Joe E. Espinoza (Espinosa) v. The State of Texas--Appeal from 175th Judicial District Court of Bexar County

MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-03-00660-CR

Joe E. ESPINOZA,

Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the 175th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 1987-CR-0760

Honorable Mary Roman, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Sandee Bryan Marion, Justice

Sitting: Alma L. L pez, Chief Justice

Karen Angelini, Justice

Sandee Bryan Marion, Justice

Delivered and Filed: April 28, 2004

AFFIRMED

Defendant, Joe E. Espinoza, pled guilty to offense of kidnapping in 1987. The trial court assessed his punishment at ten years' confinement, but suspended his sentence and placed defendant on ten years' probation. Subsequently, in August 2003, the trial court revoked defendant's probation and sentenced him to ten years' confinement. Defendant appeals the judgment revoking his community supervision. We affirm.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

In a single issue on appeal, defendant asserts the trial court erred in revoking his community supervision. The sole question in our review of the trial court's order to revoke defendant's probation is whether the trial court abused its discretion. Jackson v. State, 645 S.W.2d 303, 305 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983). In a probation revocation hearing, the State must prove defendant violated a condition of his probation by a preponderance of the evidence. Cobb v. State, 851 S.W.2d 871, 874 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). A plea of true, standing alone, is sufficient to support the trial court's order of revocation. Hays v. State, 933 S.W.2d 659, 661 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1996, no pet.). When defendant pleads true to the allegations in the State's motion to revoke probation during the probation revocation proceeding, he may not subsequently challenge the sufficiency of evidence. Id.

As grounds in its motion to revoke defendant's community supervision, the State alleged defendant failed to: (1) report to his supervision officer between the months of July 1993 to June 1994; (2) obtain the court's written consent to leave the state; (3) report his change of address with his supervision officer; and (4) pay his administrative fees to the court during the months of July 1993 to June 1994. The State elected to proceed on the first alleged violation. At the hearing to revoke his community supervision, defendant unequivocally pled true to the State's first alleged violation. In addition to pleading true, defendant testified that he stopped reporting to his supervisor because he was working and commuting between San Antonio and North Carolina. Defendant's probation officer testified that his department administrator had conducted a nationwide search for defendant beginning in 1993, which spanned a ten-year time period. Defendant argues the trial court's decision is not within the zone of reasonable disagreement because he: (1) led a productive life after the trial court originally placed him on probation; (2) paid his taxes and child support; and (3) did not violate any other penal laws. However, defendant's plea of true to the probation violation is sufficient to support the trial court's decision. In light of defendant's testimony, his plea, and his probation officer's testimony, we conclude the trial court had a sufficient amount of evidence to revoke defendant's community supervision. Therefore, we conclude the trial court did not err in revoking defendant's community supervision.

We overrule defendant's issue on appeal and affirm the trial court's judgment.

Sandee Bryan Marion, Justice

DO NOT PUBLISH