Rodrigo Garcia v. The State of Texas--Appeal from 379th Judicial District Court of Bexar County

No. 04-00-00220-CR
Rodrigo GARCIA,
Appellant
v.
The STATE of Texas,
Appellee
From the 379th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 96-CR-2916
Honorable Bert Richardson, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Alma L. L pez, Justice

Sitting: Tom Rickhoff, Justice

Alma L. L pez, Justice

Sarah B. Duncan, Justice

Delivered and Filed: November 22, 2000

AFFIRMED

The appellant, Rodrigo Garcia, challenges the revocation of his probation in this appeal. In a single issue, Garcia complains that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation. Because we disagree, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Garcia pled no contest to the offense of aggravated assault causing serious bodily injury. On December 6, 1999, the trial court accepted Garcia's plea, deferred adjudication of his guilt, and placed him on probation for a period of five years. One of Garcia's conditions of probation was that he was to have no contact with the victim, Dorothy Ruff, or any of her family members, by phone, mail, or in person. On January 19, 2000, the State filed a motion to enter an adjudication of Garcia's guilt and revoke his probation alleging that Garcia violated a condition of his probation five different times by attempting to contact Dorothy Ruff by mail. At the hearing on the motion to revoke his probation, Garcia pled "true" to the allegations. On January 24, 2000, the trial court did not enter an adjudication of guilt, but instead, sanctioned Garcia by assessing 180 days in jail without credit for time served. The trial court informed Garcia that he was to have no contact with Dorothy or anyone in her family, and in order to receive his personal belongings, he needed to contact his probation officer.

On February 14, 2000, the State filed a second motion to enter an adjudication of Garcia's guilt and revoke his probation, alleging that Garcia attempted to contact Dorothy six times by mail. At the hearing on the second motion to revoke, Garcia pled "true" to the allegations. Garcia explained that he understood he could not contact Dorothy directly, but mistakenly thought that he could contact Dorothy by sending letters through his probation officer. The envelopes were addressed to the probation officer "Gina Faubian in care of Dorothy Ruff." Garcia said that he misunderstood the trial court's instructions and these letters were written in good faith and written with the love he feels for Dorothy. On March 6, 2000, the trial court accepted Garcia's plea of "true," entered a finding of guilt, revoked Garcia's probation, and sentenced him to twelve years in prison.

On appeal, Garcia complains that the trial court abused its discretion when it revoked his probation. Specifically, Garcia contends that the evidence was insufficient to conclude that he violated the conditions of his probation.

In a probation revocation proceeding, the trial court is the sole trier of the facts, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight to be given to the evidence presented. See Naquin v. State, 607 S.W.2d 583, 586 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); Hays v. State, 933 S.W.2d 659, 660 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1996, no pet.). Consequently, our review of a trial court's order revoking probation is limited to a determination of whether the trial court abused its discretion. See Jackson v. State, 645 S.W.2d 303, 305 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983); Hays, 933 S.W.2d at 660. The State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated the terms of his probation. See Cardona v. State, 665 S.W.2d 492, 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). In determining abuse of discretion, we view the evidence adduced at the revocation hearing in the light most favorable to the trial court's findings. See Hays, 933 S.W.2d at 660.

In the instant case, although Garcia explained to the trial court that he misunderstood its instructions, Garcia pled "true" to the allegations in the motion to revoke. A plea of true alone is sufficient to sustain a revocation of probation. See Jiminez v. State, 552 S.W.2d 469, 474 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977). Additionally, one probation violation will support the court's order to revoke probation. See Sanchez v. State, 603 S.W.2d 869, 871 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); Russell v. State, 685 S.W.2d 413, 419 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1985), aff'd, 702 S.W.2d 617 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). Because the evidence in this case shows that Garcia violated a condition of his probation six times when he tried to contact Dorothy by mail, the State met its burden of proving by a preponderance of evidence that Garcia violated his probation. See Cardona, 665 S.W.2d at 493. Thus, the evidence supports the trial court's order to revoke Garcia's probation. After reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's findings, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking Garcia's probation.

Accordingly, we overrule Garcia's issue on appeal and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Alma L. L pez, Justice

DO NOT PUBLISH