Saladene Sharrieff v. The State of Texas--Appeal from 175th Judicial District Court of Bexar County

Annotate this Case
No. 04-98-00784-CR
Saladene SHARRIEFF,
Appellant
v.
The STATE of Texas,
Appellee
From the 175th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 97-CR-2707
Honorable Bill White, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Catherine Stone, Justice

Sitting: Catherine Stone, Justice

Sarah B. Duncan, Justice

Delivered and Filed: October 20, 1999

AFFIRMED

Saladene Sharrieff ("Sharrieff") was convicted of one count of aggravated assault of a peace officer and one count of assault of a peace officer. In one point of error, Sharrieff challenges his convictions on the basis that the jury's rejection of his insanity defense is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. We affirm the trial court's judgment.

Factual and Procedural Background

On April 9, 1997, Sharrieff was in the men's clothing department of the Dillard's Department Store in Central Park Mall in San Antonio, Texas, where he was observed walking into a dressing room with several items of clothing. Concerned because Sharrieff had been in there for a long period of time, a Dillard's employee contacted in-store security. Bexar County Sheriff Deputy Stephen Benoy, working as a part-time security officer for Dillard's, responded to the call. The employee directed Officer Benoy to Sharrieff's dressing room. As he approached the room, Officer Benoy smelled strong body odor and heard "metal being pried" and "plastic and paper being ripped," both noises that indicate security devices are being removed from clothing. At trial, Sharrieff explained that he attempted to break the security device in half because he had never seen it done. Officer Benoy knocked on the door, identified himself, and asked Sharrieff if he was okay. Sharrieff did not respond. Officer Benoy knocked twice more before Sharrieff opened the door wearing two pairs of pants, a black shirt, which the Dillard's employee identified as store merchandise, and concealing a second shirt. Believing Sharrieff was attempting to shoplift, Officer Benoy questioned him several times about the multiple layers of clothing. He did not respond. Officer Benoy described Sharrieff as confused.

Officer Benoy handcuffed Sharrieff and escorted him to a training office, a room adjacent to the manager's office, where Officer Benoy advised him he was under arrest. Inside the office, Officer Benoy uncuffed Sharrieff and ordered him to take off the store merchandise. Cooperating, Sharrieff took off the shirts, remaining in a bra that apparently belonged to him and the store's pants. He refused to remove the store's pants and became violent when Officer Benoy insisted that he do so. At trial, Sharrieff explained that he became agitated because he was not wearing underwear; he did not want to disrobe in front of the officers. Sharrieff hit Officer Benoy in the chest and face and then pushed him. With the help of Michael Lamb, a Dillard's operations manager, Officer Benoy attempted to restrain Sharrieff and handcuff him. Sharrieff broke free, grabbed a fire extinguisher, assumed a kick-box stance, and sprayed the extinguisher in the office. Sharrieff explained that he took such measures in order to protect himself from the officers. He testified that he feared for his life. Office Benoy cleared employees out of both the training room and the manager's office; the store manager phoned the San Antonio Police Department. Visibility in the area was significantly reduced.

Sharrieff then ran from the training room into the manager's office where he began lighting paper or clothing on fire and throwing the objects outside the office. At trial, Sharrieff explained that he lit the fires so that the fire department would respond to the crisis. He believed the firemen, as opposed to police officers, would treat him fairly. By the time San Antonio police officers arrived on the scene, Sharrieff had barricaded himself inside the office. Several officers identified themselves as law enforcement and directed Sharrieff to open the door. Officer Tucker, lead person in a rugby-like scrum formation, momentarily gained entry into the office before Sharrieff struck him in the face with a heavy metal object, breaking his glasses and gashing one of his upper eyelids. Officers eventually entered the office and discovered that Sharrieff had climbed into the crawl space in the ceiling, where he remained for approximately forty-five minutes. At trial, Sharrieff explained that he went into the ceiling with the intention of heading toward the dressing room area where he could jump down and leave the area. While in the ceiling crawl space, San Antonio police officer Benny Johnson attempted to coax Sharrieff down from the ceiling. His efforts, however, ended disastrously when Sharrieff threw a urine-filled condom at him. Officer Johnson testified that without warning Sharrieff threw a condom at him. He attempted to block himself, but it hit him in the face, breaking on contact. Sharrieff was eventually apprehended by a San Antonio Police Department S.W.A.T. team.

For his role in the April 9, 1997 melee, Sharrieff was charged with one count of aggravated assault of a peace officer and one count of assault of a peace officer. Prior to trial, Sharrieff's defense counsel filed a motion requesting that Sharrieff be examined both for competency to stand trial and sanity at the time of the offense. On September 26, 1997, and again on January 13, 1998, Sharrieff was found incompetent to stand trial. He was committed to Vernon State Hospital during his period of incompetency. On May 12,1998, Sharrieff was found to be competent; trial to a jury began in August 1998.

At trial, Sharrieff asserted the affirmative defense of insanity, which the jury implicitly rejected through its guilty verdict. On appeal, Sharrieff complains that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for new trial in which he argued that the jury's rejection of his insanity defense was against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence.

Affirmative Defense of Insanity

To establish the affirmative defense of insanity, the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he did not know that his conduct was wrong at the time of the offense as a result of a severe mental disease or defect. Tex. Penal Code Ann. 8.01 (Vernon 1994). Although the defense concerns a mental condition, the issue of insanity is not strictly medical. See Graham v. State, 566 S.W.2d 941, 948-49 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978). As explained by the Graham court:

Ultimately the issue of insanity . . . lies in the province of the jury, not only as to the credibility of the witnesses and weight of the evidence, but also as to the limits of the defense itself. . . . In deciding whether the abnormal mental condition of the accused will excuse criminal responsibility, the jury is not restricted to medical science theories of causation.

Id. at 952-53. Thus, although expert witnesses may aid the jury in its determination of whether a mental condition should excuse holding the defendant responsible for his crime, the jury may accept or reject any or all of the opinion testimony of physicians, and can accept lay testimony over that of experts. Id. at 952.

In determining whether the defendant has established his defense by a preponderance of the evidence, we consider all the evidence and determine whether the judgment is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence so as to be manifestly unjust. Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 132 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).

In support of his affirmative defense, Sharrieff called Dr. John Sparks to testify about Sharrieff's sanity at the time of the offense. Dr. John Sparks, the director of correctional health for Bexar County, first evaluated Sharrieff at the Bexar County Adult Detention Center several days after his arrest.(1) Dr. Sparks' evaluation from that first meeting indicated that Sharrieff was uncooperative, responding inappropriately to instruction, and generally unaware of his actions. Dr. Sparks described Sharrieff as agitated and noted that he appeared to be ill. Sharrieff did not seem elated or depressed; he seemed self-absorbed. And he was speaking in what is clinically referred to as "clang speech." Sharrieff would say a word and then repeatedly make a sound that mimicked the word. Based on his evaluation, Dr. Sparks concluded that Sharrieff was insane at the time of arrest.(2) This conclusion was based on Dr. Sparks' belief that Sharrieff was severely impaired by schizophrenia, and that as a result of that disease, he did not know that his conduct was wrong.

On cross-examination, Dr. Sparks explained that mentally ill people are not categorically insane. He stated that some mentally ill people are very clear on what they are doing; they understand that their actions are wrong. In the instant case, Dr. Sparks' conclusion regarding Sharrieff's sanity was based on the belief that Sharrieff lacked a clear understanding of what he had done. With respect to the shoplifting, Sharrieff told Dr. Sparks he did not know why he put on the clothes. With respect to Sharrieff's violent post-arrest reaction, Sharrieff indicated that he was acting out of fear of being harmed. Based on his conversations with Sharrieff, Dr. Sparks concluded that Sharrieff, as a result of his schizophrenic condition, did not know that his conduct was wrong. However, when presented with additional facts concerning both Sharrieff's arrest for shoplifting and the ensuing post-arrest fracas, Dr. Sparks' conclusion changed.

The prosecutor explained that Sharrieff had removed security tags from layers of store clothing he was found wearing. Acknowledging that he was unaware of those facts, Dr. Sparks agreed that such behavior would suggest that Sharrieff knew his actions were wrong; thus precluding application of the statutory affirmative defense of insanity. Sharrieff, however, as pointed out by Dr. Sparks, was not prosecuted for shoplifting. He was prosecuted for the assaults committed during his apparent attempted escape.

Turning to the circumstances surrounding that activity, the prosecutor inquired of Dr. Sparks whether an attempt to escape is consistent with someone who knows his conduct is wrong. Dr. Sparks responded affirmatively. The prosecutor also questioned Dr. Sparks about the urine-filled condom. According to Dr. Sparks that offensive gesture was not a calculated diversionary tactic. Dr. Sparks indicated that Sharrieff urinated in a condom out of necessity and simply discarded it by throwing it through an opening in the ceiling. Such a scenario, in Dr. Sparks' opinion, suggested that Sharrieff neither understood the nature of actions nor that those actions are wrong. But when asked if his opinion would change if it was established that Sharrieff deliberately threw the condom at Officer Johnson, Dr. Sparks agreed that it would. Dr. Sparks admitted he did not know Officer Johnson's version of events, and stated that "if the facts are that [Sharrieff] was looking at the officer and he threw [the condom] in the officer's face directly . . . that would change my opinion."

Understandably frustrated with being presented new facts at trial, Dr. Sparks stated:

There are two different sets of fact. I don't know which is the correct story. If I assume that Mr. Sharrieff told the truth about what happened, then I believe he was insane at the time. If I assume Mr. Sharrieff was mentally able to lie to me about that time, then I have a conflict, because if he was that sick, why was he not insane?

And the third is, if he was mentally ill, but not so ill at that time that he did know the officer was there, did [he] know what was happening and did have some reason to put all those clothes on, then he was certainly sane.

And I have to say it's somewhat confusing to hear additional facts that I haven't heard before. The facts I thought were facts and I tried to corroborate, say that at the time he did not know he was throwing [the condom] at an officer, that he got rid of it, and so he did not know he was doing something wrong by that explanation.

What you've added to it puts a different light on that explanation. Now I'm not certain that he was insane. Finding him insane is a very positive thing. Everything is negative. He wasn't, he wasn't, he wasn't. I have to say there is some fact that makes me come to that conclusion. Now I'm not certain. At that time I went through this, I thought he was definitely unaware and that he definitely didn't have intent to do some wrong.

(emphasis added).

The prosecutor then turned to the circumstances regarding the events that transpired before Sharrieff climbed into the ceiling. Dr. Sparks testified that although Sharrieff's behavior suggested a great deal of confusion, he acted as if he knew he was doing something wrong. That is, "he acted as if he needed to escape from the scene. . . When someone acts as if they know it was wrong, I have no other way of saying it's not wrong unless that person is acting as a result of a delusion that clearly says this is not real, I'm going to act because God is here, or whatever the delusion is, it's here causing me to do this. That did not happen in this case." (emphasis added).

At the close of his questioning, the prosecutor posed a final clarifying question:

So the only thing - What you're telling this jury, then, so that we're clear, is that if [Sharrieff] filled the condom with urine because he had to urinate and was merely tossing it away and not deliberately throwing it at an officer, that's the only conduct that you could describe that would tell this jury that he was insane at the time these offenses occurred?

Dr. Sparks answered affirmatively.

Considering all the evidence presented on the issue of Sharrieff's sanity, we are unable to conclude that the judgment, and thus the jury's implicit finding of sanity, was so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence that it was manifestly unjust. Dr. Sparks' opinion, although not binding upon the jury, was less than definitive. The jury heard Dr. Sparks change and or qualify his initial opinion as the prosecutor presented a fuller picture of Sharrieff's behavior. The jury, like Dr. Sparks, was free to believe that, although Sharrieff was exhibiting bizarre behavior, Sharrieff understood that his actions were wrong. The jury was free to believe that Sharrieff created a great deal of confusion and mayhem in an attempt to escape from the department store and evade arrest for shoplifting. Attempts to evade police or attempts to conceal evidence, both circumstances present in the instant case, may persuade a jury that a defendant understood that his actions were wrong. See Graham, 566 S.W.2d at 951; see also Smetana v. State, 991 S.W.2d 42, 47 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1998, pet. ref'd). The jury in the instant case was also free to disbelieve Sharrieff's benign explanation regarding the thrown condom. Thus, while the evidence suggested that Sharrieff suffered from a schizophrenic disorder, the jury was free to believe that by barricading himself in an office, striking an officer with a heavy metal object, and then climbing into a ceiling crawl space so that he could, according to his own testimony, leave the area, Sharrieff knew his actions were wrong. While this court may have reached a different decision, we do not sit as thirteenth jurors, and in the face of factually sufficient evidence, we must affirm the jury's verdict. See Blankenship v. State, 780 S.W.2d 198, 207 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (opinion on reh'g). Sharrieff's sole point of error is overruled.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Catherine Stone, Justice

DO NOT PUBLISH

1. Dr. Sparks also met with and evaluated Sharrieff in September 1997, January 1998, and June 1998. Those interviews were conducted not to determine the issue of sanity, but primarily to determine whether Sharrieff was competent to stand trial.

2. Although Dr. Sparks spoke in terms of "at the time of the arrest," review of his testimony in context indicates that he was referring to Sharrieff's mental state "at the time of the offense." See Tex. Penal Code Ann. 8.01 (Vernon 1994).

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.