State of Texas v. Cody Dale Lawler--Appeal from County Court of Lamar County

In The

Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

______________________________

No. 06-05-00099-CR

______________________________

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellant

V.

CODY DALE LAWLER, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Court

Lamar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 48105

Before Morriss, C.J., Ross and Carter, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Morriss

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The trial court granted Cody Dale Lawler's motion to suppress the evidence obtained from Texas Department of Public Safety Trooper Thomas Anderson's traffic stop of Lawler October 9, 2004. The State intended to use that evidence to prosecute Lawler for misdemeanor driving while intoxicated with an open alcoholic beverage container. On appeal, in what is effectively a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the State argues the trial court erred in suppressing the evidence because Anderson had reasonable suspicion for the stop. We affirm.

Under the Fourth Amendment, a temporary detention is justified when the detaining officer has specific articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, lead the officer to conclude that the person detained is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968). These facts must amount to more than a mere hunch or suspicion. Davis v. State, 947 S.W.2d 240, 244 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).

The factual basis for stopping a vehicle need not arise from the officer's personal observation, but may be supplied by information acquired from another person. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147, 32 L. Ed. 2d 612, 92 S. Ct. 1921 (1972). For example, in Armendariz v. State, we held that a stop based on facts observed by an undercover officer and transmitted by radio to a deputy sheriff did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 123 S.W.3d 401, 404 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 974 (2004).

Brother v. State, 166 S.W.3d 255, 257 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).

At the hearing on Lawler's motion to suppress, the trial court heard testimony from Anderson. Anderson first recounted the radio report from Deputy Donald Parks that Parks suspected Lawler was intoxicated because as Lawler drove his vehicle it wove from lane to lane and was traveling very slowly. Then Anderson recounted his personal observations that Lawler's vehicle was traveling very slowly, was "weaving within" its lane of traffic, and committed approximately one quarter of his vehicle into the adjoining lane before signaling that lane change. The in-car videotape taken from Anderson's car, while he briefly followed Lawler's car, was admitted into evidence and viewed repeatedly by the trial court. After finding from the bench that Lawler had signaled his lane change before his vehicle actually began crossing the line between the lanes and stating the court's inability to see any weaving by Lawler's vehicle, the trial court suppressed the evidence obtained from the stop.

In reviewing a motion to suppress, we give great deference to the trial court's findings of historical facts. Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). We review de novo mixed questions of law and fact that do not turn on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Id. And we will sustain the trial court's ruling if the ruling is reasonably supported by the record and correct on any theory of law applicable to the case. Willover v. State, 70 S.W.3d 841, 845 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).

The ruling of the trial court is reasonably supported by the record. We affirm the judgment.

Josh R. Morriss, III

Chief Justice

Date Submitted: October 28, 2005

Date Decided: October 31, 2005

Do Not Publish