Edgar Josias Vasquez v. The State of Texas--Appeal from 337th District Court of Harris County
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Affirmed and Majority and Concurring Opinions filed November 4, 2010.
In The
Fourteenth Court of Appeals
NO. 14-09-00620-CR
EDGAR JOSIAS VASQUEZ, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 337th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 1145289
CONCURRING OPINION
The main issue in this appeal is whether a traffic-stop detention was unreasonable
because the officer did not ask the driver for consent to search the vehicle until two
minutes after receiving confirmation that the driver had a valid license and no
outstanding warrants, and that the vehicle was not stolen. The majority concludes that
the detention was reasonable because by this time the officer had reasonable suspicion to
believe that another offense had been or was being committed. Instead, this court should
conclude that continuing the detention for two more minutes was reasonable under the
circumstances, even presuming that the officer had no reasonable suspicion of another
offense.
Fourth Amendment ―reasonableness‖ is measured ―‗in objective terms by
examining the totality of the circumstances‘‖; it ―‗eschew[s] bright-line rules, instead
emphasizing the fact-specific nature of the . . . inquiry.‘‖ Kothe v. State, 152 S.W.3d 54,
63 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (quoting Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39, 117 S. Ct. 417,
136 L.Ed.2d 347 (1996)). It requires a balance between the public interest served and the
individual‘s right to be free from arbitrary detentions and intrusions. Id.
In the case under review, Trooper Kibble‘s initial detention of appellant was
reasonable based on suspicion of two traffic violations.
Trooper Kibble promptly
initiated a license and warrants check. He asked appellant various questions and prepared
warning citations.
By 11:21 a.m., Trooper Kibble had received confirmation that
appellant had a valid license and no outstanding warrants and that the vehicle was not
stolen. Two minutes later, appellant validly consented to a search of his vehicle, which
resulted in the discovery of sixty-eight kilograms of cocaine. The main issue is whether
Trooper Kibble‘s continued detention of appellant for these two minutes was reasonable.
In deciding whether the duration of a detention is ―reasonable,‖ the general rule is
that an investigative stop can last no longer than necessary to effect the purpose of the
stop. See id. But, during a traffic stop, police officers may request information from the
driver, such as a driver‘s license and vehicle registration, and may conduct a computer
check on that information. See id. After this computer check is completed, and the
officer learns that the driver has a valid license and no outstanding warrants, and that the
vehicle is not stolen, the traffic-stop investigation is fully resolved. See id. at 63–64.
The officer may continue the detention if another reasonable basis for detaining the driver
arises. See id. at 63–67. If not, the Court of Criminal Appeals has indicated that the
officer should release the driver shortly after this computer check is completed. See id.
at 63–64 (stating that driver must be permitted to leave after computer check is completed
and there is no new valid basis for detaining the driver, indicating that detention for a
brief period after this point can be reasonable, and holding that detention for very short
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period of time after this point was reasonable). But there are no rigid time limitations on
these detentions. See id. at 64. In determining whether the detention of a driver was
reasonable, the issue is whether the officer diligently pursued a means of investigation
that was likely to confirm or dispel his suspicions quickly, during the time necessary to
detain the driver. Id.
Further, an officer making a traffic stop need not investigate the situation in a
particular order; however, the detention becomes unreasonable under the circumstances if
the officer ―unduly prolongs‖ the detention. See id. at 65. The order of events during a
traffic stop, though relevant to the determination of ―reasonableness,‖ is not
determinative. See id. at 66. Fourth Amendment ―reasonableness‖ does not require a
―single, formulaic approach‖ to a traffic-stop investigation, and it does not mandate rigid
adherence to ―the least intrusive means‖ of investigation defined by reviewing courts
using hindsight. Id. at 66 (quoting United States v. Brigham, 382 F.3d 500, 511 (5th Cir.
2004) (en banc)).
As in Kothe, in the case under review, there was a brief interval between
completion of the computer check and the next event allowing further detention. In
Kothe, the interval was very short because the next event occurred almost immediately
after the completion of the computer check. See id. at 66–67. Nonetheless, the Kothe
court stated that there was a period of time between these two events and the court held
that continued detention of the driver during this interval was reasonable. See id. at 66–
67. In the case under review, the time period was two minutes. The record shows that
Trooper Kibble diligently pursued his investigation, and there was no evidence that he
engaged in a ―fishing expedition‖ or unduly prolonged the detention. See id. at 65–67.
Viewing the totality of the circumstances, the continued detention of appellant during the
two-minute period between the completion of the computer check and appellant‘s
consent to a search of the vehicle was ―reasonable‖ as a matter of substantive Fourth
Amendment law. See id; Caraway v. State, 255 S.W.3d 302, 308 (Tex. App.—Eastland
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2008, no pet.) (involving an officer who received consent to search a vehicle less than
one minute after receiving information about the driver‘s criminal history). For the
foregoing reasons, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant‘s
motion to suppress. Accordingly, I respectfully concur in the court‘s judgment.
/s/
Kem Thompson Frost
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Anderson, Frost, and Seymore. (Anderson, J., majority).
Publish — TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
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