorboard. At the scene, Coffelt claimed that the bag was Harrington's. Harrington told the officers that it did not belong to him and that they had been headed to Denison, where Coffelt was planning to purchase a half-ounce of methamphetamine at a residence there. After being arrested, and while at the station, each of the parties attempted to convince officers to allow him to avoid prosecution by working as an informant. Officers declined both offers.

Reviewing the evidence by comparison with the suggested factors, we find it apparent that the contraband was recovered from an enclosed place in close proximity to the accused (relevant to factors 1 and 5). It appears that the vehicle belonged to Coffelt, and he was operating it at the time (relevant to factor 2). Coffelt raised the officer's suspicions because he stated he was headed for a restaurant (which was actually the other direction), and again because Harrington's version of their destination (as well as the ownership of the bag) was decidedly different from Coffelt's (relevant to factor 14). Harrington testifed Coffelt threw a set of scales out of the vehicle window before they were stopped (relevant to factors 7, 8, and 10). After the two were released on bond, Harrington testified they went back to the scene and found the scales Coffelt threw out the window, as well as a pipe Harrington had thrown away. Walker testified he observed objects bouncing off the pavement that had been thrown from the vehicle Coffelt was driving. Harrington acknowledged that Coffelt knew the drugs were in the bag, but emphasized that the drugs were his and that Coffelt would have had to pay him to get any of them. Walker also testified that, during the stop, Coffelt was very excited, talking very fast and in a high, excited voice--as compared to the way Coffelt had spoken on other occasions when they had conversed. Officer Walker also testified that he first saw the truck at the Ranch Motel, which he described as being located in a "high drug area" (relevant to factor 17).

Other factors do not apply to this case. There is no evidence of a large amount of cash in either party's possession, that any odor was involved, that Coffelt had recently used any of the contraband, that he attempted to flee, or that the quantity was enormous.

We also note that several of those factors apply not to ownership, but to knowledge that the item was contraband. There is evidence that Coffelt knew that the bag was in his vehicle and that it contained methamphetamine, thus that aspect of the proof has been directly met. (2) The remaining matter is whether the evidence provides sufficient linkages for the jury to conclude that Coffelt possessed the bag.

Coffelt points out he consented to the search of his vehicle, suggesting this indicates his innocence. However, there may be any number of other reasons for a person to consent to search--many of which obviously have nothing whatsoever to do with innocence. Many opinions may be found where consent to search was authorized even when the defendant knew drugs were in the vehicle. Coffelt relies heavily on Harrington's testimony that he owned the bag and the drugs. However, there are also other (and less altruistic) reasons why Harrington might take responsibility--including fear of retribution in jail, or an agreement with Coffelt. There was also testimony that both Harrington and Coffelt were drug users and drug dealers.

The testimony created issues of fact to be resolved at trial. It is elementary that conflicts in the evidence are to be resolved by the jury. In doing so, it may accept one version of facts and reject another or reject any of a witness' testimony. Penagraph v. State, 623 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1981). In so doing, it is the jury's job to judge the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony, and it may resolve or reconcile conflicts in the testimony, accepting or rejecting such portions thereof as it sees fit. Banks v. State, 510 S.W.2d 592 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).

In this case, the jury had two different theories of the case before it, and evidence which could support either. In such a situation, we may not second-guess the jury's determination. We find the evidence both legally and factually sufficient to support the verdict.

We affirm the judgment.

Jack Carter

Justice

 

Date Submitted: June 21, 2007

Date Decided: July 25, 2007

 

Do Not Publish

1. Two separate incidents were tried together in this proceeding. The other charge was based on another traffic stop made three months after the date of this offense--also for possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver. Coffelt pled guilty to that charge and was sentenced for commission of a state jail felony. That conviction is not a subject of this appeal.

2. The jury was not charged on any theory of criminal responsibility.