Desai Hospitality, L.L.C. v. Rajesh Patel, Amaret Patel, and Navnit Patel--Appeal from 102nd District Court of Bowie County

In The
Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
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No. 06-07-00032-CV
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DESAI HOSPITALITY, L.L.C., Appellant
V.
RAJESH PATEL, AMARAT PATEL, AND NAVNIT PATEL, Appellees
On Appeal from the 102nd Judicial District Court
Bowie County, Texas
Trial Court No. 07C0137-102
Before Morriss, C.J., Carter and Cornelius,* JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Cornelius

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*William J. Cornelius, Chief Justice, Retired, Sitting by Assignment

 
MEMORANDUM OPINION

Desai Hospitality, L.L.C., appeals from the trial court's denial of its petition for a temporary injunction. Because we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition for temporary injunction, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

Desai purchased a tract of land in New Boston from Mr. and Mrs. Harold K. Powell. Desai purchased the property for the purpose of building a hotel on it. As part of the terms of the purchase, the Powells agreed to place certain written negative restrictions on the use of other land they owned adjoining but separate from the parcel Desai purchased. Among the restrictions placed on the Powells' remaining and adjoining land was a provision that "No part of those lands described on Exhibit 'A' hereto shall be used for the construction and/or operation of any hotel, motel, or other overnight lodging facility." After Desai bought its land from the Powells, Rajesh, Amarat, and Navnit Patel bought a tract from B & C Enterprises that is adjacent to the tract Desai bought, and is not subject to the restrictions applicable to the Powells' land. The Patels then began construction of a hotel on that tract. The Patels also bought a separate strip of land from the Powells. That strip is subject to the restrictions previously placed on the Powells' land. The Patels began to construct a road on that strip. According to the evidence presented at the hearing on the temporary injunction, the road will provide access to the Patels' hotel tract, which is not subject to any restrictions, as well as access to another piece of land still owned by the Powells. The road also connects to the frontage road to Interstate Highway 30 and will be open for use by the general public.

Desai filed suit against the Patels for damages and for an injunction prohibiting them from using the road, claiming that the use of the road would violate the restriction against using the property for the construction or operation of a hotel or motel.

The trial court granted Desai a temporary restraining order. A hearing was later held on the request for a temporary injunction. After hearing evidence and argument of counsel, the trial court dissolved the temporary restraining order previously issued, denied Desai's request for a temporary injunction, and reserved the question of damages for future trial. No findings of fact or conclusions of law were filed. Desai has perfected an interlocutory appeal from the trial court's ruling on the petition for temporary injunction.

To obtain a temporary injunction, the applicant must plead and prove (1) a cause of action against the defendant; (2) a probable right to the relief sought; and (3) a probable, imminent, and irreparable injury if the injunction is not issued. Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex. 2002). The decision whether to grant a request for a temporary injunction is within the trial court's sound discretion. A reviewing court should reverse the trial court's decision only if the trial court abused that discretion. Walling v. Metcalfe, 863 S.W.2d 56, 58 (Tex. 1993). The reviewing court must not substitute its judgment for the trial court's judgment unless the trial court's action exceeded the bounds of reasonable discretion. Johnson v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 700 S.W.2d 916, 918 (Tex. 1985).

In construing a restrictive covenant, the court's primary task is to determine the intent of those who framed the covenants. Wilmoth v. Wilcox, 734 S.W.2d 656, 658 (Tex. 1987). A reviewing court should draw all legitimate inferences in favor of the trial court's judgment, Community State Bank v. New Investment, L.L.C., 38 S.W.3d 256, 258 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 2001, writ dism'd w.o.j.), and should affirm the judgment on any legal theory supported by the evidence. Lassiter v. Bliss, 559 S.W.2d 353, 358 (Tex. 1977), overruled on other grounds by Cherne Indus., Inc. v. Magaallanes, 763 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. 1989); Cmty. State Bank v. New Investment, 38 S.W.3d at 258.

We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plea for a temporary injunction. There is ample evidence from which the trial court could have reasonably concluded that the parties who framed the restrictive covenants did not intend for them to prohibit the construction or use of a general access road on the strip of land purchased by the Patels from the Powells, and that the construction and use of the road on that land would not constitute the "construction or operation" of a hotel or motel. The road is not a private, exclusive access road to the hotel, but will provide access, not only to the Patels' hotel tract, but also to the Powells' land and to the general public. Unlike the situation involved in Highlands Management Co. v. First Interstate Bank of Texas, N.A., 956 S.W.2d 749 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, writ denied), on which Desai relies, the road in question will not be a driveway or parking area for a hotel. Nor will the road involved here be an integral or indispensable part of the operation of the hotel, since there are other areas of access to the hotel tract. Additionally, there is testimony that Mr. Powell, who adopted the restrictions, told Rajesh Patel that he was free to build a road on the strip of land in question, but not a hotel or motel. Of course, there is conflicting testimony in some respects as to the intent and meaning of the restrictions, but the trial court in a temporary injunction hearing does not abuse its discretion when it bases its decision on conflicting evidence. Davis v. Huey, 571 S.W.2d 859 (Tex. 1978); Zmotony v. Phillips, 529 S.W.2d 760 (Tex. 1975).

The Patels argue that Desai failed to prove the existence and nature of the restrictive covenants because it never introduced the written instrument containing the restrictions in evidence at the hearing. However, it appears there was sufficient oral testimony about the wording and nature of the restrictions that, in the absence of a "best evidence" objection, adequately proved the restrictions. Assuming that the restrictions were adequately proven, there is sufficient evidence to support the trial court's conclusion that the Patels' acts in building and using the road in question here do not violate the restrictive covenants, and therefore Desai failed to prove it was probably entitled to the relief sought.

For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

 

William J. Cornelius

Justice*

 

*Chief Justice, Retired, Sitting by Assignment

 

Date Submitted: June 6, 2007

Date Decided: July 19, 2007