Edmundo Reveron v. Monique Reveron--Appeal from 285th Judicial District Court of Bexar County

No. 04-01-00087-CV
Edmundo REVERON,
Appellant
v.
Monique REVERON,
Appellee
From the 288th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2000-CI-10244
Honorable Frank Montalvo, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Phil Hardberger, Chief Justice

Sitting: Phil Hardberger, Chief Justice

Paul W. Green, Justice

Sarah B. Duncan, Justice

Delivered and Filed: October 17, 2001

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART

Edmundo Reveron ("Edmundo") appeals the trial court's granting of Monique Reveron's ("Monique") Special Appearance and dismissal of his petition for divorce. (1) Edmundo raises two points of error, arguing that: (1) Monique established sufficient minimum contacts with Texas to give the trial court personal jurisdiction over her; and (2) regardless of whether the trial court had personal jurisdiction over Monique, it remained vested with subject matter jurisdiction over the case. We affirm the judgment of the trial court in part, reverse in part, and remand the cause for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Facts and Procedural History

Edmundo and Monique were married on June 16, 1979 in Valdosta, Georgia. On April 16, 1993, as a result of irreconcilable marital differences, the Reverons entered into a consensual Separation Agreement and Property Settlement while residing in Wayne County, North Carolina. On April 19, 1993, the District Court of Wayne County, North Carolina issued a Consent Order in accordance with their agreement. At the time of their separation, Edmundo and Monique had two minor children, Erik Alexander Reveron and Brian Neal Reveron ("Brian"). Edmundo now resides in San Antonio, Texas, while Monique and Brian, who is still a minor, currently reside in Valdosta, Georgia.

On July 14, 2000, Edmundo filed his Original Petition for Divorce in the 285th District Court of Bexar County, Texas, seeking to terminate the marriage in complete conformity with the 1993 Separation Agreement. Monique filed a special appearance challenging the trial court's personal jurisdiction over her and Brian. Monique also challenged the court's subject matter jurisdiction under the Texas Family Code and requested the court to dismiss the action. The trial court sustained Monique's special appearance and dismissed without prejudice Edmundo's petition for divorce. In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the trial court held that it did not have personal jurisdiction over Monique or Brian, and that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the case. The trial court also concluded that under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act, Georgia was the state of controlling jurisdiction.

Standard of Review

We review the trial court's grant or denial of a special appearance for an abuse of discretion. Whalen v. Laredo Nat'l Bancshares, Inc., 37 S.W.3d 89, 91 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2000, pet. denied). "Under this standard, we will not disturb the trial court's resolution of factual issues absent a showing of arbitrariness or unreasonableness." Id. "Because a challenge to [subject matter] jurisdiction presents a question of law, we review the trial court's determination of subject matter jurisdiction de novo." Saenz v. Saenz, 49 S.W.3d 447, 449 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2001, no pet.).

Personal Jurisdiction / Special Appearance

Texas courts may exercise jurisdiction over a non-resident if: (1) the Texas long-arm statute authorizes the exercise of jurisdiction; and (2) the exercise of jurisdiction comports with constitutional guarantees of due process. Whalen, 37 S.W.3d at 91. The broad language of the Texas long-arm statute permits a court to reach as far as federal constitutional due process allows. Schlobohm v. Shapiro, 784 S.W.2d 355, 357 (Tex. 1990). In a suit for dissolution of marriage, a Texas court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident spouse if Texas was the last marital residence of the parties or if there is any basis consistent with the constitutions of this state and the United States for the exercise of personal jurisdiction. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. 6.305 (Vernon 1998). Under the federal constitutional requirements of due process, a state may assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant if: (1) the defendant has purposefully established sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state; and (2) the exercise of jurisdiction comports with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475-76 (1985). "An appellate court must consider a case based upon the record filed, and it cannot consider documents attached as exhibits or appendices to briefs or motions." Brown v. McGonagill, 940 S.W.2d 178, 179 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996, no writ).

It is undisputed that North Carolina was the last marital residence of the Reverons. Our analysis must focus on whether Monique established sufficient minimum contacts with Texas to permit the trial court to exercise personal jurisdiction over her. (2) The record indicates that Monique's only contacts with Texas have been two visits to the state in the past seven years. In his appellate brief, Edmundo contends that Monique is the co-owner and co-obligor of real property located in Bexar County, Texas, and that this ownership interest alone creates sufficient minimum contacts with Texas to give the trial court personal jurisdiction over her. This evidence, however, was never before the trial court, nor is it part of the record on appeal. See Id. Based on the evidence before the trial court, Monique did not purposefully establish minimum contacts with Texas. See Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. at 475-76. Accordingly, there is no basis consistent with the United States Constitution for the trial court to exercise personal jurisdiction over her. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting Monique's special appearance.

Subject Matter Jurisdiction / Dismissal

To maintain a suit for divorce in Texas, either the petitioner or respondent must have been a domiciliary of this state for the proceeding six months at the time the suit was filed. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. 6.301 (Vernon 1998). In any suit for the dissolution of a marriage, the suit must include a suit affecting the parent-child relationship if the parties are also parents of a minor child. Id. 6.406. A Texas court acquires jurisdiction to determine child custody issues if this state was the home state of the child on or within six months before the date of the commencement of the suit. Id. 152.201(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2001).

In a suit for dissolution of marriage, the court in which the suit is filed may exercise partial jurisdiction over those portions of the suit for which it has authority. Id. 6.308(a) (1998). The court's authority to resolve the issues in controversy between the parties may be restricted because the court lacks the required personal jurisdiction over a nonresident party or the required jurisdiction to resolve child custody. Id. 6.308(b). "Where the trial court in a divorce proceeding has no personal jurisdiction over the respondent, the trial court has the jurisdiction to grant the divorce, but not to determine the managing conservatorship of children or divide property outside of the State of Texas." Dawson-Austin v. Austin, 968 S.W.2d 319, 324 (Tex. 1998) (quoting Comisky v. Comisky, 597 S.W.2d 6, 8 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1980, no writ)). A valid judgment for child support may be rendered only by a court having jurisdiction over the person of the obligor. In the Interest of S.A.V., 837 S.W.2d 80, 83 (Tex. 1992).

Edmundo argues that, notwithstanding the issue of Brian's conservatorship, the trial court had proper jurisdiction over all other issues raised in the petition for divorce. He says the trial court had the power to grant the divorce and enter a child support order. Edmundo satisfied the Family Code's residency requirement for filing a divorce petition in Texas. See Tex. Fam. Code. Ann. 6.301 (Vernon 1998). Even though the trial court did not have personal jurisdiction over Monique, it remained vested with subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the marital status of one of its citizens, Edmundo. See Dawson-Austin, 968 S.W.2d at 324. Despite the fact that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the custody of Brian, the trial court could have exercised partial jurisdiction under the Family Code. See Tex. Family Code Ann. 6.308 (Vernon 1998). With respect to child support, the trial court had personal jurisdiction over Edmundo. Therefore, the trial court could have set child support in accordance with the 1993 North Carolina Consent Order. See In the Interest of S.A.V., 837 S.W.2d at 83. The trial court erred in holding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case and dismissing Edmundo's petition for divorce.

Conclusion

The portion of the trial court's judgment granting Monique's special appearance is affirmed. The portion of the trial court's judgment dismissing Edmundo's petition for divorce for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Phil Hardberger, Chief Justice

DO NOT PUBLISH

1. Monique did not file a brief in this appeal.

2. Edmundo concedes in his appellate brief that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over Brian.