Robert Barrientes v. The State of Texas--Appeal from 144th Judicial District Court of Bexar County

MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-01-00264-CR
Robert BARRIENTES,
Appellant
v.
STATE of Texas,
Appellee
From the 144th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 1999-CR-5726
Honorable Mark R.Luitjen, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Sarah B. Duncan, Justice

Sitting: Catherine Stone, Justice

Paul W. Green, Justice

Sarah B. Duncan, Justice

Delivered and Filed: March 12, 2003

AFFIRMED

Robert Barrientes appeals the trial court's judgment convicting him of attempted capital murder and sentencing him to seventy-five years in prison. We hold that the jury's implicit finding that Barrientes was not insane at the time of the offense is not so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust; and Barrientes' second competency trial did not violate the double jeopardy clause of the Texas Constitution. We therefore affirm the judgment.

Factual and Procedural Background

While Barrientes and his common law wife Debra Degollado were separated, Barrientes became convinced Debra was seeing another man. One day Barrientes accosted Debra and threatened that "if [she] didn't go back to him now, that [she'd] better watch [her] back or it [was] going to be war, that he was going to get [her] either way out in the street." Instead of getting back together with Barrientes, Debra began divorce proceedings.

While the divorce was pending, Barrientes met Debra and their three children - Robert, Jacob, and Judith - to go out to dinner. As Debra drove onto the access road, Barrientes pulled a knife out of his organizer and held it to Debra's throat, threatening her and accusing her of having an affair. Debra pulled the car over; and Barrientes began stabbing her in the arm and neck. When Debra exited the vehicle, Barrientes followed. Jacob tried to help his mother but was attacked with the knife by Barrientes. Eventually Debra and Jacob escaped into the car of a passerby. Barrientes returned to the car and began stabbing Robert. After Robert ran away, Barrientes began stabbing Judith. Barrientes then carried Judith to a nearby tree and sat down holding the knife to her neck. Shortly thereafter, San Antonio Police Sergeant James Eigner arrived at the scene and approached Barrientes with his weapon drawn. But Eigner could not get a clear shot at Barrientes. So Eigner holstered his gun and continued to approach Barrientes. Barrientes threw down the knife; and Eigner took Judith. Barrientes told Eigner that he had "cut" his family.

Because Debra and the children all survived the attack, Barrientes was charged with attempted capital murder. He pled not guilty by reason of insanity and supported his insanity plea with the testimony of two expert medical witnesses. Dr. John Sparks testified that Barrientes has major depression with psychotic features; Dr. Richard E. Coons diagnosed Barrientes with schizo-affective disorder. Both doctors opined that at the time of the offense Barrientes suffered from a severe mental illness, which prevented him from knowing that his conduct was wrong. Dr. Coons also testified that Barrientes' psychosis caused him to hear a voice (which Barrientes identified as God) that told him to kill his family and himself. Similarly, Dr. Coons testified that Barrientes had told him that to carry out God's will, he had to "force [him]self to move [his] hand and kill them."

The State did not present any experts, choosing instead to rely on its cross-examination of the doctors and evidence regarding Barrientes' conduct leading up to the attack. Although both doctors testified the stress of the divorce could have brought on the psychosis, they also admitted Barrientes did not have any known psychiatric history before attacking his family. Both doctors also testified that the attack could have been motivated by Barrientes' anger towards Debra; Dr. Coons testified that Barrientes was probably motivated by his anger and irrational psychotic thinking. According to Dr. Sparks, whether Barrientes was legally insane at the time of the attack is a close call since Barrientes demonstrated ambivalence towards his children and anger towards his wife. In a note to addressed to his mother and found in his organizer, Barrientes stated that he and the children would go to heaven, while Debra would go to hell for her sins. On another page in the organizer, Barrientes wrote "the end of are [sic] life, God bless us, amen!"

The State also elicited testimony to establish that, before meeting his family the day of the attack, Barrientes had visited the human resources director at his work and changed the beneficiary of his and his children's life insurance policies from Debra to his mother. The human resources director described Barrientes as calm, normal, and responsive. Additionally, although Eigner's report described Barrientes as almost incoherent, throwing out disjointed or disorganized statements, Eigner testified that when he encountered Barrientes at the end of the incident, he was able to understand Barrientes.

Implicitly rejecting Barrientes' insanity defense, the jury found Barrientes guilty. Before the punishment phase began, Barrientes asked for and received a competency trial. This trial ended in a mistrial due to prosecutorial misconduct. At the second competency trial, Barrientes was found competent to stand trial. Following the trial, the trial court signed a judgment convicting Barrientes of attempted capital murder and sentencing him to seventy-five years in prison.

Factual Sufficiency

Barrientes first argues the evidence is factually insufficient to support the jury's implied finding that, at the time of Barrientes' attack on his family, he was not legally insane. We disagree.

Applicable Law

It is an affirmative defense to prosecution that, at the time of the conduct charged, the actor, as a result of severe mental disease or defect, did not know that his conduct was wrong. Tex. Pen. Code Ann. 8.01(a) (Vernon 1994). The burden is on the accused to prove the defense by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. 2.04(d). Although expert medical testimony may aid the jury in its ultimate determination, it is not conclusive on the issue. Plough v. State, 725 S.W.2d 494, 499 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1987, no pet.).

Whether insanity exonerates one from a criminal act involves medical, legal, and ethical considerations. Graham v. State, 566 S.W.2d 941, 948 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978). To incorporate the legal and ethical elements, a jury should consider all of the evidence surrounding the offense. See id. at 951. Particularly relevant to this inquiry are whether the defendant had a possible motivation for the offense, see Torres v. State, 976 S.W.2d 345, 347-48 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1998, no pet.); the accused's demeanor and actions during and immediately following the criminal episode, see Plough, 725 S.W.2d at 500; and whether the accused surrendered. See id.; Ashbacher v. State, 61 S.W.3d 532, 535 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2001, no pet.).

Standard of Review

To determine whether the jury's implicit finding rejecting Barrientes' insanity defense is supported by factually sufficient evidence, we consider all of the relevant evidence and determine whether the jury's implied finding is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust. Meraz v. State, 785 S.W.2d 146, 155 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).

Discussion

Clearly, the testimony of Drs. Sparks and Coons supports Barrientes' claim that he was legally insane at the time he attacked his family. However, although Drs. Sparks and Coons testified that Barrientes exhibited bizarre, psychotic thinking, neither could rule out that his attack on his family was motivated by his anger and marital problems. Moreover, Barrientes exhibited organizational skills and appeared calm and normal when meeting with the human resources director the afternoon of the attack. And the jury could have viewed Barrientes' compliance with Eigner's request to put down the knife, coupled with Barrientes' admission that he had "cut" his family, as evidence that he knew his conduct was wrong.

After reviewing all of the evidence, we hold that, while the question was a close one, the jury's implied finding that Barrientes knew his conduct was wrong at the time of the attack is not so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust. We therefore need not address Barrientes' legal sufficiency argument.

Double Jeopardy

Barrientes next argues that the second competency hearing violated his right under the Texas Constitution to not be twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense. See Bauder v. State, 921 S.W.2d 696, 698-99 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). We again disagree. Even assuming this complaint was preserved, the fact remains that a hearing on competency is not a criminal action and thus does not involve a determination of guilt or innocence. See Jackson v. State, 548 S.W.2d 685, 690 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977). Because culpability is not at stake, the basis for the double jeopardy protection against successive prosecutions for the same offense is not present in a competency trial. (1) See Bauder, 921 S.W.2d at 698; Jackson, 548 S.W.2d at 690.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Sarah B. Duncan, Justice

Do not publish

1. Under the United States Constitution, jeopardy does not attach at the competency hearing. See Parker v. Estelle, 498 F.2d 625, 628 n.6 (5th Cir. 1974) ("Since there is no possibility of conviction for the substantive offense, jeopardy does not attach at such a [competency] hearing."), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963; Davis v. United States, 316 F. Supp. 913, 916 (E.D. Tenn. 1970).