David Wayne Rosson v. The State of Texas--Appeal from 102nd District Court of Red River County

In The
Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
______________________________
No. 06-06-00227-CR
______________________________
DAVID WAYNE ROSSON, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 102nd Judicial District Court
Red River County, Texas
Trial Court No. CR00882
Before Morriss, C.J., Carter and Moseley, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Carter
MEMORANDUM OPINION

David Wayne Rosson appeals from the order placing him on deferred adjudication for the offense of indecency with a child. We dismiss Rosson's appeal for want of jurisdiction.

The trial court filed a certification, in accordance with Rule 25.2(a)(2), that Rosson "waived the right of appeal." Rule 25.2(a)(2) states, in pertinent part:

(2) . . . A defendant in a criminal case has the right of appeal under Code of Criminal Procedure article 44.02 and these rules. The trial court shall enter a certification of the defendant's right of appeal in every case in which it enters a judgment of guilt or other appealable order.

Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2). If a certification showing that the defendant has the right of appeal is not made a part of the appellate record, we must dismiss the case unless the record affirmatively indicates that an appellant may have the right of appeal. Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(d); see Greenwell v. Court of Appeals for Thirteenth Judicial Dist., 159 S.W.3d 645, 649 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Dears v. State, 154 S.W.3d 610, 612 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). We have examined the clerk's record to determine whether the trial court's certification is defective. See Dears, 154 S.W.3d at 613. Nothing in the record indicates the certification is defective. This Court lacks jurisdiction over this appeal. (1)

 

We dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

 

Jack Carter

Justice

 

Date Submitted: January 29, 2007

Date Decided: January 30, 2007

 

Do Not Publish

1. The negotiated plea agreement in this case demonstrates that Rosson's waiver of appeal was done knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. See Ex parte Delaney, 207 S.W.3d 794 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) ("One way to indicate that the waiver was knowing and intelligent is for the actual punishment or maximum punishment to have been determined by a plea agreement when the waiver was made.").