Justice Frimpong Manson v. The State of Texas--Appeal from 240th District Court of Fort Bend County

Opinion issued September 27, 2007

In The

Court of Appeals

For The

First District of Texas

NOS. 01-06-00224-CR

01-06-00225-CR

01-06-00226-CR

01-06-00227-CR

JUSTICE FRIMPONG MANSON Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 240th District Court

Fort Bend County, Texas

Trial Court Cause Nos. 40,866; 40,867; 40,868 A; & 43,182

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Justice Frimpong Manson ("Manson") appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress prior recorded statements. Concluding that the trial court acted within its discretion in denying the motion, we affirm.

Background

In accord with the deferential standard of review applicable to the trial court's denial of Manson's motion to suppress, we recite the facts in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling. See State v. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d 808, 818 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

In September 2004, Officer Wood of the Rosenberg Police Department responded to a reported incident of indecency with a child. Wood, who was in plain clothes, drove his unmarked car to the family's apartment that morning to investigate the report. Other uniformed officers in marked patrol cars also arrived at the scene to aid in the investigation.

Wood went into the home to speak with the victim's mother. While he was interviewing her, Manson called numerous times. During one of the calls, Wood spoke with Manson and asked him to return to the apartment so that they could talk.

Manson voluntarily drove himself to the location and met Wood outside the apartment. Wood identified himself as a police officer and explained that he was there to investigate the charge of indecency with a child. Wood suggested to Manson, "[l]et's go sit in my car. You can sit in the passenger's seat, and I'll sit in the driver's seat, sit in the car so we can talk."

Manson got into the car and sat in the front passenger seat as requested. Wood started the car to run the air conditioning and explained that he planned to tape record their conversation. Wood then turned on the tape recorder that was sitting on the armrest between the passenger and driver's seats and told Manson: "First off, I need to read you your Miranda warning." According to Wood's procedure, he read each right to Manson and then asked him if he understood that right. Manson replied that he understood and agreed to waive his rights, and, without prompting, gave a statement in which he confessed to improper physical contact with the victim.

Following Manson's statement, Wood instructed another officer at the scene to arrest Manson. That officer placed Manson under arrest and took him to the Rosenberg city jail for processing. Manson was charged with indecency with a child. At some point after processing, Manson was transferred to the Fort Bend County jail.

A few weeks later, Officer Lilly of the Harris County Sheriff's Office visited Manson at the Fort Bend County jail. Lilly told Manson that he was investigating allegations against Manson of sexual misconduct occurring in Harris County and gave him some information about the possible charges, including the fact that they involved the same victim. Then, Lilly recited the warnings verbatim from the Miranda form used by law enforcement officers. Lilly also advised Manson that he would be recording the statement. Manson waived his Miranda rights and agreed to give a statement, admitting that he knew he had a problem and wanted to get some help.

After the interview, Lilly discovered that the recording equipment did not work properly and did not make a recording. The next day, Lilly returned with a video recorder and asked Manson if he was willing to give another statement. Lilly repeated each of the Miranda warnings to Manson, This time, Lilly recorded the entire interview. During the interview, Manson confessed to further conduct that led to the three additional charges of aggravated sexual assault against him.

Officer Lilly testified that he did not deprive Manson of food, water, or sleep, or otherwise coerce him into giving the statement. Manson did not invoke his right to an attorney in either interview and did not indicate that he did not want to be recorded.

Manson initially entered a plea of not guilty on all counts. (1) Before trial, Manson sought to suppress the recorded statements. The court heard evidence and denied the motion. At the State's request, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law supporting its denial of Manson's motion to suppress. They include findings that:

the testimony of Officers Woods and Lilly was trustworthy and credible;

Manson's testimony describing the circumstances surrounding his statements was not credible; and

both Wood and Lilly had refrained from asking Manson any questions before giving Manson his Miranda warnings.

The trial court also concluded that: (1) Manson was warned of his Miranda rights before making the confessions; (2) Manson knowingly waived his right to an attorney on each occasion; and (3) Manson's confessions "were freely and voluntarily made without any compulsion or persuasion," and thus were admissible at trial.

Following the court's denial of the motion to suppress, the case proceeded to trial. After the State rested its case in chief, Manson changed his plea to guilty on all four counts and elected to have the jury assess his punishment. The jury determined punishment for each count, assessing ten years' confinement for the count of indecency with a child, and confinement for sixty years, twenty-five years, and fifty years, respectively, for each count of aggravated sexual assault. Manson preserved and now pursues his right to appeal the pretrial motion to suppress.

Motion to Suppress

Texas law codifies procedural safeguards designed to ensure that the custodial interrogation of a defendant does not violate that individual's constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. Tex. R. Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.22 2 (Vernon 2005); see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1612 (1966); Wilkerson v. State, 173 S.W.3d 521, 526 n.14 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (Article 38.22 adds to safeguards outlined in Miranda). When a defendant moves to suppress a prior statement on the grounds that it was not given voluntarily, the trial court must independently determine whether the statement was voluntary and admissible. Tex. R. Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.22, 6 (Vernon 2005).

Standard of review

When, as here, the trial court makes explicit fact findings to support its ruling on a motion to suppress, we determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, actually supports those findings. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d at 818. Because the trial court is the sole trier of fact and judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony, we give almost total deference to its determination of the historical facts that the record supports, especially when they turn on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). We likewise defer to the trial court's rulings on mixed questions of law and fact if the resolution of those ultimate questions turns on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Montanez v. State, 195 S.W.3d 101, 108-09 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 89. We review de novo a trial court's rulings on mixed questions of law and fact only when the trial court's rulings do not turn on the credibility and demeanor of the witnesses. Estrada v. State, 154 S.W.3d 604, 607 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Johnson v. State, 68 S.W.3d 644, 652-53 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).

The trial court's ruling rests entirely on its express determinations concerning the credibility of the witnesses' testimony. Consequently, a highly deferential standard applies in examining whether its findings amount to clear and convincing evidence that Manson made his statements voluntarily.

Denial of Manson's motion

Manson claims that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to suppress because the officers' initial efforts to conduct each of the interviews occurred without the safeguards required by Miranda and thus tainted any statement made following the Miranda warnings. He complains that:

Officer Wood never told him the purpose of the investigation or that Manson was free to leave, and that he did not feel he was free to leave;

he did not want to give a statement, but did so because Officer Wood told him that he was making things harder for himself by not giving a statement;

he asked Officer Lilly for an attorney before making his statement, but Lilly responded that Manson would receive probation if he cooperated by just giving the statement.

Manson's complaints are all premised on his version of events. Both officers disputed Manson's testimony. They averred that they did not discuss any of the charges with Manson until he heard the Miranda warnings, acknowledged that he understood them, and expressed his intent to waive his rights. The trial court found credible the officer's version of events and specifically found that Manson's testimony on these same issues not credible.

An accused who has received the Miranda warnings has been sufficiently informed of the nature of his rights, so a waiver on that basis is considered a knowing and intelligent one. Tex. R. Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.22, 2, 6; see Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 296, 300, 108 S. Ct. 2389, 2397-99 (1988). The evidence, viewed in light of the trial court's credibility determinations, supports its findings that the officers timely and properly informed Manson of his Miranda rights and that, on each occasion, he "did then knowingly waive his right to an attorney and did then freely and voluntarily, without being induced by any compulsion, threats, promises, or persuasion," before making his oral confessions. Giving due deference to the trial court's findings of fact, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Manson voluntarily waived his rights before giving each statement.

Conclusion

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Jane Bland

Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Hanks and Bland.

Do not publish. Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).

1. Each trial court cause number assigned in this case represents one of the counts brought against Manson.