Wilber Collins v. Clarence Walker d/b/a Brotherhood Recycling--Appeal from 129th District Court of Harris County
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Appellant’s Motion for Rehearing Denied; Majority and Concurring Opinions of
December 16, 2010, Withdrawn; Affirmed and Substitute Majority and Concurring
Opinions filed May 12, 2011.
In The
Fourteenth Court of Appeals
___________________
NO. 14-09-00587-CV
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WILBER COLLINS, Appellant
V.
CLARENCE WALKER D/B/A BROTHERHOOD RECYCLING, Appellee
On Appeal from the 129th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 2006-38481
SUBSTITUTE MAJORITY OPINION
Appellant, Wilbur Collins’s Motion for Rehearing is overruled; the majority
opinion of December 16, 2010 is withdrawn, and the following substitute majority opinion
is issued in its place.
This is an appeal by appellant from a judgment in favor of appellee, Clarence
Walker d/b/a Brotherhood Recycling. Finding no error, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This litigation arose out of a dispute involving a real estate lease. Appellant owned
the real estate and evicted appellee because appellee allegedly violated terms of the lease.
Appellee then filed suit against appellant alleging causes of action for breach of contract,
promissory estoppel, wrongful eviction, fraud, and trespass to try title. The dispute went
to trial before the court without a jury. The trial court ruled in favor of appellant on all of
appellee’s causes of action except promissory estoppel. On the promissory estoppel
claim, the trial court found in favor of appellee and entered judgment awarding appellee
$2,796.00 in actual damages. In addition, the trial court awarded appellee $5,600.00 in
attorney’s fees. The trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.
Plaintiff Clarence Walker d/b/a Brotherhood Recycling (“Mr.
Walker”) is an individual and currently the sole proprietor of Brotherhood
Recycling.
2.
Defendant Wilber Collins (“Mr. Collins”) is an individual who
formerly owned the property located at … Crosby, Texas 77532 (the
“Property”).
3.
Mr. Collins leased the Property pursuant to a Commercial Lease
Agreement (the “Lease Agreement”), dated August 30, 1999, to David
Lamon and Kenneth Washington.
4.
The Lease Agreement contained certain special provisions which
were typewritten into the agreement.
5.
The special provisions provided that the tenants had the option to
purchase the Property wherein the total rents paid would be applied toward
the same.
6.
The special provisions also provided that the term of the rental would
be as follows: (i) 43 monthly payments in the amount of $700 dollars and
120 monthly payments in the amount of $467 dollars and (ii) if the tenant
failed to pay rent for two consecutive months, the tenants could no longer
exercise the option to purchase and would lose their deposit.
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7.
Originally, David Lamon, Kenneth Washington, and Mr. Walker
were partners that did business as Brotherhood Recycling.
8.
Mr. Walker, although a partner with Brotherhood Recycling, did not
sign the Lease Agreement. The Lease Agreement also did not reference
Brotherhood Recycling. The Property, however, was used by Brotherhood
Recycling.
9.
Not long after the execution of the Lease Agreement, David Lamon
passed away. A few years later, Kenneth Washington was no longer
affiliated with Brotherhood Recycling. Mr. Walker became the sole de
facto tenant of the Property and as a sole proprietor of Brotherhood
Recycling, he continued to make payments to Mr. Collins for the Property.
10.
Mr. Collins allowed Mr. Walker to make certain excess payments
under the mistaken belief that he would eventually procure title to the
property [sic].
11.
Mr. Walker communicated his belief that he thought he was
purchasing the property [sic] from Mr. Collins as provided for under the
Lease Agreement. Mr. Collins through his conduct also led him to believe
that this was the case, although Mr. Walker was never a signatory to the
Lease Agreement.
12.
As a result of Mr. Walker’s reliance on Mr. Collins promises, he paid
amounts in excess of what he would have required to pay, as he believed the
excess would eventually go to the purchase of the Property.
13.
Attorneys’ fees in the amount of $5,600 are reasonable and necessary.
14.
Any finding contained herein which is more appropriately considered
a conclusion of law shall be considered as such.
CONCLUSION OF LAW
1.
There was no express contract between Mr. Walker and Mr. Collins
regarding the subject matter of the Property.
2.
Mr. Walker detrimentally relied on the promises of Mr. Collins and
that such reliance was reasonable, substantial, and foreseeable. In order to
avoid injustice, Plaintiff is entitled to damages resulting from the foregoing
reliance and unintentional windfall.
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3.
The Court finds that Plaintiff, Mr. Walker, has proven by a
preponderance of the evidence that the sum of $2,796 as damages, which, if
paid now in cash, would fairly and reasonably compensate Plaintiff, Mr.
Walker, for his claim of promissory estoppel.
4.
The Court finds the Plaintiff, Mr. Walker, is entitled to attorneys’ fees
on his claim for promissory estoppel in the amount of … Five Thousand Six
Hundred Dollars ($5,600).
5.
Any conclusion of law contained herein which is more appropriately
considered a finding of fact shall be considered as such.
Appellant timely requested that the trial court modify/amend its findings of fact and
conclusions of law. However, appellant’s request for modified or amended findings and
conclusions were all requests for the trial court to omit its original findings and conclusions
and to substitute them with findings and conclusions contrary to the trial court’s decision in
the case. Appellant’s request was overruled by operation of law. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
Appellant brings two issues on appeal. In his first issue, appellant contends the
trial court erred in rendering judgment in favor of appellee because the judgment is not
supported by all necessary findings of fact and conclusions of law and the trial court erred
when it refused to adopt appellant’s requested additional or amended findings of fact and
conclusions of law. In his second issue, appellant asserts the evidence is not legally or
factually sufficient to support the trial court’s judgment. We address each issue in turn.
I.
Is the judgment supported by all necessary findings of fact and conclusions of
law?
The judgment in this case awarded appellee damages on his promissory estoppel
cause of action. The elements of promissory estoppel are: (1) a promise, (2) foreseeability
of reliance by the promisor, (3) substantial and reasonable reliance by the promisee to its
detriment, and (4) enforcing the promise is necessary to avoid injustice. Sipco Servs.
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Marine v. Wyatt Field Serv. Co., 857 S.W.2d 602, 605 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
1993, no writ).
There is a general presumption that judgments of courts of general jurisdiction are
valid.
Vickery v. Commission for Lawyer Discipline, 5 S.W.3d 241, 251 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied). In a case tried before the court without a
jury, in which there are findings of fact and conclusions of law, the reviewing court will
indulge every reasonable presumption in favor of the findings and judgment of the trial
court. Id. at 252. No presumption will be indulged against the validity of the judgment.
Id. The presumption of validity may be rebutted. Id. Because the presumption is
always in favor of the validity of the judgment, the burden of demonstrating error rests with
the appellant. Id.
After judgment is rendered in a bench trial, either party may request findings of fact
and conclusions of law. Id. at 253 (citing Tex. R. Civ. P. 296). However, because
findings of fact and conclusions of law can provide a basis for overcoming the presumption
of validity that extends to judgments and demonstrating error on appeal, they are normally
requested by the losing party. Id. When this occurs, the trial court will, as a matter of
practice, invite the prevailing party to submit proposed findings and conclusions based
upon its rulings. Id. Therefore, it is normally the prevailing party in the trial court and
the appellee on appeal, who prepares proposed findings on specific elements necessary to
support the trial court’s judgment. Id. Following this, the losing party, normally the
appellant on appeal, may request additional findings on omitted elements to prevent them
from being deemed found on appeal. Id. at 254 (citing Tex. R. Civ. P. 298). This fits
with the primary purpose of the Rules of Civil Procedure dealing with findings of fact and
conclusions of law: assisting the losing party in narrowing the issues on appeal by
ascertaining the true basis for the trial court’s decision. Id. at 255. A request for negative
findings contrary to the trial court’s judgment has no logical or legal significance toward
rebutting the presumption of validity unless the trial court is specifically alerted to the real
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issue; namely, that one or more necessary elements have been omitted in the trial court’s
original findings. Id. at 256.
Here, both in the trial court and in his appellate brief, appellant has not referred this
court to specific and necessary elements that were omitted from the trial court’s findings of
fact and conclusions of law.
Instead, appellant’s request for amended or modified
findings of fact and conclusions of law appears to be appellant’s protest that the trial court
resolved disputed facts against him. Because appellant did not present any necessary
elements that were omitted from the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law,
we conclude (1) that appellant has not rebutted the presumption of validity that attaches to
a trial court’s judgment; and (2) that the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of
law, when viewed from that perspective, support the judgment.
In the second part of appellant’s first issue, appellant complains that the trial court
erred when it refused to adopt appellant’s requested additional or amended findings of fact
and conclusions of law. A trial court has no duty to make additional or amended findings
that are unnecessary or contrary to its judgment; a trial court is only required to make
additional findings and conclusions that are appropriate. Id. at 254. In addition, the trial
court is not required to make additional findings which conflict with the original findings.
Id. As pointed out above, all of appellant’s requested additional or amended findings of
fact and conclusions of law were contrary to the trial court’s original judgment; therefore,
we hold the trial court was not required to adopt them.
We overrule appellant’s first issue.
II.
Did appellant waive his second issue?
In his second issue appellant asserts the evidence is legally and factually insufficient
to support the judgment. However, appellant fails to cite any legal authority under this
issue. The Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure control the required contents and the
organization for an appellate brief.
Valadez v. Avitia, 238 S.W.3d 843, 845 (Tex.
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App.—El Paso 2007, no pet.) (citing Tex. R. App. P. 38.1). An appellant’s brief must
contain a clear and concise argument that includes appropriate citations to legal authority.
Id. This requirement is not satisfied by merely uttering brief, conclusory statements
unsupported by legal citations. Id. Failure to cite legal authority results in waiver of the
complaint. Id. Because appellant’s second issue does not comply with the requirements
of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38, he has waived it on appeal.1 Because it has been
waived, we overrule appellant’s second issue.
/s/
John S. Anderson
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Anderson, Frost, and Seymore. (Frost, J., Concurring).
To the extent appellant’s second issue could be construed as complaining about the lack of a
reporter’s record, we conclude that too is waived due to the failure to cite any legal authority. Tex. R. App.
P. 38.
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