Tommy Ray Young v. The State of Texas--Appeal from 402nd Judicial District Court of Wood County

In The

Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

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No. 06-05-00193-CR

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TOMMY RAY YOUNG, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 402nd Judicial District Court

Wood County, Texas

Trial Court No. 18,587-2004

Before Morriss, C.J., Ross and Carter, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Morriss

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Tommy Ray Young appeals from his conviction by the trial court for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. Young's punishment was enhanced as a habitual offender. The trial court sentenced Young to thirty-five years' imprisonment. We dismiss Young's appeal for want of jurisdiction.

The trial court filed a certification, in accordance with Rule 25.2(a)(2), that this case "[i]s a plea-bargain case, and the Defendant has NO right of appeal." Rule 25.2(a)(2) states, in pertinent part:

(2) . . . A defendant in a criminal case has the right of appeal under Code of Criminal Procedure article 44.02 and these rules. The trial court shall enter a certification of the defendant's right of appeal in every case in which it enters a judgment of guilt or other appealable order.

Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2). If a certification showing that the defendant has the right to appeal is not made a part of the appellate record, we must dismiss the case unless the record affirmatively indicates that an appellant may have the right to appeal. Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(d); see Greenwell v. Court of Appeals for Thirteenth Judicial Dist., 159 S.W.3d 645, 649 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Dears v. State, 154 S.W.3d 610, 612 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). We have examined the clerk's record to determine whether the trial court's certification is defective. See Dears, 154 S.W.3d at 613. Nothing in the record indicates the certification is defective. This Court lacks jurisdiction over this appeal.

On December 28, 2005, we informed Young, by letter, of this apparent defect in our jurisdiction and informed him that, if he did not show us how we have jurisdiction, within ten days of the letter, his appeal would be subject to dismissal for want of jurisdiction. Young has now requested an extension of thirty days to file a response to our letter. The motion for extension contains no explanation of the need for an extension. We overrule Young's motion for extension.

We dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

Josh R. Morriss, III

Chief Justice

Date Submitted: January 11, 2006

Date Decided: January 12, 2006

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