Cedric A. Harris v. The State of Texas--Appeal from 188th District Court of Gregg County

In The
Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
______________________________
No. 06-02-00224-CR
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CEDRIC A. HARRIS, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 188th Judicial District Court
Gregg County, Texas
Trial Court No. 26698-A
Before Morriss, C.J., Carter, and Cornelius,* JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Cornelius
*William J. Cornelius, C.J., Retired, Sitting by Assignment
MEMORANDUM OPINION

Cedric A. Harris appeals from a trial court order revoking his community supervision and sentencing him to five years' confinement. Harris raises only one issue on appeal: he contends that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his community supervision. Harris raises under this general issue two contentions, (1) that the trial court should have used alternative sanctions rather than revocation, and (2) that the trial court should have conducted an inquiry into Harris' competency to stand trial. We overrule these contentions and affirm the judgment.

The State alleged that Harris violated seven of the conditions of his community supervision. The court, after hearing testimony, found that Harris committed four violations of the terms of his community supervision by (1) knowingly fleeing from a peace officer who was lawfully attempting to detain him; (2) knowingly damaging tangible personal property without the consent of the owner, causing pecuniary loss of between $50.00 and $1,500.00; (3) failing to notify his community supervision officer of his change of address; and (4) failing to complete community service in the amount and within the time required by the conditions of his community supervision.

The evidence that Harris committed these violations is overwhelming and virtually undisputed, but Harris contends that the trial court's discretion would have been better exercised if the court had modified or amended the conditions of community supervision. However, a trial court does not abuse its discretion in revoking community supervision if the State proves that the person on community supervision violated one or more of the conditions of his supervision. Sanchez v. State, 603 S.W.2d 869, 871 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980). Moreover, there is no evidence that reasonable, effective alternative measures were available.

Harris also contends that the trial court should have conducted an inquiry to determine if he was competent to stand trial on the revocation application. A trial court must initiate an inquiry to determine competency only if there is evidence sufficient to create a bona fide doubt in the judge's mind as to the defendant's competency to stand trial. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46.02, 2(a), (b) (Vernon 1979); Alcott v. State, 51 S.W.3d 596, 601 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001); Reeves v. State, 46 S.W.3d 397, 399 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2001, pet. dism'd).

Harris suggests that he is "mentally challenged," but there is no clear, direct evidence that he is mentally ill or retarded. Harris relies on facts that he took some special education courses in secondary school and that, while attending Kilgore College, he took regular "low level" courses, as circumstantial evidence that he is retarded. Harris' community supervision officer testified, however, that there was nothing in her files and she never had any information indicating that Harris was even mildly retarded.

On the other hand, evidence showed without dispute that Harris graduated from high school and attended Kilgore College. His mother testified that he maintained a "C" average in high school. He has held numerous jobs, he has played football, he drives a car, and he is able to perform the ordinary tasks that average persons perform. His mother did testify at one point that Harris "has a problem with understanding things," and on questioning from Harris' defense counsel as to whether he is mentally retarded, she answered, "Yes, sir. He has some complications."

To be incompetent to stand trial, a person must lack sufficient ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding, or to have a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46.02, 1A(a)(1), (2) (Vernon Supp. 2003). We find there is not sufficient evidence in this record to raise a bona fide doubt as to Harris' competency, so the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to conduct an inquiry into his competency.

For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment.

 

William J. Cornelius*

Justice

 

*Chief Justice, Retired, Sitting by Assignment

 

Date Submitted: March 19, 2003

Date Decided: June 12, 2003

 

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