In the Interest of B.B., et al., Children--Appeal from 166th Judicial District Court of Bexar County

MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-03-00279-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF B.B., A.B., and T.K.

From the 166th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2002-PA-00636

Honorable Juan Gallardo, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Sandee Bryan Marion, Justice

Sitting: Catherine Stone, Justice

Paul Green, Justice

Sandee Bryan Marion, Justice

Delivered and Filed: December 10, 2003

AFFIRMED

This is an appeal from the trial court's order terminating appellant's parental rights. (1) In five issues on appeal, appellant challenges the factual sufficiency of the evidence in support of the court's termination order. Appellant also complains that the trial court failed to pronounce and render final judgment. We affirm.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

The trial court terminated appellant's parental rights under Family Code sections 161.001(1)(D), (E), (O), and (P). The court also found that termination was in the children's best interest. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. 161.001(2) (Vernon 2002). Parental rights can be terminated only by a showing of clear and convincing evidence. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. 161.001; In re G.M., 596 S.W.2d 846, 847 (Tex. 1980); In the Interest of B.T., 954 S.W.2d 44, 46 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1997, writ denied). Under a clear and convincing standard, we ask whether sufficient evidence was presented to produce in the mind of a rational factfinder a "firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established." Tex. Fam. Code Ann. 101.007; see also In re G.M., 596 S.W.2d at 847.

In a factual sufficiency review, we must give due consideration to evidence the factfinder could have reasonably found to be clear and convincing. In the Interest of J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002). We must determine "whether the evidence is such that a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the State's allegations." Id. We also consider whether disputed evidence is such that a reasonable factfinder could not have resolved that disputed evidence in favor of its finding. Id. "If, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence that a reasonable factfinder could not have credited in favor of the finding is so significant that a factfinder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction, then the evidence is factually insufficient." Id.

Endangerment to the children's physical or emotional well-being

The trial court heard testimony from two caseworkers, a therapist, a police officer, a clinical psychologist, the children's father, and appellant. One of the caseworkers, Monica Duran, testified about the reported medical and physical abuse of A.B. Duran told the court about tubes in A.B.'s ears that had not been cleaned and that caused discharge from the boy's ears. Duran described A.B. as destructive, aggressive, and hostile. Appellant would not restrain A.B. from hitting his sister, B.B.; instead, appellant blamed B.B. for provoking A.B. A.B. suffered a broken collarbone when he jumped off a dresser, and he was bitten by the family's pet python snake.

Several of the witnesses testified about domestic violence in appellant's home, which she shared with a boyfriend, John Comer. Some of these incidents were witnessed by one or more of appellant's children. A police officer, Bob Miller, testified he and others in his department regularly went to appellant and Comer's house on disturbance calls. Miller said that he and other officers were concerned enough about the children's environment that they contacted Child Protective Services ("CPS"). During one incident, police were dispatched to the couple's house because appellant had cursed a caseworker, thrown items on the front lawn, and appeared naked from the waist up. When appellant was arrested, she cursed and spat at the officers. During another incident, at approximately 4:00 a.m. in the morning, Miller found all the children sitting at a table where Comer was attempting to force-feed them because, according to Comer, they had not been fed.

A therapist, Kristy Dean, testified appellant and Comer were superficially cooperative during a counseling session and she sensed they withheld information from her regarding their documented history with CPS. Dean described appellant as passive and as someone who refused to take responsibility for her family's problems or minimized and rationalized the problems. Dean was concerned about allegations made by Comer's daughter that he sexually abused her. Appellant's response to these allegations was that they were either not true or not a "concern." Dean thought the family's problems could be addressed through counseling, but after missing a scheduled appointment, neither appellant nor Comer again contacted her.

Another caseworker, Stephanie Desmairas, testified she reviewed appellant's service plan and Comer's service plan with appellant and Comer. She explained that Comer's noncompliance with his service plan could affect appellant's getting her children back. Comer has not complied fully with his service plan. Desmairas believed appellant has engaged in conduct that physically or emotionally placed the children's well-being in danger and that appellant's inability to parent caused her to place the children with other people who endangered the children's physical and emotional well-being. She testified that A.B. and B.B. alleged Comer sexually abused B.B. Appellant merely "shrugged off" these allegations.

Although appellant completed a drug assessment and drug testing, completed a parenting class, and completed an empowerment class, she has not complied fully with her service plan. Appellant has not attended recommended individual counseling, not completed her GED, not attended job skills training classes, and not completed anger control or family violence prevention groups. Appellant stated she was learning, on her own, how to control her anger. However, she assumed little to no responsibility for her actions. Regarding A.B.'s behavior, appellant claimed she had once been bi-polar, but grew out of it. Appellant said her children were removed because of "dirty housekeeping and other people's concern about her inability to parent a child who was a difficult needs child."

We have reviewed the entire record and hold that based upon the evidence adduced at trial, a trier of fact could have formed a firm belief that appellant knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the children to remain in conditions or surroundings that endanger the children's physical or emotional well-being; or engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged in conduct that endangered the children's physical or emotional well-being. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. 161.001(1)(D), (E).

Children's best interests

Among the factors that may be considered in determining whether termination is in the children's best interest are: the child's desires; the child's emotional and physical needs, now and in the future; the emotional and physical danger to the child, now and in the future; the parenting abilities of the individual seeking custody; the stability of the home or proposed placement; the parent's acts or omissions indicating that the existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one; and any excuse for the parent's acts or omissions. In the Interest of H.C. & S.C., 942 S.W.2d 661, 664 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1997, no writ).

Dean expressed concern over placing the children with someone who lacked concerned about and showed no commitment to solving significant issues such as sexual abuse. Desmairas did not believe appellant could parent her children and she believed termination was in the children's best interest. A court-appointed special advocate, Reyna Lewis, testified she met with appellant twice in her home, spoke to her over the telephone, and observed appellant at parent-child visitations. Lewis stated it was in the children's best interest to terminate appellant's parental rights. If appellant's rights were not terminated, Lewis said she would suspend parental visitation. She testified that A.B.'s condition worsened after each visit with his mother. The eldest child, B.B., hoped to reunite with her mother, but resisted following rules. The youngest, an infant, had bonded well with her foster family. Lewis did not believe appellant could meet the needs of her family. Although she thought appellant loved her children, Lewis said appellant was not willing to accomplish what needed to be done to obtain the return of her children. The children's father voluntarily relinquished his parental rights, and he also believed it was in the children's best interest that appellant's parental rights be terminated.

We have reviewed the entire record and hold that based upon the evidence adduced at trial, a trier of fact could have formed a firm belief that termination is in the children's best interest. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. 161.001(2).

RENDITION OF JUDGMENT

In her sixth issue, appellant complains that the trial court failed to pronounce and render its judgment in open court. The trial court did not pronounce or render judgment at the close of testimony on February 21, 2003; however, the termination order was signed on March 13, 2003. Appellant argues the cause must be reversed because there is no final judgment in this case. Appellant provides no authority for her argument; therefore, it is waived as inadequately briefed. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(h).

We overrule appellant's issues on appeal and affirm the trial court's order of termination.

Sandee Bryan Marion, Justice

1. Appellant's three children are B.B. (born August 19, 1994), A.B. (born May 5, 1996), and T.K. (born April 20, 2001).