Richard Adams v. Tammie Elizabeth Adams--Appeal from 359th District Court of Montgomery County
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In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
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NO. 09-10-00531-CV
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RICHARD ADAMS, Appellant
V.
TAMMIE ELIZABETH ADAMS, Appellee
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On Appeal from the 359th District Court
Montgomery County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 09-11-11433 CV
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Richard Adams appeals a money judgment in favor of Tammie Elizabeth Adams
in a divorce decree. Tammie filed a petition for divorce alleging the marriage had become
insupportable and Richard had engaged in cruel treatment. After a bench trial, the trial
court signed a decree of divorce dividing the marital property.
Richard was awarded the house, and other property was divided. The property
division included a money judgment against Richard in favor of Tammie. Richard was
awarded 50% of his retirement account as of the date of divorce. Tammie’s community
share of the residence was awarded to her as $40,000 of the monetary judgment; that
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portion of the monetary judgment is not contested. An additional $20,000 award
recognized Tammie’s loss of employment due to Richard’s wrongful conduct. Richard
argues the trial court abused its discretion in awarding Tammie $20,000. He maintains
there is insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding of cruelty.
The Texas Family Code provides that a trial court “shall order a division of the
estate of the parties in a manner that the court deems just and right, having due regard for
the rights of each party . . . .” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 7.001 (West 2006). A divorce court
has some latitude in the exercise of its discretion to divide the marital estate. See
generally Williams v. Williams, 160 Tex. 99, 325 S.W.2d 682, 684 (1959). Absent an
abuse of discretion, the court’s division of a marital estate will not be disturbed on
appeal. See Schlueter v. Schlueter, 975 S.W.2d 584, 588-90 (Tex. 1998); Murff v. Murff,
615 S.W.2d 696, 698 (Tex. 1981); see also Loaiza v. Loaiza, 130 S.W.3d 894, 900 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2004, no pet.) (sufficiency review under abuse of discretion standard).
The division of the marital estate need not be equal. Murff, 615 S.W.2d at 698-99
& n.1. A disproportionate division must have a reasonable basis. Smith v. Smith, 143
S.W.3d 206, 214 (Tex. App.—Waco 2004, no pet.). Fault is one of many factors that a
trial court may consider in making a division of the community estate. See Schlueter, 975
S.W.2d at 589; Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619, 625 (Tex. 1993); Murff, 615
S.W.2d at 698-99; Young v. Young, 609 S.W.2d 758, 761-62 (Tex. 1980). The trial court
may award a money judgment to one spouse to accomplish a just and right division. See
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Hanson v. Hanson, 672 S.W.2d 274, 278-79 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ
dism’d). The money judgment must be directly related to the division of the community
property. Price v. Price, 591 S.W.2d 601, 603 (Tex. Civ. App.—Tyler 1979, no writ).
Tammie testified she had been employed at a bank for twenty-six years. A few
months before Tammie filed for divorce, Richard gave her permission to withdraw fifty
dollars from his sole proprietorship account containing community property funds.
Richard was the only signatory on the account, but she signed for the withdrawal.
Richard then reported the withdrawal to the bank, and the bank investigated the matter.
The bank gave Tammie the option of resigning or having the action reviewed by the
bank’s regional office as a violation of the code of ethics. At the time she resigned, her
annual salary was $42,000. Richard did not question Tammie at trial regarding the bank
transaction, and he offered no contrary testimony disputing Tammie’s explanation of the
events that led to her resignation.
The trial court found that Richard’s actions resulting in Tammie’s “loss of income
from a long term employment relationship were an act of cruelty which caused her
financial hardship.” The trial court stated that many factors were considered, including
fault in the breakup of the marriage and the financial loss suffered by one of the parties
caused by the actions of the other party. The trial court found that it could, in order to
accomplish a just and right division of the community estate, award a money judgment.
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As the trier of fact, the trial judge determined the credibility of the witnesses and
the weight to be given their testimony. Burtch v. Burtch, 972 S.W.2d 882, 888 (Tex.
App.—Austin 1998, no pet.) The trial judge obviously believed Tammie’s testimony that
Richard authorized the withdrawal and then reported the withdrawal to her employer as
unauthorized. The trial court could reasonably find Richard intentionally caused
Tammie’s difficulty with her employer.
In considering a spouse’s unjust conduct, the court may consider the relative
financial costs to the parties. See Murff, 615 S.W.2d at 698-99. “The circumstances of
each marriage dictate what factors should be considered in the property division upon
divorce.” Young, 609 S.W.2d at 761. On the record presented, we cannot say that the trial
court’s division of the community estate was unjust or wrong, or that error requires a
reversal of the judgment for a new property division. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.1(a). The
evidence sufficiently supports the trial court’s findings. Issues one and two are overruled.
The judgment is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
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DAVID GAULTNEY
Justice
Submitted on September 15, 2011
Opinion Delivered September 29, 2011
Before McKeithen, C.J., Gaultney and Horton, JJ.
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