Ronald James Wooden v. The State of Texas--Appeal from County Court of Waller County

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed July 24, 2007

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed July 24, 2007.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

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NO. 14-06-00093-CR

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RONALD JAMES WOODEN, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from County Court at Law

Waller County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. CC04-488

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Appellant Ronald James Wooden challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for the misdemeanor offense of failure to stop and give information after being involved in a traffic accident. We affirm.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

While en route to College Station via FM 359 in Waller County on the afternoon of June 17, 2004, David Michael Brown noticed a light colored GMC pick-up truck following his vehicle very closely. Brown, who was driving a black Ford Expedition, observed that the individual in the pick-up, whom he later identified as appellant, was making strange hand gestures at him. Brown also noticed that the pickup=s headlights were on high beam. Brown recalled passing the pick-up earlier that day. According to Brown, he tapped his brake pedal to warn appellant that he was following too closely, and appellant slammed on his brakes. As Brown approached an intersection and slowed down to stop, appellant accelerated around Brown on the right-hand shoulder of the road and wedged his vehicle between Brown=s Expedition and the vehicles in front of Brown. After Brown saw appellant glaring at him, Brown attempted to go around appellant=s pickup by driving on the shoulder. Instead of allowing Brown to pass around him, appellant drove his own vehicle onto the shoulder and prevented Brown from driving back onto the road.

The two vehicles proceeded along the roadway, with appellant on the shoulder and Brown in the grass trying to gain enough speed to get around appellant and back on the roadway. After Brown veered around a road sign, he was able to get back onto the road behind appellant=s pickup. Because appellant then began driving very slowly, Brown tried to pass appellant on the left-hand side. Brown moved into the opposite lane to pass, but appellant sped up and veered into that lane. Appellant forced Brown=s vehicle onto the shoulder on the opposite side of the road and then hit Brown=s Expedition in the front right quarter panel and right-side door, causing over $200 in damage. Brown slammed on his brakes after appellant=s vehicle collided with his Expedition, and then managed to get back onto the road behind appellant=s pickup. Appellant again slowed his vehicle to a low rate of speed, and, rather than trying to pass again, Brown used his cell phone to make a 9-1-1 call. When appellant saw Brown using his cell phone, he sped up and fled the scene.

Brown followed appellant while describing to the 9-1-1 operator where he was and what turns he was taking. Brown was able to follow appellant until appellant turned off into a driveway. Brown then waited in his vehicle on the street in front of the driveway for a law enforcement officer to arrive.

A Department of Public Safety (ADPS@) officer arrived at the scene and attempted to talk with appellant. Appellant denied involvement in the accident and refused to allow the officer onto his property to inspect his pickup truck without a warrant. The DPS officer and Brown returned to the scene of the accident where the officer took Brown=s statement and photographed various skid marks and tire tracks on the road and in the grass.

A few weeks later, on August 5, 2004, appellant was charged by information with the misdemeanor offense of failure to stop and give information after being involved in an accident. He was convicted by a jury after a one-day trial. The trial court sentenced appellant to ninety days= confinement in the Waller County Jail, probated for one year with thirty days of his sentence to be served on consecutive weekends, and a $1,000 fine, with $800 probated.

II. Issues and Analysis

In two issues, appellant challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction.

A. Legal Sufficiency

When conducting a legal-sufficiency review, we examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Mason v. State, 905 S.W.2d 570, 574 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). The standard is the same for both direct and circumstantial evidence. King v. State, 895 S.W.2d 701, 703 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). We do not weigh the evidence, or evaluate the credibility of any witnesses, as this is the function for the trier of fact. Fuentes v. State, 991 S.W.2d. 267, 271 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). The jury may choose to believe or disbelieve any portion of the witnesses=s testimony. Sharp v. State, 707 S.W .2d 611, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). When faced with conflicting evidence, we presume the trier of fact resolved any conflicts in favor of the prevailing party. Turro v. State, 867 S.W.2d 43, 47 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). Therefore, if any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, we must affirm. McDuff v. State, 939 S.W.2d 607, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).

The driver of a vehicle involved in an accident resulting only in damage to another vehicle must immediately stop at the scene of the accident and remain there until he has: (1) provided the other driver with his name and address, the license plate number of his vehicle, and the name and address of his liability insurer, and (2) shown his driver=s license, if requested and available, to the other driver. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. '' 550.022(a), 550.023 (Vernon 1999); see also Birdwell v. State, 10 S.W.3d 74, 79 (Tex. App.CHouston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. ref=d). Failure to comply with these requirements is a Class B misdemeanor if the damage to all vehicles is $200 or more. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. ' 550.022(c)(2).

The record contains eyewitness testimony that appellant, while driving a vehicle, was involved in an accident that caused damage in excess of $200 and knowingly left the scene of the accident without providing any information whatsoever to the driver of the other vehicle. Although the record contains conflicting evidence that appellant was not involved in this accident and that his vehicle could not have been driven in the manner described by Brown at the time the accident occurred, when conducting a legal sufficiency review, we presume the jury resolved any such conflicts in favor of the prevailing party. See Turro, 867 S.W.2d at 47. Indeed, in his brief, appellant admits that the testimony at trial provided Asome evidence of each of the required elements@ of the offense and that Athe State did make its prima facie case on each element of the offense charged.@ Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense in this case beyond a reasonable doubt. See McDuff, 929 S.W.2d at 614. Accordingly, the evidence is legally sufficient to support appellant=s conviction, and we overrule his first issue.

B. Factual Sufficiency

In evaluating a challenge to the factual sufficiency of the evidence, we view all the evidence in a neutral light and inquire whether we are able to say, with some objective basis in the record, that a conviction is Aclearly wrong@ or Amanifestly unjust@ because the great weight and preponderance of the evidence contradicts the jury=s verdict. Watson v. State, 204 S.W.3d 404, 414 17 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). It is not enough that this court harbor a subjective level of reasonable doubt to overturn a conviction that is founded on legally sufficient evidence, and this court cannot declare that a conflict in the evidence justifies a new trial simply because it disagrees with the jury=s resolution of that conflict. Id. at 417. If this court determines the evidence is factually insufficient, it must explain in exactly what way it perceives the conflicting evidence greatly to preponderate against conviction. Id. at 414 17. Our evaluation should not intrude upon the fact finder=s role as the sole judge of the weight and credibility given to any witness=s testimony. See Fuentes v. State, 991 S.W.2d 267, 271 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). In conducting a factual sufficiency review, we discuss the evidence appellant claims is most important in allegedly undermining the jury=s verdict. Sims v. State, 99 S.W.3d 600, 603 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).

First, we note that in his appellate briefing, appellant has not identified any evidence that he claims undermines the jury=s verdict. However, both appellant and his wife testified at trial that he was at home when the accident occurred. In addition, appellant and two other witnesses testified that appellant=s truck had serious mechanical problems near the time of the accident.[1] Although, this evidence contradicted Brown=s eyewitness testimony regarding the accident, this court may not re-evaluate the weight and credibility of the record evidence and thereby substitute our judgment for that of the fact-finder. Wilson v. State, 863 S.W.2d 59, 65 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). The jury was entitled to believe all of the State=s evidence and, at the same time, disbelieve all of the evidence introduced by appellant. See Tucker v. State, 15 S.W.3d 229, 235 36 (Tex. App.CHouston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. ref=d). Giving due deference to the jury=s assessment of the witnesses= credibility and resolution of evidentiary conflicts, we conclude, after reviewing the evidence in a neutral light, that the verdict is not against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence and is not clearly wrong or unjust. Therefore, the evidence is factually sufficient to support appellant=s conviction, and we overrule appellant=s second issue on appeal.

Having overruled both of appellant=s issues, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

/s/ Kem Thompson Frost

Justice

Judgment rendered and Memorandum Opinion filed July 24, 2007.

Panel consists of Justices Anderson, Fowler, and Frost.

Do not publish C Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).

[1] Appellant also emphasizes that at the time of the accident his GM pickup, which the jury actually viewed in the courthouse parking lot during his trial, was a dark green color with primer on the front. In an effort to cast doubt on whether his truck was involved in the accident, appellant focuses on Brown=s description of the vehicle, which appellant characterized as Apale green.@However, Brown actually described the color of the truck as follows, AIt was a real pale color, kind of a green and white pale, real flat color, almost like a primer or something like that.@ Additionally, the State was not required to identify appellant=s vehicle as part of its case-in-chief; rather, it was appellant=s identity as the driver of the vehicle that was an element of the offense. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. '' 550.022(a), 550.023.