The State of Texas v. Joey Griffin--Appeal from County Court at Law of Kerr County

No. 04-02-00192-CR
The STATE of Texas,
Appellant
v.
Joey GRIFFIN,
Appellee
From the County Court at Law of Kerr County, Texas
Trial Court No. CR01-0602
Honorable Spencer Brown, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Paul W. Green, Justice

Sitting: Catherine Stone, Justice

Paul W. Green, Justice

Sarah B. Duncan, Justice

Delivered and Filed: May 7, 2003

AFFIRMED

The State appeals an order granting appellant Joey Griffin's motion to suppress. Tex. Crim. Proc. Code Ann. art. 44.01(a)(5)(Vernon Supp. 2003). Griffin was indicted for the offense of driving while intoxicated. Griffin pled not guilty to the charge and filed a motion to suppress. Following a hearing, the trial court granted Griffin's motion, entering an order suppressing the evidence. The State of Texas appeals this order, bringing two issues before this court.

Background

On February 25, 2001, Kerrville Police Officer Pat Goldthorn stopped Joey Griffin's vehicle for failure to maintain a single marked lane, failure to signal a lane change, and for drifting on to the shoulder. Officer Goldthorn testified that Griffin smelled of alcohol. Griffin admitted he had been drinking and was then asked to perform several field sobriety tests. Griffin failed each test and was placed under arrest for driving while intoxicated (DWI).

Griffin entered a plea of not guilty and filed a motion to suppress the evidence based on Officer Goldthorn's lack of reasonable suspicion in stopping him. Following a hearing, the trial court granted Griffin's motion to suppress. The State now appeals.

Standard of Review

Motions to suppress are subject to a bifurcated standard of review. Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). In reviewing the trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, we afford deference to the trial court's determination of the historical facts and rulings on mixed questions of law and fact if the resolution of those questions turns upon the credibility and demeanor of witnesses. Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 87-88 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); Morfin v. State, 34 S.W.3d 664, 666 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 2000, no pet.). Appellate courts are not at liberty to disturb the trial court's findings of fact as long as they are supported by the record. However, we decide de novo whether the trial court erred in misapplying the law to the facts. Carmouche, 10 S.W.3d at 327; Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 87-88; Morfin, 34 S.W.3d at 666.

Discussion

In two issues, the State complains the trial court erred in granting Griffin's motion to suppress because (1) its findings of fact are not supported by the record, and (2) it misapplied the law to the facts of this case. Ultimately, the State contends the trial court erred in finding Officer Goldthorn did not have reasonable suspicion to stop Griffin.

A police officer may stop an individual if the officer has specific articulable facts, which, in light of his experience and personal knowledge, together with other inferences from those facts, would reasonably warrant the intrusion on the freedom of the person stopped. See Francis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 176, 178 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has set forth the totality of the circumstances test as the current reasonableness standard for reviewing warrentless arrests in the context of DWI investigatory detentions. Hulit v. State, 982 S.W.2d 431, 435 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998); State v. Arriaga, 5 S.W.3d 804, 805 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1999, pet ref'd).

At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Officer Goldthorn testified he observed Griffin stray out of his lane a minimum of three times, drifting on to the shoulder of the roadway for the distance of a mile. He also claimed Griffin failed to signal when leaving his lane. Upon stopping him, Officer Goldthorn smelled alcohol on Griffin's breath and inquired as to whether he had been drinking. Griffin admitted to having had four beers that evening. Officer Goldthorn then administered several field sobriety tests (1) which Griffin failed. Officer Goldthorn subsequently arrested Griffin for DWI.

Officer Goldthorn testified that he observed Griffin violate 545.058, 545.060, and 545.104 of the Texas Transportation Code: driving on an improved shoulder, failing to drive as nearly as practical within a single lane, and failing to use a turn signal to indicate an intention to change lanes, respectively. Griffin testified he did not commit a traffic violation under any of the above sections. First, he claimed he did not fail to signal under the applicable law. He also argued that he did not fail to maintain a single lane or drift onto the shoulder. Instead, Griffin contended that his actions were justified under one of the exceptions to 545.058. Tex. Transp. Code 545.058(a). Explaining that Officer Goldthorn had been tailing him for three miles, Griffin asserted he was merely driving on the shoulder to allow another vehicle, namely, Officer Goldthorn, to pass. See Tex. Transp. Code 545.058(a)(5).

Because we must afford deference to the trial court's determination of historical facts and rulings on mixed questions of law and fact if the resolution of those questions turns upon the credibility of witnesses, we must defer to the trial court's findings of fact. Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 87-88. Here, the trial court found that Griffin's vehicle never fully left its own lane of traffic, that the movements made by Griffin's vehicle were not unsafe, that Griffin drove on the shoulder to allow Officer Goldthorn to pass him, that Griffin did not signal when pulling onto the shoulder which was not a lane, and that Officer Goldthorn did not stop Griffin because he felt Griffin was intoxicated. Because these findings are supported by Griffin's testimony, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Paul W. Green, Justice

Do Not Publish

1. Although there is some contention regarding the fact that Officer Goldthorn was never certified in performing the standardized field sobriety tests, the type of tests conducted would have enabled a reasonable officer, in light of his experience, to determine some degree of sobriety.