In Re: The Commitment of Paul Vincent Keen, Jr.--Appeal from 284th District Court of Montgomery County

In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
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NO. 09-02-366 CV
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IN RE THE COMMITMENT OF PAUL VINCENT KEEN, JR.

On Appeal from the 284th District Court
Montgomery County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 01-11-07041-CV
MEMORANDUM OPINION

The State filed a petition seeking to involuntarily civilly commit appellant Paul Vincent Keen, Jr. as a sexually violent predator. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. 841.001-841.147 (Vernon 2003). Keen had three prior sexually violent offenses that qualified him for consideration under the statute. There is evidence in the record that Keen admitted he had molested approximately 100 male children who were in their early teens. The State's expert testified that Keen is a pedophile who is "very dangerous" and is likely to reoffend, because he "can't control himself." A jury found Keen suffers from a behavioral abnormality that makes him likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence. He raises four issues on appeal.

Keen first argues Chapter 841 is unconstitutional because it is punitive in nature. He relies on the factors set forth in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69, 83 S. Ct. 554, 9 L. Ed. 2d 644 (1963). We have considered and rejected similar complaints before. See In re Commitment of Martinez, 98 S.W.3d 373 (Tex. App.-- Beaumont 2003, pet. filed); Beasley v. Molett, 95 S.W.3d 590, 607-08 (Tex. App.--Beaumont 2002, pet. filed); In re Commitment of Mullens, 92 S.W.3d 881, 883-84 (Tex. App.-- Beaumont 2002, pet. filed). Issue one is overruled.

In issue two, Keen contends his due process rights were violated when the trial court refused his proposed jury question on the issue of volitional control. We have recently considered and rejected a similar jury submission argument in In re Commitment of Almaguer, No. 09-02-172-CV, Slip op. at ______, 2003 WL ______ (Tex. App.--Beaumont Sept. 25, 2003, no pet. h.). As in Almaguer, the court's submission in Keen encompasses the appropriate standard. See id.; see also Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 413, 122 S. Ct. 867, 151 L. Ed. 2d 856 (2002). Issue two is overruled.

In issue three, Keen contends Chapter 841 is unconstitutionally vague and violates the separation of powers doctrine because of subparts (a)(1), (2), (4),(5),and (9) of section 841.082. He argues these sections give the trial judge unfettered discretion in imposing terms and conditions of civil commitment. Subpart 4 is unconstitutionally vague, he says, because it requires the person's participation in a "specific course of treatment" without specifying the treatment. He argues subpart 5 is vague, because it requires the person to "submit to tracking under a particular type of tracking service and to any other appropriate supervision" without specifying what places the person cannot go, what conduct is expected of him, and the meaning of "any other appropriate supervision." Finally, he asserts subpart 9 is vague and violates the separation of powers doctrine, because it allows the trial judge to impose any requirement determined necessary. We have considered similar arguments in prior cases and rejected them. In re Commitment of Morales, 98 S.W.3d 288 (Tex. App.--Beaumont 2003, pet. filed); Beasley, 95 S.W.3d at 608-609;Mullens, 92 S.W.3d at 887-888. We overrule issue three.

Keen also asserts section 841.085 and the final judgment violate the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, because the commitment order requires Keen to submit to periodic polygraph examinations. We rejected this argument in Mullens. See 92 S.W.3d at 888. We overrule issue four.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

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DAVID B. GAULTNEY

Justice

Submitted on August 18, 2003

Opinion Delivered October 2, 2003

 

Before McKeithen, C.J., Burgess and Gaultney, JJ.