Ex Parte Emanuel Delmar Douglas--Appeal from 290th Judicial District Court of Bexar County

MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-03-00153-CR
EX PARTE Emanuel Delmar DOUGLAS
From the 290th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2003-CR-1121
Honorable Sharon MacRae, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Karen Angelini, Justice

Sitting: Karen Angelini, Justice

Sandee Bryan Marion, Justice

Phylis J. Speedlin, Justice

Delivered and Filed: May 28, 2003

AFFIRMED

Emanuel Delmar Douglas appeals the trial court's partial denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging excessive bail. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in partially denying Douglas's requested relief, the trial court's judgment is affirmed.

Douglas is incarcerated pending the resolution of an indictment for aggravated robbery: Douglas allegedly fired a handgun at an employee while stealing cash from a pawn shop. Bail was initially set at $100,000.00. Douglas filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging the bail as excessive and requesting a reduction to $20,000.00 bail. The trial court reduced bail to $75,000.00 and imposed the condition of so-called "full-custody" electronic monitoring, which would prevent him from leaving his house even for the purpose of going to work.

On appeal, Douglas and the State agree that the trial court had jurisdiction to consider his petition. Douglas, however, asserts that the $75,000.00 bail with full-custody electronic monitoring is still excessive. He requests a reduction to $20,000.00 bail and "partial-custody" electronic monitoring, which would allow him to leave his house to go to work.

We review the trial court's decision regarding bail under an abuse of discretion standard. Ex Parte Garcia, 100 S.W.3d 243, 245 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 2001, no pet.); see also Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 17.15 (Vernon Supp. 2003). The factors to be considered in setting the amount of bail are (1) the need for the bail to be sufficiently high so as to give a reasonable assurance that the undertaking will be complied with, (2) the requirement that the setting of bail not be used as an instrument of oppression, (3) the nature of the offense and the circumstances under which it was committed, (4) the evidence about the ability to make bail, and (5) the future safety of the victim and the community. See Ex Parte Garcia, 100 S.W.3d at 245-46.

Douglas testified at the hearing that he has strong family and work ties to San Antonio, indicating that he is a low flight risk. He also testified that his family would be able to raise enough money for his release if bail were set at $20,000.00, which they were unable to do while bail was set at $100,000.00. However, the circumstances of the offense involve use of a handgun. At the hearing, the State argued that there is a risk that if Douglas were released he would harass the pawn shop employee who identified Douglas. Also at the hearing, the State presented evidence that in 2002 Douglas served time in jail for assault by causing bodily injury to a family member. In addition, the indictment alleges that in 1993 Douglas was convicted in Illinois of the felony of unlawful use of a weapon. If convicted of aggravated robbery (a first-degree felony) as a repeat felony offender, Douglas faces punishment of imprisonment for between 15 and 99 years and a fine of up to $10,000.00. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. 12.32, 12.42(c)(1), 29.03(b) (Vernon 2003).

We believe that the trial court, in considering all the factors, did not abuse its discretion in reducing the amount of bail from $100,000.00 to $75,000.00, but not to $20,000.00, and in imposing the condition of full-custody rather than partial-custody electronic monitoring. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Karen Angelini, Justice

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