Rhiny Larne Phillips v. The State of Texas--Appeal from 187th Judicial District Court of Bexar County

MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-06-00849-CR
Rhiny Larne PHILLIPS,
Appellant
v.
The STATE of Texas,
Appellee
From the 187th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2005-CR-8007
Honorable Raymond Angelini, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Alma L. L pez, Chief Justice

 

Sitting: Alma L. L pez, Chief Justice

Sandee Bryan Marion, Justice

Phylis J. Speedlin, Justice

 

Delivered and Filed: October 10, 2007

 

AFFIRMED

Rhiny Larne Phillips appeals his conviction for attempted capital murder of a police officer. Phillips waived a jury trial and entered a no-contest plea. The trial court found Phillips guilty of the charged offense and sentenced him to fifty years in prison. Phillips filed a motion for new trial, which was denied by the trial court. On appeal, Phillips contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for new trial because his no-contest plea was involuntary. We affirm the trial court's judgment.

Standard of Review We review a trial court's denial of a motion for new trial under an abuse of discretion standard. Holden v. State, 201 S.W.3d 761, 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). We do not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court; rather, we decide whether the trial court's decision was arbitrary or unreasonable. Id. A trial court abuses its discretion in denying a motion for new trial only when no reasonable review of the record could support the trial court's ruling. Id.

Analysis

Phillips argues that his plea was involuntary because his trial attorney coerced him into entering the plea. A plea of nolo contendere must be made freely and voluntarily. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.13(b) (Vernon Supp. 2007). Proper admonishments by the trial court create a prima facie showing that a plea of nolo contendere was entered knowingly and voluntarily. Martinez v. State, 981 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998); McGill v. State, 200 S.W.3d 325, 333 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.). When the record reflects that the defendant was duly admonished, the defendant has the burden to demonstrate that he did not fully understand the consequences of his plea and was harmed as a result. Martinez, 981 S.W.2d at 197; McGill, 200 S.W.3d at 333. In considering the voluntariness of a nolo contendere plea, we must examine the record as a whole. Martinez, 981 S.W.2d at 197.

The record shows that Phillips reviewed and signed the trial court's written admonishments, which included the statements: "I have had my [c]onstitutional and legal rights explained to me by my attorney, and [I] have decided to waive my [c]onstitutional right of trial by jury and enter this plea before the judge," and "I have not been threatened, coerced or placed in fear by any person to induce me to enter my plea." The record also reflects the following exchange between the trial court and Phillips at the hearing on the plea:

Court: Your attorney has filed this set of papers here with the Court. Did you read these papers?

Phillips: Yes, sir.

Court: Did you sign them and go over them with your attorney?

Phillips: Yes, sir.

Court: Did you understand that you're charged with a first-degree felony, [and that] you could get anywhere from five to ninety-nine years or life for this crime. Do you understand that?

 

Phillips: Yes, sir.

 

Court: And you have a right to have a trial by a jury to decide - a trial before a jury to decide if you're guilty or not guilty of this crime. Do you understand that, sir?

Phillips: Yes, sir.

Court: Do you know you're giving up that right?

Phillips: Yes, sir.

Court: Did anyone force you to do that or make you do that?

Phillips: No, sir.

Because the record reflects that Phillips received the proper admonishments, he must demonstrate that he did not fully understand the consequences of his plea and was harmed as a result. See Martinez, 981 S.W.2d at 197; McGill, 200 S.W.3d at 333. At a hearing on his motion for new trial, Phillips testified that he had repeatedly informed his trial attorney that he wanted a jury to assess his punishment but that his attorney advised against it because he believed that a jury would give Phillips a life sentence. Phillips acknowledged that he previously told the trial court that he wanted to enter a plea and waive a jury trial, but he stated that "it was a mistake," that he "was scared," and that he "needed another lawyer and [was] indigent, so [he] felt there was no way out." He conceded that he never informed the trial court that he wanted a different attorney. Phillips's trial attorney, Jon Disrud, testified that Phillips initially wanted a jury to assess his punishment but that Disrud advised against it because he thought Phillips would get a better sentence from the trial court than from a jury. Disrud testified that he and Phillips discussed the issue three times and that Phillips agreed to have the trial court assess his punishment.

Nothing in the record suggests that Phillips did not understand the consequences of his plea. Instead, the record reflects that the trial court properly admonished him and that he indicated that he understood his rights and that he was freely and voluntarily entering a plea and waiving his right to a jury trial. Because the record does not support Phillip's contention that his plea was involuntary, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Phillips's motion for new trial. See Martinez, 981 S.W.2d at 197; McGill, 200 S.W.3d at 333.

Conclusion

We affirm the trial court's judgment.

Alma L. L pez, Chief Justice

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