In the Matter of S.M.--Appeal from 386th Judicial District Court of Bexar County

MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-02-00683-CV
IN THE MATTER OF S.M.
From the 386th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2002-JUV-02049-A
Honorable Laura Parker, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Alma L. L pez, Chief Justice

Sitting: Alma L. L pez, Chief Justice

Catherine Stone, Justice

Sarah B. Duncan, Justice

Delivered and Filed: April 2, 2003

AFFIRMED

S.M. appeals the trial court's modification of its previous disposition order. In two points of error, S.M. argues (1) that the trial court abused its discretion in modifying its prior disposition order because the evidence was legally insufficient to show that S.M. violated a reasonable and lawful probation order, and (2) that the trial court abused its discretion because it did not specifically state in the order its reasons for modifying the disposition. We affirm.

In 2002, S.M. was found to have engaged in delinquent conduct, and the trial court imposed a disposition of twelve months probation. The State subsequently moved to modify the trial court's disposition, alleging that S.M. had violated the conditions of her probation by violating her curfew hours and associating with prohibited persons. Upon a finding that S.M. had violated conditions of her probation, the trial court modified its disposition, committing S.M. to the Texas Youth Commission.

A juvenile judge has broad discretion in determining a suitable disposition for a juvenile that has been adjudicated delinquent. In re H.G., 993 S.W.2d 211, 213 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1999, no pet.). A trial court may modify its prior disposition by ordering commitment to the Texas Youth Commission if the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence "that a child violated a reasonable and lawful order of the court." TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. 54.05(f) (Vernon 2002). Absent an abuse of discretion, a reviewing court will not disturb the juvenile court's determination. See In re A.S., 954 S.W.2d 855, 861 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1997, no writ). The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court acted arbitrarily or unreasonably, or without reference to guiding principles. See In re H.G., 993 S.W.2d at 213.

In the present case, the record reflects that as a condition of S.M.'s probation, the trial court required S.M. to abide by a 7 p.m. curfew and prohibited S.M. from associating with specifically named individuals, including Vanessa Vasquez. At the modification hearing, S.M. judicially confessed to violating these conditions of her probation by entering a plea of "true" to each of the alleged violations. A plea of "true" to a violation of a probation order and a stipulation to the evidence are analogous to a judicial confession which justifies the court's finding that the violation was committed by a preponderance of the evidence. See In re M.A.L., 995 S.W.2d 322, 324 (Tex. App.-Waco 1999, no pet.).

Because the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's finding that S.M. violated a reasonable and lawful order of the court, the court was authorized to modify its previous disposition order and commit S.M. to the Texas Youth Commission. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. 54.05(f) (Vernon 2002). S.M.'s first point of error is overruled.

In her second point of error, S.M. argues that the trial court abused its discretion in modifying its previous disposition order because it did not specifically state its reasons for modifying the disposition.

When a court enters a disposition or modifies a disposition order, it must find that the child violated a reasonable and lawful order of the court. TEX. FAM. CODE Ann. 54.04(f) (Vernon 2002); see In re H.G., 993 S.W.2d at 214. In this case, the order states that the modification was based on the findings that S.M. violated condition #7 by failing to be at her place of residence by 7:00 p.m. and that S.M. violated condition #13 by associating with prohibited individuals. Accordingly, the trial court correctly found that S.M.'s conduct violated a lawful order of the court. The modification order, viewed as a whole, sufficiently states the court's reasoning for the modification of S.M.'s disposition order. S.M.'s second point of error is overruled.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Alma L. L pez, Chief Justice

PUBLISH