Harold Ronald Hughes and Gigi Hughes v. Aames Funding Corporation d/b/a Aames Capital Corporation, Aames Capital Corporation, A California Corporation, et al.; and Wendover and Wendover Funds, Inc., et al.; and United Homebuilders & Remodelers of San Antonio, et al. and Peter Estevez--Appeal from 288th Judicial District Court of Bexar County

No. 04-00-00442-CV

Harold Ronald HUGHES and Gigi Hughes,

Appellants

v.

AAMES FUNDING CORPORATION d/b/a Aames Capital Corporation, Ames Capital Corporation, A California Corporation, et al.; Wendover Funding, Inc. d/b/a Wendover and Wendover Funds, Inc., et al.; United Homebuilders and Remodelers of San Antonio, LLC.; and Peter Estevez,

Appellees

From the 288th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 1999-CI-00728

Honorable Peter Michael Curry, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Tom Rickhoff, Justice

Sitting: Tom Rickhoff, Justice

Alma L. L pez, Justice

Sarah B. Duncan, Justice

Delivered and Filed: December 20, 2000

REVERSED AND REMANDED

This is an appeal from the trial court=s order that sanctioned the appellants and dismissed their case with prejudice. Because the sanction order lacks specificity, we reverse.

BACKGROUND

Harold and Gigi Hughes, the plaintiffs below and appellants here, owned property at 935 H. Street, San Antonio, Texas. The Hughes borrowed money to purchase the property, and the lender secured the loan with a note and deed of trust. Eventually, Aames Funding Corporation (AAames@) purchased the note and deed of trust. When the Hughes became almost two years delinquent, Aames set the property for foreclosure. The dispute between the parties involved litigation in the Justice of the Peace Court, County Court, District Court, this Court, and Federal Bankruptcy Court.

In District Court, the appellees moved for sanctions, asserting the appellants were attempting to re-litigate issues already decided by the other courts. The trial court sanctioned the appellants $5,000, ordered the lis pendens filed by the appellants removed, prohibited the appellants from filing any further lawsuits asserting the same causes of action against the appellees, permanently restrained the appellants from interfering with the property, and dismissed the lawsuit with prejudice.

On appeal, the Hughes challenge the dismissal of their case on three grounds, one of which is that the sanction order does not specify the trial court=s reasons for the sanctions

DISCUSSION

Standard of Review

The imposition of sanctions is within the trial judge=s sound discretion, and we will not reverse unless the judge clearly abused that discretion. GTE Communications Sys. Corp. v. Tanner, 856 S.W.2d 725, 730 (Tex. 1993) (orig. proceeding). Our test for abuse of discretion is deferential to the trial courtBwhether the court acted without reference to any guiding rules and principles. Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241 42 (Tex. 1985). The trial court=s discretion is limited only by the requirement that its order be just and that the sanction imposed be directly related to the harm done by the sanctioned conduct. Ray v. Beene, 721 S.W.2d 876, 879 (Tex. App.CHouston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ ref=d n.r.e.).

Specificity of Sanctions Order

Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 13 provides, in part, that ANo sanctions under this rule may be imposed except for good cause, the particulars of which must be stated in the sanction order.@ Tex. R. Civ. P. 13. We interpret a rule of civil procedure by the same rules that govern statutes. GTE Communications Sys. Corp. v. Curry, 819 S.W.2d 652, 653 (Tex. App.CSan Antonio 1991, no writ). When a rule is clear and unambiguous, we construe the language according to its literal meaning. Id. The language contained in Rule 13 is clear and unambiguous. Id. at 654. The rule provides that no sanctions may be imposed except for good cause and the trial court must enumerate the particulars of the good cause in the sanction order. Id.

Thus, Rule 13 imposes a duty on the trial court to point out with particularity the acts or omissions on which the sanction is based. Keever v. Finlan, 988 S.W.2d 300, 312 (Tex. App.CDallas 1999, pet. dism=d); GTE Communications, 819 S.W.2d at 654. Requiring a trial court to state its reasons in the sanction order serves a two fold purpose: (1) it invites the trial court to reflect carefully on its order before imposing sanctions and (2) it informs the party of the offensive conduct so that he can refrain from committing the same or similar conduct in the future. Keever, 988 S.W.2d at 312. These findings also enable the appellate court to review the order in light of the facts found by the trial court. GTE Communications, 819 S.W.2d at 654. The requirement that the court state its findings in the order is in lieu of the traditional findings of fact and conclusions of law that normally are filed in a trial on the merits in a non jury case. Id. Without the findings required by Rule 13, effective review of the sanctions is unavailable because the sanctioned party would be unable to overcome the presumption that the trial court found necessary facts in support of its judgment. Id.

Likewise, Chapter 10 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code allows for sanctions when parties advance frivolous pleadings and motions. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. ''10.001, 10.004 (Vernon Supp. 2000). Section 10.005 provides that A[a] court shall describe in an order imposing a sanction under this chapter the conduct the court has determined violated Section 10.001 and explain the basis for the sanction imposed.@ Id. ' 10.005. The use of the word Ashall@ in the statute indicates that the requirement for particularity in the sanction order is mandatory. University of Texas at Arlington v. Bishop, 997 S.W.2d 350, 355 (Tex. App.CFort Worth 1999, pet. denied). Because compliance with Rule 13 and Section 10.005 is mandatory, failure to comply with the language of the rule is an abuse of discretion. The order considered in GTE Communications is similar to the order considered here. Here, as in GTE Communications, the order merely imposes sanctions; it does not find that good cause exists for such impositions; it does not find that the pleadings filed by the Hughes were groundless and filed for the purpose of delay or harassment, or were made in bad faith; and, more fatally, it does not state any facts or particulars of the good cause. Therefore, the order is defective because it does not comply with the mandatory requirements of Rule 13 and Section 10.005. This defect warrants reversal because it probably prevented the appellants from properly presenting their case to this Court. Tex. R. App. P. 44.1(a).

Appellants also complain that they should not have been sanctioned because their pleadings were not groundless, filed in bad faith, or frivolous; and because the sanctions were not directly related to the harm done by the sanctioned conduct. In light of our holding that the order does not comply with Rule 13 or Section 10.005, these complaints are moot.

CONCLUSION

We reverse the trial court=s judgment and remand for further proceedings.

Tom Rickhoff, Justice

DO NOT PUBLISH