In Re Commitment of Ricardo Diaz Appeal from 435th District Court of Montgomery County (memorandum opinion)
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In The Court of Appeals Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont ____________________ NO. 09-17-00294-CV ____________________ IN RE COMMITMENT OF RICARDO DIAZ _______________________________________________________ ______________ On Appeal from the 435th District Court Montgomery County, Texas Trial Cause No. 07-09-08955-CV ________________________________________________________ _____________ MEMORANDUM OPINION Ricardo Diaz was determined to be a sexually violent predator and committed for sex offender treatment. See In re Commitment of Diaz, No. 09-08-00303-CV, 2009 WL 2749958, at *1 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Aug. 31, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.). On July 13, 2017, the trial court signed an order denying Diaz’s motion for change of venue. Diaz filed a notice of appeal. We questioned our jurisdiction and the parties filed responses. 1 Generally, appeals may be taken only from final judgments. Lehmann v. HarCon Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). Diaz argues the order denying his motion for a change of venue disposed of all pending claims and parties. In a civil commitment case, however, the trial court retains jurisdiction while the commitment order remains in effect. See In re Commitment of Cortez, 405 S.W.3d 929, 932 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2013, no pet.). Diaz has not identified a signed order by the trial court that is appealable at this time.1 In response to this Court’s suggestion that the appeal is frivolous, Diaz argues that the appeal is not frivolous because he faces subsequent hearings that will be conducted in Montgomery County and individual venire members’ previous jury service in civil commitment proceedings might taint the potential jury pool. In this response, Diaz reveals that his response to this Court’s inquiry regarding jurisdiction, which claimed the venue ruling was the final ruling in the case, was less than forthcoming regarding the true status of the litigation. We conclude that the appeal is frivolous. See Tex. R. App. P. 45. In the event Diaz files a frivolous appeal with this Court in the future, the Court will consider imposing sanctions. See id. 1 Diaz requests that we consider his response as a mandamus petition, but neither the form nor the substance of the response presents a valid basis for granting mandamus relief. See generally Tex. R. App. P. 52. Accordingly, the request is denied. 2 The appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a); 43.2(f). APPEAL DISMISSED. ________________________________ LEANNE JOHNSON Justice Submitted on August 30, 2017 Opinion Delivered August 31, 2017 Before McKeithen, C.J., Kreger and Johnson, JJ. 3
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