John Sharp and Coradine Sharp v. Stanley J. Bronder, Jr.--Appeal from 225th Judicial District Court of Bexar County

No. 04-99-00631-CV

John SHARP and Coradine Sharp,

Appellants

v.

Stanley J. BRONDER, Jr.,

Appellee

From the 225th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 96-CI-10007

Honorable David Berchelman, Jr. Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Catherine Stone, Justice

Sitting: Catherine Stone, Justice

Paul W. Green, Justice

Karen Angelini, Justice

Delivered and Filed: July 31, 2000

AFFIRMED

John Sharp and Coradine Sharp appeal from a summary judgment granted in favor of Stanley J. Bronder, Jr. Because the dispositive issue in this case involves well-settled law, we overrule the Sharps' points of error and affirm the trial court's order in this memorandum opinion pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1.

The Sharps sued Bronder for breach of an oral contract regarding the winding up of the parties' partnership. The Sharps alleged that, as part of the winding up of their partnership, Bronder orally agreed to reconvey his undivided one-half interest in certain real property owned by the partnership to them. Bronder moved for summary judgment on three independent grounds: (1) the parties never entered into such a winding-up agreement; (2) if such an agreement existed, the subject property would not be included in the terms of the agreement because it was not owned by the partnership; and (3) if such an agreement existed, it is unenforceable under the statute of frauds. The trial court granted Bronder's motion without specifying a ground as a basis for the judgment.

When, as in the instant case, the trial court enters a general summary judgment order, the nonmoving party on appeal must negate each ground on which the trial court could have granted summary judgment. Malooly Brothers, Inc. v. Napier, 461 S.W.2d 119, 121 (Tex. 1970). On appeal, the Sharps contest only the third stated ground - that the statute of frauds bars enforcement of the alleged oral agreement for reconveyance of real property, and they have failed to advance a broad point of error attacking the summary judgment in general. See id. (broad point of error complaining that trial court erred in granting summary judgment sufficient to permit argument as to all possible grounds upon which judgment should have been denied). Because the Sharps neither rebutted by specific points of error the two other arguments advanced by Bronder nor presented a Malooly point attacking the summary judgment in general, the summary judgment must be affirmed. See id.; Basse Truck Line, Inc. v. First State Bank, 949 S.W.2d 17, 19 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, writ denied).

Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Catherine Stone, Justice

DO NOT PUBLISH