William Bloodworth, III v. Kristi Aden--Appeal from 278th District Court of Walker County

Opinion issued June 28, 2007

Opinion issued June 28, 2007

 

 

 

In The

Court of Appeals

For The

First District of Texas

 

NO. 01-05-00796-CV

 

WILLIAM BLOODWORTH II, Appellant

V.

KRISTI ADEN, Appellee

 

 

On Appeal from the 278th District Court

Walker County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 14153C

 

 

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

William Bloodworth II appeals the trial court s order granting appellee Kristi Aden s motion for sanctions. In four issues, Bloodworth contends the trial court erred in submitting the sanctions issue to the jury, and in imposing a sanction against Bloodworth personally instead of against William D. Bloodworth II, PLLC. We conclude that (1) any error in the submission of the sanctions issue to the jury was harmless, and (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sanctioning Bloodworth personally. We therefore affirm.

Background

Kristi petitioned the trial court to modify a child support order against her ex-husband, Steven Wayne Aden. Steven hired Bloodworth to represent him in the lawsuit. Bloodworth answered the lawsuit and filed a counterclaim on Steven s behalf. The counterclaim sought to modify the trial court s conservatorship order. Kristi moved for sanctions against Bloodworth, asserting that the counterclaim was frivolous and filed in violation of section 10.001 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code and Rule 13 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 10.001 (Vernon 2002); Tex. R. Civ. P. 13.

Steven thereafter fired Bloodworth because he felt that Bloodworth had misled him with regard to filing a counterclaim. The trial court granted Bloodworth s motion to withdraw from his representation of Steven. Bloodworth then intervened in the lawsuit between Steven and Kristi, asserting claims against Steven for breach of contract and sworn account, and challenging Kristi s motion for sanctions. Steven counterclaimed against Bloodworth, asserting claims for legal malpractice, fee forfeiture, and violations of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act. Steven and Bloodworth, however, eventually nonsuited their claims against one another.

At the hearing on the motion for sanctions, Steven testified that he never authorized Bloodworth to file the counterclaim to modify the conservatorship order. Rather, Steven told Bloodworth simply that he would like more visitation with his daughter. When Steven asked Bloodworth why he had filed the counterclaim to modify conservatorship, Bloodworth responded, that s the way us lawyers do that. You know, give the Judge some playing room to go in there and settle for something in between.

Kristi testified that she paid $25,000 to retain an attorney to defend the conservatorship counterclaim. Kristi had to borrow money from her grandmother to pay the retainer. Kristi s attorney testified that he billed $32,131.83 in this case.

Bloodworth testified that Steven came to his office and informed him of the various problems he was having with Kristi concerning custody of the couple s daughter. Bloodworth explained to Steven the various actions he could take to remedy the problems, and asked Steven to discuss the options with his most trusted advisors. Bloodworth testified that Steven gave him permission to file the counterclaim to modify conservatorship.

At the end of the hearing, the trial court submitted the sanctions issue to the jury. The jury found that Steven s counterclaim against Kristi seeking to modify the trial court s conservatorship order was frivolous. The jury also found that Bloodworth should pay Kristi $8,250 in attorney s fees as a sanction for filing the frivolous counterclaim on Steven s behalf. The trial court entered an order against Bloodworth, stating:

IT IS ORDERED that the pleadings filed in this matter by William Bloodworth, III [sic] were found to be frivolous, groundless and baseless by a jury and this Court. The fact that William Bloodworth, III [sic] filed fictitious pleadings causing this matter to become a custody issue in order to harass and intimidate Kristi Aden and against the wishes of his client, Steven Aden created a frivolous, groundless and baseless cause of action, with the intent to harass Kristi Aden. Therefore, IT IS ORDERED by this Court that a money judgment is rendered against William Bloodworth, III [sic] as sanctions and in favor of Kristi Aden in the amount of $8,250.00. Further, it is an ORDER of this Court that William Bloodworth, III [sic] make payment to Kristi Aden on or before 5:00 p.m. on _______________, 2005.

Jury Trial

In his first three issues, Bloodworth contends the trial court erred in submitting the sanctions issue to the jury.

Filing a frivolous pleading is litigation misconduct subject to sanction under Chapter 10 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code and Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 13. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 10.001 10.006 (Vernon 2002); Tex. R. Civ. P. 13; Low v. Henry, 221 S.W.3d 609, 614 (Tex. 2007); Am. Transitional Care Ctrs. of Tex., Inc. v. Palacios, 46 S.W.3d 873, 878 (Tex. 2001). If a sanction order refers to a specific rule, either by citing the rule, tracking its language, or both, we determine whether the sanction is appropriate under that particular rule. Finlay v. Olive, 77 S.W.3d 520, 524 (Tex. App. Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.). In this case, the trial court s sanction order tracks the language of Rule 13. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 13.

Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 13 provides for sanctions if a party files a pleading that is groundless and brought in bad faith or groundless and brought for the purpose of harassment. Id. Groundless means no basis in law or fact and not warranted by a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. Id. Rule 13 requires the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing to make the necessary factual determinations about the motives and credibility of the person signing the allegedly groundless petition. Id.; Bisby v. Dow Chem. Co., 931 S.W.2d 18, 21 (Tex. App. Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no writ). A court may not impose sanctions under Rule 13 except for good cause, the particulars of which must be stated in the sanction order. Tex. R. Civ. P. 13.

The decision to impose Rule 13 sanctions and the existence of groundlessness, bad faith, and harassment are questions of law for the court. See id. ( If a pleading, motion or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, after notice and hearing, shall impose an appropriate sanction available under Rule 215-2b, upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both. (emphasis added)); Trevino v. Ortega, 969 S.W.2d 950, 954 (Tex. 1998); Donwerth v. Preston II Chrysler-Dodge, Inc., 775 S.W.2d 634, 636 (Tex. 1989); Riddick v. Quail Harbor Condo. Ass n, Inc., 7 S.W.3d 663, 677 78 (Tex. App. Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.); Falk & Mayfield L.L.P. v. Molzan, 974 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex. App. Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. denied) ( We hold, therefore, that a trial court may, under appropriate circumstances, impose sanctions under Rule 13 in excess of the costs or expenses incurred by the defendant. ). There is no right to a trial by jury on the issue of whether rule 13 has been violated. Neely v. Comm n for Lawyer Discipline, 976 S.W.2d 824, 827 28 (Tex. App. Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, no pet.); see also Brantley v. Etter, 677 S.W.2d 503, 504 (Tex. 1984) (rejecting proposition that one complaining of the award of attorney s fees as sanctions has the right to a jury trial to determine the amount of such attorney s fees and holding that the amount of attorney s fees awarded as sanctions for discovery abuse is solely within the sound discretion of the trial judge, only to be set aside upon a showing of clear abuse of that discretion ); Bradt v. Sebek, 14 S.W.3d 756, 763 n.2 (Tex. App. Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. denied).

A trial court errs if it submits a question of law to the jury. See Knutson v. Ripson, 163 Tex. 312, 314, 354 S.W.2d 575, 576 (1962); Hudson Buick, Pontiac, GMC Truck Co. v. Gooch, 7 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. App. Tyler 1999, pet. denied); Markert v. Williams, 874 S.W.2d 353, 356 (Tex. App. Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied). Absent a showing of extraneous prejudice, however, such error is harmless since no harm results if it is answered as the trial court should have answered it, or it can be deemed immaterial and disregarded by the trial court if answered incorrectly. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.1(a)(1); Spencer v. Eagle Star Ins. Co. of Am., 876 S.W.2d 154, 157 (Tex. 1994) ( A question which calls for a finding beyond the province of the jury, such as a question of law, may be deemed immaterial. ); Med. Towers, Ltd. v. St. Luke s Episcopal Hosp., 750 S.W.2d 820, 826 (Tex. App. Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, writ denied).

In this case, the trial court s sanction order states, the pleadings filed in this matter by William Bloodworth, III [sic] were found to be frivolous, groundless and baseless by a jury and this Court. (emphasis added). This language indicates that the trial court made the necessary findings to support the sanction order separate from the jury s findings. The order further provides:

The fact that William Bloodworth, III [sic] filed fictitious pleadings causing this matter to become a custody issue in order to harass and intimidate Kristi Aden and against the wishes of his client, Steven Aden created a frivolous, groundless and baseless cause of action, with the intent to harass Kristi Aden. Therefore, IT IS ORDERED by this Court that a money judgment is rendered against William Bloodworth, III [sic] as sanctions and in favor of Kristi Aden in the amount of $8,250.00.

The trial court complied with the requirements of Rule 13 in that it held an evidentiary hearing on the sanctions issue, and its order particularly states the good cause for issuing the sanction. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 13; Gaspard v. Beadle, 36 S.W.3d 229, 239 (Tex. App. Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. denied) ( A trial court s failure to specify the good cause for sanctions in a sanction order may be an abuse of discretion. ); Bisby, 931 S.W.2d at 21. Because the trial court made the necessary findings to support the sanction order on its own, the jury s answers to the charge questions on sanctions could have been deemed immaterial and disregarded by the trial court if answered incorrectly. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.1(a)(1); Spencer, 876 S.W.2d at 157; Med. Towers, 750 S.W.2d at 826. We therefore hold that any error in the submission of the sanctions issue to the jury was harmless. SeeTex. R. App. P.44.1(a)(1).

  Professional Limited Liability Company

In his fourth issue, Bloodworth contends the trial court erred in imposing a sanction against him personally instead of against William D. Bloodworth II, PLLC. Bloodworth admitted a certificate of incorporation at the sanctions hearing demonstrating that he operates his law practice as a professional limited liability company (PLLC).[1] Bloodworth asserts that he acted on behalf of William D. Bloodworth II, PLLC when he signed the groundless pleading, and is therefore protected from personal liability for the sanction under the Texas Limited Liability Company Act. See Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 1528n, 4.03(A) (Vernon Supp. 2006) ( Except as and to the extent the regulations specifically provide otherwise, a member or manager is not liable for the debts, obligations or liabilities of a limited liability company including under a judgment decree, or order of a court. ).

Under the Texas Government Code, the practice of law means

the preparation of a pleading or other document incident to an action or special proceeding or the management of the action or proceeding on behalf of a client before a judge in court as well as a service rendered out of court, including the giving of advice or the rendering of any service requiring the use of legal skill or knowledge, such as preparing a will, contract, or other instrument, the legal effect of which under the facts and conclusions involved must be carefully determined.

Tex. Gov t Code Ann. 81.101(a) (Vernon 2005). The practice of law in Texas is restricted to members of the State Bar, with limited exceptions permitted by the Texas Supreme Court. Id. 81.102 (Vernon 2005); In re Nolo Press/Folk Law, Inc., 991 S.W.2d 768, 770 (Tex. 1999). The State Bar is composed of those persons licensed to practice law in Texas. Tex. Gov t Code Ann. 81.051(a) (Vernon 2005).

Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 13 provides: If a pleading, motion or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, after notice and hearing, shall impose an appropriate sanction available under Rule 215-2b, upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both. Tex. R. Civ. P. 13.

Bloodworth has a license to practice law and he acted in his professional capacity when he signed the pleading at issue in this case.[2] As the person who signed the pleading, Bloodworth subjected himself to personal liability for the sanction resulting from the pleading. Id. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sanctioning Bloodworth personally.

Conclusion

We hold that (1) any error in the submission of the sanctions issue to the jury was harmless, and (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sanctioning Bloodworth personally. We therefore affirm the order of the trial court.

Jane Bland

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Nuchia, Hanks, and Bland.

 

[1] Bloodworth formed his PLLC before January 1, 2006. The Texas Business Organizations Code therefore will not apply to the PLLC until January 1, 2010. See Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code Ann. 402.005(b) (Vernon Supp. 2006). Until then, the Texas Limited Liability Company Act remains applicable. See Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 1528n (Vernon Supp. 2006).

[2] An attorney may also subject his law firm to liability for a sanction in certain circumstances. See Finlay v. Olive, 77 S.W.3d 520, 527 (Tex. App. Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (upholding sanction against attorney and his law firm);Kiefer v. Cont l Airlines, Inc., 10 S.W.3d 34, 41 (Tex. App. Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied) (affirming sanction against law firm for introducing certain witnesses at hearing on motion for new trial).