Scott Jessup v. The State of Texas--Appeal from County Court at Law No 2 of Bexar County

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No. 04-99-00941-CR
Scott JESSUP,
Appellant
v.
The STATE of Texas,
Appellee
From the County Court at Law No. 2, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 716110
Honorable H. Paul Canales, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Phil Hardberger, Chief Justice

Sitting: Phil Hardberger, Chief Justice

Paul W. Green, Justice

Karen Angelini, Justice

Delivered and Filed: November 8, 2000

AFFIRMED

Scott Jessup ("Jessup") pled no contest to a misdemeanor theft offense and was sentenced in accordance with a plea bargain agreement. In his sole point of error, Jessup contends that the trial court inaccurately admonished him regarding the effect of his plea on his parole hold. We affirm the trial court's judgment.

Procedural History

Jessup was on a parole hold relating to a prior offense when he entered a plea of no contest to a misdemeanor theft offense pursuant to a plea bargain agreement. The trial court admonished Jessup regarding the range of punishment and noted that Jessup had executed a waiver of constitutional rights and court admonitions. The trial court confirmed that Jessup is a United States citizen and asked Jessup how he pled to the misdemeanor offense of theft. Jessup pled no contest and acknowledged his understanding that the trial court could still find him guilty. The trial court then stated:

THE COURT: I've also been informed that you have a parole hold. You also understand that this plea of no contest could also result in your plea being revoked?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

In response to the trial court's questioning, Jessup further stated that he had not been forced to enter the plea, that he had not been promised anything other than the plea bargain in exchange for the plea, and that he was entering the plea of his own free will. The State indicated that the plea agreement was for a fine of $500 plus court costs and 90 days in the Bexar County jail. The trial court accepted the plea but only sentenced Jessup to 45 days in the Bexar County jail plus the $500 fine and court costs.

Discussion

Jessup asserts that his plea was rendered involuntary by the statement the trial court made relating to his parole hold. Jessup acknowledges that the parole hold consequences are an indirect consequence of his plea. Because the trial court voluntarily chose to admonish Jessup regarding those consequences, however, Jessup contends that the trial court had an affirmative duty to admonish him correctly. Jessup contends that he was harmed by the misinformation provided by the trial court because he did not have a full understanding of the consequences of his plea.

When the record reflects that a trial court appropriately admonished a defendant, a prima facie showing that the defendant's guilty plea was knowing and voluntary is established. Guzman v. State, 993 S.W.2d 232, 235 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1999, pet. ref'd), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1174 (2000); Crawford v. State, 890 S.W.2d 941, 944 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1994, no pet.). If the erroneous admonishment addresses a collateral consequence of entering a guilty plea, and the trial court otherwise substantially complied with the admonishments required under article 26.13 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, the State satisfies its burden. Guzman, 993 S.W.2d at 235. The burden then shifts to the defendant to show that he did not otherwise understand the consequences of his plea. Id. The burden on the defendant is quite heavy, especially when the defendant states that he understands the nature of the proceeding, that the allegations are true, and that no outside pressure or influences coerced him into making the plea. Crawford, 890 S.W.2d at 944. The entire record must be examined in determining the voluntariness of a plea. Harling v. State, 899 S.W.2d 9, 13 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1995, pet. ref'd).

Courts across Texas consistently have held that article 26.13 applies only to pleas involving felony offenses. State v. Jimenez, 987 S.W.2d 886, 889 (Tex. Crim. App.1999). However, when a trial court undertakes to voluntarily admonish a defendant, it must do so accurately. Ex Parte Williams, 704 S.W.2d 773, 775 (Tex. Crim. App.1986); Rodriguez v. State, 933 S.W.2d 702, 704 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1996, pet. ref'd). In this case, Jessup does not complain that the trial court inaccurately admonished him regarding any of the article 26.13 admonishments. Jessup's complaint relates to the trial court's statement regarding Jessup's parole hold, which Jessup admits is a collateral consequence of his plea. As a result, Jessup bears the burden to show that he did not understand the consequences of his plea.

In order to show that a plea was rendered involuntary based on erroneous advice regarding parole eligibility, a defendant is required to show that parole eligibility is an affirmative part or element of the plea bargain. Ex parte Trahan, 781 S.W.2d 291, 293 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989). The same showing should apply to advice regarding a parole hold. In this case, Jessup does not claim, and the record does not show, that the effect of the plea on Jessup's parole hold was part of his plea bargain. See Delgado v. State, 891 S.W.2d 17, 19 (Tex. App.--El Paso 1994, no pet.) (no showing parole eligibility part of plea bargain). In fact, Jessup told the trial court that he had not been promised anything other than the plea agreement in exchange for his plea. Therefore, Jessup has failed to show that he relied on the court's statement relating to his parole hold in entering his plea. See id. (no showing of reliance on statement relating to parole eligibility). The court's confusing statement relating to Jessup's parole hold, even if considered erroneous, had absolutely nothing to do with the voluntariness of Jessup's plea. See id. (misstatement relating to parole eligibility not related to plea).

Conclusion

Because Jessup failed to show that his plea was rendered involuntary based on the trial court's confusing reference to his parole hold, we overrule Jessup's point of error and affirm the trial court's judgment.

PHIL HARDBERGER,

CHIEF JUSTICE

DO NOT PUBLISH

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