Lafayette Dason Richardson v. The State of Texas--Appeal from 194th District Court of Dallas County

In The

Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

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No. 06-05-00256-CR

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LAFAYETTE DESON RICHARDSON, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 194th Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court No. F-0457001-PM

Before Morriss, C.J., Ross and Carter, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Carter

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Lafayette Deson Richardson was charged with aggravated robbery. A jury found him guilty of the lesser-included offense of robbery. Richardson pled true to one enhancement paragraph in the indictment, raising the punishment to a first-degree level. The trial court assessed punishment at thirty-five years' confinement. Richardson appeals alleging he was denied due process of law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution because the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to uphold the guilty verdict. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Background Facts

The complainant, Eunhui Kim, // operates the Hi Ho grocery store in Dallas. // On October 7, 2004, Kim observed Richardson steal some merchandise and told him to leave and not return, but she did not call the police. The next day, Kim and her brother, David Kim, were at the store when Richardson returned, shouting, "[W]here is that woman?" Richardson began throwing bottles of shampoo at David. At that time, Kim picked up a metal rod used to reach T-shirts and told Richardson to leave, but instead Richardson took the rod away from her. Richardson then struck Kim on the shoulder and knee with the rod. Kim grabbed the rod to prevent Richardson from striking her in the head. Richardson held Kim by the hair and dragged her outside the store. After Kim escaped and ran back in the store, Richardson followed and forced the door open, even though David and his wife were attempting to hold the door shut. Richardson then picked up the cash register and carried it outside. Officer William Langston was responding to another call and was passing in front of the Hi Ho store when he was flagged down and told about the incident. Langston requested assistance and then saw a person running out of the store, holding a cash register. Langston observed the man throw the cash register on the ground about three times in an attempt to open it. Langston then drew his weapon and ordered Richardson to the ground, and he complied. Richardson was arrested, placed in handcuffs, and put in Officer Donald Robb's vehicle. After Robb read Richardson his Miranda // rights, Richardson said, "[Y]eah, I robbed the bitch, take me to jail." Later, Richardson volunteered that "he had been on the streets for eight months with no money and he didn't realize it was that easy to steal a cash register."

Standards of Review

In our review of the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we employ the standards set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). We are to view the relevant evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). We must evaluate all of the evidence in the record, both direct and circumstantial, whether admissible or inadmissible. Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).

In a factual sufficiency review, the appellate court views all the evidence in a neutral light and determines whether the evidence supporting the verdict is too weak to support the finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, or if evidence contrary to the verdict is strong enough that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard could not have been met. Threadgill v. State, 146 S.W.3d 654, 664 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (citing Zuniga v. State, 144 S.W.3d 477, 486 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)).

Analysis

The offense of robbery is committed if, in the course of committing theft, and with intent to obtain or maintain control of property, a person: (1) intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another; or (2) intentionally or knowingly threatens or places another in fear of imminent bodily injury or death. Tex. Pen. Code Ann. 29.02 (Vernon 2003).

Here, Richardson argues that the evidence does not support a finding of robbery, and at most, supports a finding that two separate offenses occurred: assault, and the theft of the cash register and its contents. This is so, according to Richardson, because the bodily injury to Kim did not occur in the course of committing theft. Instead, Richardson urges that the initial assault of Kim arose from animosity toward her, rather than as a means to commit the offense of theft. Further, it is reasoned that Richardson formed the intent to commit theft only after he went back into the store after the assault was completed.

The offense of robbery is not shown when the evidence only shows the defendant both assaulted and stole from the same victim. To commit robbery, there must be some nexus between the two offenses showing that the assault occurred "[i]n the course of committing theft." The phrase "[i]n the course of committing theft" refers to conduct that occurs during an attempt to commit theft, during the commission of a theft, or in immediate flight after a theft or an attempted theft. Tex. Pen. Code Ann. 29.01(1) (Vernon 2003). The connection between the assault and the theft may in many instances be inferred when both offenses occur in close temporal proximity. Cooper v. State, 67 S.W.3d 221, 224 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Richardson recognizes the general rule as stated in Cooper that a theft occurring immediately after an assault will support an inference that the assault was intended to facilitate the theft. Id. Richardson points out that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals left open the question as to whether and under what circumstances evidence of a motive other than theft negates the natural inference that arises when a theft immediately follows an assault. Richardson argues that, in this case, the initial assault of Kim arose from animosity toward her, rather than from a larcenous intent. Apparently, this argument is based on the statement, "[W]here is that woman?" uttered by Richardson when he entered the store. Cooper further explains that evidence of an alternative motive (for the assault) that may be rationally disregarded does not negate the natural inference that a theft occurring immediately after an assault shows an intention to facilitate the theft. Id. In Cooper, the defendant assaulted the victim and then stole his truck. Cooper testified the assault occurred because he heard voices and thought the victim was hitting a child. Cooper took the truck because, "I didn't know what I was doing. I just ran and jumped in the truck and just took off." Id. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that a jury could have rationally disbelieved that testimony and therefore, the evidence supported an inference that the assault was committed in the course of the commission of the theft. Id.

In this case, the assault occurred when Kim attempted to use a metal rod when confronted by Richardson. Richardson took the rod from her and used it in assaulting her. Kim continued to attempt to hold the rod and was dragged outside by Richardson. After she escaped, Richardson immediately went back inside the store and took the cash register, even though David and his wife were attempting to keep him from re-entering. After his arrest, Richardson told the police officer, "[Y]eah, I robbed the bitch, take me to jail," and "[I've] been on the streets for eight months with no money and [I] didn't realize it was that easy to steal a cash register." This evidence supports the conclusion that Richardson's objective for entering the store was to commit theft. Intent to steal may be inferred from the actions or conduct of Richardson. See McGee v. State, 774 S.W.2d 229, 234 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989); Birl v. State, 763 S.W.2d 860, 863 (Tex. App. Texarkana 1988, no pet.). There is no direct evidence that Richardson assaulted Kim for some reason unrelated to the theft. The jury could have rationally refused to deduce that his statement, "[W]here is that woman?" showed that Richardson intended only to assault Kim because of personal animosity toward her. The jury could have rationally concluded from the evidence that Richardson's assault of Kim was intended to facilitate the theft and therefore occurred in the course of committing theft.

We find the evidence to be both legally and factually sufficient. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Jack Carter

Justice

Date Submitted: July 13, 2006

Date Decided: August 9, 2006

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