In the Matter of D.J.W.--Appeal from 73rd Judicial District Court of Bexar County

99-00868 In Matter of DJW.wpd No. 04-99-00868-CV
In the Matter of D.J.W.
From the 73rd Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 98-JUV-00397
Honorable Andy Mireles, Judge Presiding

PER CURIAM

Sitting: Alma L. L pez, Justice

Catherine Stone, Justice

Paul W. Green, Justice

Delivered and Filed: March 15, 2000

DISMISSED

D.J.W., a minor, was charged with engaging in delinquent conduct by committing the offense of burglary with the intent to commit sexual assault. The State petitioned the juvenile court to waive its jurisdiction and to transfer its jurisdiction to the criminal court. On April 13, 1998, the juvenile court conducted a certification hearing pursuant to section 54.02 of the Family Code. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. 54.02 (Vernon 1996). At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court waived its jurisdiction over the cause and transferred D.J.W. to the criminal district court. D.J.W. was subsequently tried in the district court and found guilty of the offense of burglary with the intent to commit sexual assault. On July 20, 1999, the district court sentenced D.J.W. to twenty years in prison.

On August 18, 1999, D.J.W. filed notice of appeal and a motion for new trial in this cause. The notice of appeal or the motion for new trial, however, was due to be filed May 13, 1998. See Tex. R. App. P. 26.1(a); Tex. R. Civ. P. 329b(a). A motion for extension of time to file the notice of appeal was due on May 28, 1998, see Tex. R. App. P. 26.3, but D.J.W. did not file a motion to request additional time to file his notice of appeal. As a result, D.J.W.'s notice of appeal and motion for new trial were filed fourteen months late. Because our initial review of the record indicated that this court did not have jurisdiction in this cause, we ordered D.J.W. to show cause in writing why this appeal should not be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. D.J.W. responded, stating that he "contends that he is entitled to an appeal of his juvenile certification because the juvenile trial court did not invoke the proper jurisdiction over him," and that "he would be entitled to any jurisdictional error in his transfer process" in his appeal of the conviction in the criminal district court. These statements, however, do not explain why jurisdiction is proper in this cause.

To invoke this court's jurisdiction in an appeal from a juvenile certification, an appellant must follow the requisites for the perfection of appeal in civil cases. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. 56.01(b) (Vernon 1996); Matter of T.L.C., 948 S.W.2d 41, 42, (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no pet.). The rules of appellate procedure require an appellant to perfect an appeal by filing a notice of appeal or motion for new trial within thirty days of the court's transfer order. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.1, 26.1. Because D.J.W. did not file a notice of appeal or a motion for a new trial within thirty days of the transfer order, this court's jurisdiction was not invoked. As a result, we have no jurisdiction over this appeal and we must dismiss this appeal. A jurisdictional error in the transfer process, however, may be raised for the first time on appeal from a conviction subsequent to the transfer. See Adams v. State, 827 S.W.2d 31, 33 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, no pet.); Stubblefield v. State, 659 S.W.2d 496, 498 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1983, no pet.); Clemons v. State, 630 S.W.2d 506, 508 ((Tex. App.-Austin 1982, pet. ref'd). This appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

PER CURIAM

DO NOT PUBLISH