Manuel Romero v. Sgt. K. Vaughn--Appeal from 81st Judicial District Court of Karnes County

MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-03-00649-CV
Manuel R. ROMERO,
Appellant
v.
Sergeant Kerry VAUGHN,
Appellee
From the 81st Judicial District Court, Karnes County, Texas
Trial Court No. 02-10-00172-CVK
Honorable Ron Carr, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Phylis J. Speedlin, Justice

Sitting: Paul W. Green, Justice

Sandee Bryan Marion, Justice

Phylis J. Speedlin, Justice

Delivered and Filed: June 2, 2004

AFFIRMED

Manuel R. Romero ("Romero") appeals the trial court's judgment dismissing his suit against Sergeant Kerry Vaughn ("Vaughn"), a correctional officer employed with the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. Romero contends the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing his claims as frivolous. We affirm the trial court's judgment of dismissal.

Background

Proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, Romero filed his original complaint alleging four related causes of action: (1) violation of the First, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution based on the retaliatory destruction of Romero's legal materials; (2) violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution based on interference with Romero's right to petition the government for redress of grievances; (3) violation of title 42 U.S.C. 1983 based on the intentional destruction of personal property belonging to Romero; and (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress. Romero complied with the affidavit requirements of Chapter 14 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 14.002, 14.004, 14.005 (Vernon 2002). Vaughn responded by filing a motion to dismiss on the grounds that Romero's allegations did not form a cognizable legal claim and therefore, were frivolous. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed Romero's claims as frivolous.

Standard of Review

We review a dismissal of an inmate's action as frivolous under an abuse of discretion standard. Spurlock v. Johnson, 94 S.W.3d 655, 657 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 2002, no pet.). To establish that the trial court abused its discretion, the complaining party must show that the court acted without reference to any guiding rules and principles. Id. In determining whether a claim is frivolous, the trial court may consider whether: (1) the claim's realistic chance of ultimate success is slight; (2) the claim has no arguable basis in law or fact; (3) it is clear that the party cannot prove facts in support of the claim; or (4) the claim is substantially similar to a previous claim filed by the inmate because the claim arises from the same operative facts. Id.; see Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 14.003(b) (Vernon 2002). We review de novo the legal question of whether there was an arguable basis in law for the claim. In re Humphreys, 880 S.W.2d 402, 404 (Tex. 1994). In reviewing the dismissal, we take as true the allegations in the original petition. Harrison v. Tex. Dep't of Crim. Justice, 915 S.W.2d 882, 888 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ).

Analysis

In his sole issue on appeal, Romero contends that the trial court erred in dismissing his allegations of intentional destruction of property as frivolous. Because Vaughn moved for dismissal on the grounds that Romero had no cognizable legal claim, the trial court must have determined that Romero's claim was frivolous because he had "no arguable basis in law " for his claim. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 14.003(b)(2). To determine whether a trial court has properly concluded that there is no arguable basis in law for a claim, we examine the types of relief and causes of action pled by the appellant to determine whether, as a matter of law, the petition stated a cause of action that would authorize relief. Spurlock, 94 S.W.3d at 658. We review and evaluate pro se pleadings by a less stringent standard than that applied to formal pleadings drafted by a lawyer. Thomas v. Collins, 860 S.W.2d 500, 503 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied).

On appeal, Romero asserts that he has an arguable claim under section 1983. (1) In his original petition, Romero broadly asserted that his "rights to Title 42 U.S.C. 1983 were violated when [Vaughn] intentionally, knowingly and willfully destroyed [his] property." In order to state a claim under section 1983, a litigant must allege that a person acting under color of state law deprived him of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. 42 U.S.C. 1983 (2000). Both on appeal and in his original petition, Romero failed to allege specific deprivations of constitutional rights in connection with his section 1983 cause of action. Romero, however, did allege in his petition that Vaughn violated the First, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments by destroying Romero's legal materials. Assuming that these constitutional deprivations are the basis for Romero's section 1983 cause of action, we find that Romero has failed to adequately state a claim under section 1983 for deprivation of a constitutional right, privilege or immunity.

By alleging a violation of his First and Sixth Amendment rights based on destruction of his legal materials, Romero presumably claims a deprivation of his right of access to the courts. Prisoners have a fundamental constitutional right to "adequate, effective, and meaningful" access to the courts. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 822 (1977). In order to establish a claim for denial of access to the courts, a prisoner must demonstrate that he suffered "actual injury" as a result of the alleged violative conduct. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351-52 (1996). A prisoner must show that the alleged conduct hindered his efforts to pursue a legal claim. Id. at 351. Here, Romero alleged that an appellate brief, a final draft of an application for habeas corpus, a few pages of case law research, and "other legal documents" were intentionally destroyed by Vaughn. Romero has failed, however, to allege how the destruction of these documents hindered his efforts to pursue a legal claim. See Aguilar v. Chastain, 923 S.W.2d 740, 744 (Tex. App.--Tyler 1996, writ denied) (damage to inmate's legal papers and loss of pens did not violate right of access to courts and was an inadequate basis for a section 1983 claim). Because Romero failed to allege an actual injury or legal prejudice resulting from the destruction of his legal documents, Romero failed to adequately state a claim for denial of access to the courts. Accordingly, Romero's section 1983 claim for denial of his right of access to the courts had no arguable basis in law.

By alleging a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights, Romero presumably claims a deprivation of his right to due process. The United States Supreme Court has held that an unauthorized intentional deprivation of property by a state prison official does not constitute a violation of the procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if a meaningful post-deprivation remedy for the loss is available. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984); see also Aguilar, 923 S.W.2d at 744. The Texas Legislature has provided an administrative remedy to compensate inmates for property lost or damaged by the Department of Corrections. See Tex. Gov't. Code Ann. 501.007, 501.008 (Vernon 1998) (addressing compensation process for inmate claims for lost or damaged property and establishing an inmate grievance system). Inmates in Texas have no arguable basis in law for asserting a section 1983 due process claim for the intentional destruction of their property because Texas inmates have a meaningful post-deprivation remedy. Aguilar, 923 S.W.2d at 744; see also Spurlock v. Schroedter, 88 S.W.3d 733, 736-37 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.) (citing Aguilar for the proposition that a prison official's unauthorized intentional deprivation of an inmate's property is not a constitutional violation if there exists an adequate post-deprivation remedy). Accordingly, there was no arguable basis in law for Romero's section 1983 claim based on a violation of his due process rights.

We do not suggest that an inmate may never seek redress in the courts for the unauthorized intentional destruction of his property, for example, through a common law tort claim for damages, after exhaustion of his administrative remedies. Section 501.008(d) establishes the requirement that an inmate exhaust the grievance procedures before initiating suit, and clearly envisions that inmates will in fact file suit in state court after exhaustion of their administrative remedies. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. 501.008(d); see Schroedter, 88 S.W.3d at 737 (holding that the purpose of sections 501.007 and 501.008 is to ensure that an inmate proceeding in forma pauperis exhausts his administrative remedies before filing a claim in state court); see also Gordon v. Scott, 6 S.W.3d 365, 370 (Tex. App.--Beaumont 1999, pet. denied) (holding that existence of inmate grievance procedures does not foreclose an inmate's suit in court, including a properly alleged section 1983 claim for intentional destruction of property, after exhaustion of administrative remedies).

While claims regarding the intentional destruction of an inmate's property may be actionable under section 1983 if based on a specific constitutional deprivation, Romero failed to assert a viable section 1983 claim. Since Romero could not establish that he was deprived of a specific right, privilege or immunity of constitutional significance, his section 1983 claim had no arguable basis in law. The trial court did not abuse its discretion, and properly dismissed Romero's section 1983 claim as frivolous under 14.003(b)(2), Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. Romero's single issue on appeal is overruled.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's judgment is affirmed.

Phylis J. Speedlin, Justice

1. Although Romero asserted four related causes of action in his original petition, we only address the issue of whether Romero's claim of intentional destruction of property under section 1983 has an arguable basis in law because his section 1983 claim is the only claim briefed by Romero on appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(e).