Randle, Jeffrey Leante v. The State of Texas--Appeal from 182nd District Court of Harris County

Affirmed and Opinion filed _____________, 2002

Affirmed and Opinion filed October 3, 2002.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

____________

NO. 14-01-01090-CR

____________

JEFFREY LEANTE RANDLE, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

 

On Appeal from the 182nd District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 872,319

 

O P I N I O N

A jury found appellant, Jeffrey Leante Randle, guilty of delivery of cocaine weighing less than one gram, and sentenced him to eleven months in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, State Jail Division. Appellant argues the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support a guilty verdict. We affirm.

On March 22, 2001, Houston Police Officers Batts and Weido were working undercover to identify and arrest narcotics dealers. Officer Batts asked appellant if he knew where someone was. Appellant responded by asking, What are you looking for? Officer Batts told appellant he was looking for a twenty, slang for twenty dollars worth of crack cocaine. Appellant instructed Officer Batts to pull his car over to the curb. Appellant approached the driver s side window and handed Batts a rock of crack cocaine in exchange for a twenty-dollar bill. Shortly thereafter, a different officer stopped appellant and found a twenty-dollar bill in his pocket. The serial number on this bill matched the number Officer Batts had recorded from the bill he handed appellant. Appellant presented no testimony in his defense.

In six points of error, appellant challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to establish he delivered cocaine through an actual transfer, constructive transfer, or by an offer to sell. See Tex. Health & Safety Code 481.112 & 481.102 (3)(D). We apply the usual standards of review. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2797 (1979); Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 10 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).

To support a conviction for delivery of a controlled substance, the State must prove appellant knowingly delivered a controlled substance by either actual transfer, constructive transfer, or by an offer to sell. Tex. Health & Safety Code 481.112 & 481.102 (3)(D). The verdict stands if the evidence supports any one of the three alternative manners of delivery the State alleged in the indictment. See Brooks v. State, 990 S.W.2d 278, 283 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).

Here, the testimony of two officers establishes that appellant took a rock of crack cocaine from his mouth and handed it to Officer Batts. In return, Officer Batts gave appellant a twenty-dollar bill. Appellant argues that a lack of physical evidence corroborating the officers testimony (such as a recording of the transaction) undermines the sufficiency of the evidence. But corroboration of undercover officers testimony is not required. Williams v. State, 830 S.W.2d 303, 304 (Tex. App. Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no pet.).

In the instant case, the testimony of the officers and admission of the cocaine into evidence is both legally and factually sufficient to support a finding that an actual transfer occurred, and we will not second-guess the jury s determination of the officers credibility. See Allen v. State, 39 S.W.3d 428, 430 (Tex. App. Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.) (finding testimony of a single officer factually sufficient to uphold conviction for delivery of cocaine).

Having found the evidence legally and factually sufficient to establish appellant delivered cocaine through an actual transfer, we will not review the sufficiency of the evidence to establish delivery through either constructive transfer or by an offer to sell. See Aguirre v. State, 732 S.W.2d 320, 326 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (declining to review sufficiency under each alternative means). We overrule appellant s six points of error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

/s/ Scott Brister

Chief Justice

Judgment rendered and Opinion filed October 3, 2002.

Panel consists of Chief Justice Brister and Justices Hudson and Fowler.

Do Not Publish Tex. R. App. P. 47.3(b).