Flanigan, Billy R. v. Arriba Limited, A Bahamas Corporation and The Petroleum Workers Union of The Republic of Mexico, et al--Appeal from 281st District Court of Harris County

Dismissed and Memorandum Opinion filed July 17, 2003.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

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NO. 14-02-01138-CV

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BILLY R. FLANIGAN, Appellant

V.

ARRIBA LIMITED, A BAHAMAS CORPORATION and THE PETROLEUM WORKERS UNION OF THE REPUBLIC OF MEXICO, ET AL., Appellees

On Appeal from the 281st District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 85-35446AC

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

This is an attempted interlocutory appeal from an order denying appellant=s motion to vacate the receiver=s appointment signed September 27, 2002. On October 16, 2003, appellant, the intervenor below, filed his notice of accelerated appeal. Because we lack jurisdiction over this appeal, we dismiss.

James B. Gomez, was appointed by a Bahamian court as the receiver for Arriba Limited. On May 22, 2002, he filed an application for a writ of garnishment to enforce an earlier judgment in favor of Arriba in the underlying suit. Appellant filed a motion to show authority questioning Gomez=s authority to act on behalf of Arriba. The trial court denied the motion and ordered Athat James B. Gomez be recognized as the receiver for Arriba Limited and Astor Limited with all powers granted by his order(s) of appointment.@ The trial court did not appoint Gomez as receiver. Appellant then moved to vacate the receiver=s appointment, which the court denied. When the trial court denied appellant=s motion to vacate the receiver=s appointment, the court specifically included the following language in the order:

To clarify: James B. Gomez has not been appointed receiver by this Court. This Court, however, will give full faith and credit [to] the Bahamian Order absent (1) further order of that court; or (2) a showing as to why such order should not be recognized.

On May 28, 2003, appellee, Arriba Limited, filed its brief in this appeal. In its brief, Arriba asserted this is an improper interlocutory appeal because it does not arise from an order that appoints a receiver or from an order overruling a motion to vacate an order that appoints a receiver. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. ' 51.014(a)(1),(2) (listing interlocutory orders that may be appealed).[1] Arriba requested the appeal be dismissed.

The legislature determines, by statute, whether a particular type of pretrial ruling may be appealable before a final judgment is rendered. Appellate courts have jurisdiction to consider immediate appeals of interlocutory orders only if a statute explicitly provides appellate jurisdiction. Stary v. DeBord, 967 S.W.2d 352, 352 53 (Tex. 1998). A statute authorizing an appeal from an interlocutory order is in derogation of the general rule that only final judgments are appealable; therefore, Texas courts strictly construe those statutes authorizing interlocutory appeals. America Online, Inc. v. Williams, 958 S.W.2d 268, 271 (Tex. App.CHouston [14th Dist.] 1997, no writ).

On June 23, 2003, notification was transmitted to all parties of the Court=s intent to dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction unless appellant demonstrated meritorious grounds for continuing the appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a). Appellant=s response was due July 3, 2003, but no response was filed. Appellant also did not file a brief in reply to appellee=s brief requesting dismissal of the appeal.

We hold that Section 51.014 does not grant the right to an interlocutory appeal over the trial court=s order denying appellant=s motion to vacate the appointment of a receiver who was not appointed by the court pursuant to Texas law. Accordingly, the appeal is ordered dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

PER CURIAM

Judgment rendered and Memorandum Opinion filed July 17, 2003.

Panel consists of Chief Justice Brister and Justices Fowler and Edelman.

[1] Section 51.014 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code provides in relevant part:

A person may appeal from an interlocutory order of a district court, county court at law, or county court that:

(1) appoints a receiver or trustee;

(2) overrules a motion to vacate an order that appoints a receiver or trustee;

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. ' 51.014(a)(1),(2).