Marcus Wayne Springer v. The State of Texas--Appeal from 396th District Court of Tarrant County

COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NOS. 2-06-205-CR

  2-06-206-CR

MARCUS WAYNE SPRINGER APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

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FROM THE 396TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY

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MEMORANDUM OPINION[1]

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Appellant Marcus Wayne Springer entered open pleas of guilty to indecency with a child in two cases and pleaded Atrue@ to a repeat-offender enhancement allegation recited in both indictments. The trial court convicted Appellant and sentenced him to twenty-five years= confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) for each offense, with the sentences to run concurrently.

In each case, Appellant=s court appointed appellate counsel has filed a motion to withdraw as counsel and a brief in support of that motion. In his brief, counsel has reviewed the history of the case, including detailing the evidence presented. Counsel=s brief and motion meet the requirements of Anders v. California[2] by presenting a professional evaluation of the record demonstrating why there are no reversible grounds on appeal and referencing any grounds that might arguably support the appeal.[3] Although this court gave Appellant the opportunity to file a pro se brief, he did not file one.

In our duties as a reviewing court, we must conduct an independent evaluation of the record to determine whether counsel is correct in determining that the appeal is frivolous.[4] Only then may we grant counsel=s motion to withdraw.[5] Because Appellant entered an open plea of guilty, our independent review for potential error is limited to potential jurisdictional defects, the voluntariness of Appellant=s plea, error that is not independent of and supports the judgment of guilt, and error occurring after entry of the guilty plea.[6] We have carefully reviewed the record and counsel=s brief. We agree with counsel that these appeals are wholly frivolous and without merit. We find nothing in the record that might arguably support the appeals.[7]

Consequently, we grant the motion to withdraw in each case and affirm the trial court=s judgments.

PER CURIAM

PANEL F: GARDNER, DAUPHINOT, and HOLMAN, JJ.

DO NOT PUBLISH

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

DELIVERED: August 31, 2007

[1]See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.

[2]386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396 (1967).

[3]See Mays v. State, 904 S.W.2d 920, 922 23 (Tex. App.CFort Worth 1995, no pet.).

[4]See Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Mays, 904 S.W.2d at 923.

[5]See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 84, 109 S. Ct. 346, 351 (1988).

[6]See Monreal v. State, 99 S.W.3d 615, 620 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); Young v. State, 8 S.W.3d 656, 666-67 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).

[7]See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).