Terry Richard Quam v. The State of Texas--Appeal from 402nd Judicial District Court of Wood County

In The
Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
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No. 06-06-00250-CR
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TERRY RICHARD QUAM, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 402nd Judicial District Court
Wood County, Texas
Trial Court No. 15,749-98
Before Morriss, C.J., Carter and Moseley, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Morriss
MEMORANDUM OPINION

When he was twenty-three years old, Terry Richard Quam had sexual relations with a girl who was sixteen, resulting in the birth of a child. In 1999, in a proceeding arising from those events, Quam pled guilty to sexual assault of a child and was placed on deferred adjudication. On July 21, 2006, the State filed a "First Amended Motion to Proceed to Final Adjudication." Although the State had previously issued a capias warrant in connection with a prior motion to proceed to adjudication, the State did not issue one based on the amended motion. At the hearing on the motion to proceed to adjudication, Quam pled true to some allegations and untrue to others. The trial court found several allegations true, adjudicated Quam guilty, and sentenced Quam to ten years' confinement. In his sole issue on appeal, Quam argues the trial court lacked jurisdiction to revoke his deferred adjudication community supervision and to adjudicate him guilty, because the State failed to issue a second capias warrant, that is, one based on the amended motion to proceed to adjudication.

The Texas Legislature has expressly stated that a defendant may not appeal a trial court's decision to proceed to an adjudication of guilt. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12, 5(b) (Vernon 2006); Connolly v. State, 983 S.W.2d 738, 741 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); Cooper v. State, 2 S.W.3d 500, 502 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 1999, pet. ref'd). "With regard to deferred adjudication, the Legislature authorized appeal of only two types of orders: (1) an order granting deferred adjudication, and (2) an order imposing punishment pursuant to an adjudication of guilt." Davis v. State, 195 S.W.3d 708, 712 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). The Legislature's prohibition includes all complaints attaching to the trial court's decision to proceed to an adjudication of guilt, except for issues related to proceedings following the adjudication decision. See, e.g., id.; Fluellen v. State, 71 S.W.3d 870, 872 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 2002, pet. ref'd) (defendant whose guilt was adjudicated may appeal issues relating to sentencing).

Quam argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to proceed to adjudication. At one time, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals recognized a "void judgment" exception to prohibition of the deferred adjudication proceedings. See Nix v. State, 65 S.W.3d 664, 667-68 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). Now, that court recognizes no jurisdictional exception to the prohibition against appealing the determination to adjudicate guilt. Davis, 195 S.W.3d at 712. "To the extent that a 'void judgment' claim might be possible under Nix, it would be only as an attack on the original plea proceedings imposing deferred adjudication, not on a trial court's jurisdiction to adjudicate based upon subsequent events." Id. "A jurisdictional attack on the trial court's determination is still an attack on that determination, and it may not be advanced on appeal." Id. If an appeal raises a claim of purported error in the adjudication of guilt determination, a court of appeals should dismiss that claim without reaching the merits. Hogans v. State, 176 S.W.3d 829, 832 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Quam's sole point of error claims error in adjudicating his guilt. Thus, that claim must be dismissed.

 

We affirm the trial court's judgment.

 

Josh R. Morriss, III

Chief Justice

 

Date Submitted: May 29, 2007

Date Decided: May 30, 2007

 

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