James Herbert LeBlanc, III. v. The State of Texas--Appeal from County Court at Law No 2 of Jefferson County

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In The
Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
______________________________
No. 06-00-00113-CR
______________________________
JAMES HERBERT LEBLANC, III, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2
Jefferson County, Texas
Trial Court No. 205,756
Before Cornelius, C.J., Grant and Ross, JJ.
Opinion by Justice Grant
O P I N I O N

James Herbert LeBlanc, III was tried for criminal trespass in the County Court at Law Number 2, Jefferson County, on February 25, 2000. The-six member jury found him guilty. Punishment was assessed by the trial court at ninety days in the county jail and a fine of $200. LeBlanc filed his pro se Notice of Appeal and brief, requesting reversal of the trial court's decision based on allegations of false arrest, false imprisonment, and jury tampering. Because these issues were not presented to the court below, and because they cannot be properly raised for the first time on direct appeal, we overrule all of LeBlanc's points of error.

This case arises out of repeated reports of disturbances at the Beaumont Coca-Cola plant where LeBlanc had been employed. LeBlanc was placed on short-term disability leave in January 1998 to seek treatment for depression, schizophrenia, and other nonspecific medical problems. Though warned not to enter Coca-Cola property while on leave, he continued to return to plant property, and on at least one occasion threatened a manager. Coca-Cola eventually hired extra security to help deal with him. On April 9, 1998, LeBlanc went to Coca-Cola to file work release papers from some of his doctors. Beaumont police issued an oral trespass warning to LeBlanc for unauthorized presence on Coca-Cola property. LeBlanc testified he was only told to leave the premises and not return unannounced. Two police officers were present with LeBlanc when the warning was written. One of the officers testified LeBlanc was told the meaning and effect of the warning. LeBlanc was further informed criminal charges would be filed against him if he entered Coca-Cola property again. The officer testified LeBlanc seemed to understand the conversation. A written copy of the warning was given to Coca-Cola, but not to LeBlanc. (1) LeBlanc received adequate warning under the law. Oral communication by someone with apparent authority to act on behalf of the property owner constitutes sufficient notice. Tex. Pen. Code Ann. 30.05(b)(2)(A) (Vernon Supp. 2002).

LeBlanc received medical clearance to return to work on May 3, 1998. On May 4 when he attempted to return to work, LeBlanc was arrested on the Coca-Cola premises and charged with criminal trespass. LeBlanc's employment with Coca-Cola was not terminated until May 6, 1998, two days after he was arrested. The termination letter explained that LeBlanc was not to come back onto the Coca-Cola premises.

LeBlanc was charged by information with misdemeanor criminal trespass. On February 23, 2000, after a one-day trial, a jury found him guilty. The court assessed punishment at ninety days in the Jefferson County jail, plus a $200 fine. LeBlanc timely filed his pro se Notice of Appeal. Although no motion to withdraw was filed by trial counsel, the trial court appointed appellate counsel in the interest of justice on September 7, 2000. Urging that LeBlanc had failed to cooperate in any way with the attempt to represent him on appeal, counsel filed a Motion to Withdraw. This motion was granted on May 25, 2001. The trial court found LeBlanc was not indigent and ruled he could continue the appeal on his own if he wished. LeBlanc continued his appeal pro se.

LeBlanc now complains that he was falsely arrested and falsely imprisoned and that he was deprived of a fair trial due to jury tampering. LeBlanc's pro se brief presents unsupported allegations of misconduct on the part of the police, the trial court, and his own lawyer, as well as an account of the events on which the trial was based from his perspective. LeBlanc's brief sets forth nothing in the way of argument or authorities. There is no reference made to the evidence in the trial record.

Because none of the issues now raised by LeBlanc were presented to the trial court, his points of error have not been preserved for appellate review. The general requirement for preservation of error is that the aggrieved party must first present his complaint to the trial court for a ruling. The Rules of Appellate Procedure provide that

(a) In General. As a prerequisite to presenting a complaint for appellate review, the record must show that

 

(1) the complaint was made to the trial court by a timely request, objection, or motion that:

 

(A) stated the grounds for the ruling that the complaining party sought from the trial court with sufficient specificity to make the trial court aware of the complaint, unless the specific grounds were apparent from the context; and

 

(B) complied with the requirements of the Texas Rules of Civil or Criminal Evidence or the Texas Rules of Civil or Appellate Procedure; and

 

(2) the trial court:

 

(A) ruled on the request, objection, or motion, either expressly or implicitly; or

 

(B) refused to rule on the request, objection, or motion, and the complaining party objected to the refusal.

 

Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a).

We note further that consideration of LeBlanc's arguments would not be possible on the record before the court. All of his points of error are predicated on evidence extrinsic to the record of the proceedings below and are therefore not fully cognizable on this direct appeal. For this reason, we decline to comment on the merits of his arguments. Rather, we simply note that on the record before the court, LeBlanc has failed to meet his burden of showing error in the proceedings below.

LeBlanc's points of error are overruled. The judgment of the trial court is hereby affirmed.

 

Ben Z. Grant

Justice

 

Date Submitted: October 11, 2001

Date Decided: February 6, 2002

 

Do Not Publish

1. According to the testimony, Beaumont Police Department procedure in use at the time involved giving a oral warning to the trespasser, providing a written copy to the property owner, and retaining a copy in the police files.

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