IN THE MATTER OF D.H., A CHILD

AFFIRM; Opinion issued September 30, 2010
 
 
 
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
............................
No. 05-09-00657-CV
............................
IN THE MATTER OF D.H., A CHILD
.............................................................
On Appeal from the 397th Judicial District Court
Grayson County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 07-03-8148-J
.............................................................
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices O'Neill, Francis, and Lang
Opinion By Justice Francis
        D.H. appeals the trial court's order modifying his disposition and committing him to the Texas Youth Commission until his nineteenth birthday. In two points of error, D.H. claims he did not receive adequate notice of the hearing on the motion to modify disposition and the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court's finding he violated his probation. We affirm.
         In January 2005, when D.H. was thirteen, he committed two acts of aggravated sexual assault of a child as well as indecency with a child. The trial court found D.H. to have engaged in delinquent conduct and placed him on probation. During the next few years, the State filed several motions to modify disposition. In its final motion to modify dated April 14, 2009, the State alleged D.H. violated two terms of his probation: (1) failing to successfully complete the juvenile sexual offender treatment program and (2) failing to successfully complete the boot camp program at the Department of Juvenile Services Juvenile Boot Camp because he did not follow the program rules and successfully complete the inpatient sex offender treatment portion of the boot camp. After a hearing, the trial court ordered D.H. committed to the Texas Youth Commission until he reached nineteen years of age and ordered D.H. be required to register as a sex offender.
        In his first point of error, D.H. claims he did not receive reasonable notice of the hearing on the State's motion to modify disposition as required by section 54.05(d) of the family code and, thus, did not have an adequate opportunity to prepare for the hearing as required by law.
        Section 54.05(d) provides that “[r]easonable notice of a hearing to modify disposition shall be given to all parties.” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.05(d) (West 2008). However, as a prerequisite to presenting a complaint on appeal, Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1 requires the record show the complaint was timely made to the trial court, the grounds were specifically stated or were readily apparent from the context, the complaint complied with the rules of evidence or appellate procedure, and the trial judge ruled on the objection. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a); Ibarra v. State, 11 S.W.3d 189, 197 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). “Except for complaints involving fundamental constitutional systemic requirements which are not applicable here, all other complaints based on a violation of both constitutional and statutory rights are waived by failure to comply with Rule 33.1.” Ibarra, 11 S.W.3d at 197.
        The State filed its petition for hearing to modify disposition on April 14, 2009. At the April 22, 2009 hearing, D.H. did not object to the lack of reasonable notice on the modification nor did he seek a continuance or argue he required additional time to prepare for the hearing. Under these circumstances, we conclude appellant has not preserved this issue for appellate review. We overrule his first point of error.
        In his second point of error, D.H. contends “there was clearly insufficient evidence to support” the trial court's finding that D.H. violated his probation. D.H. does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence or any other aspect of the trial court's order requiring him to register as a sex offender.
        Juvenile courts are vested with broad discretion in determining whether to modify the disposition of juveniles found to have engaged in delinquent conduct. In re D.R., 193 S.W.3d 924, 924 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.). When reviewing the trial court's decision, we examine the entire record to determine whether the trial court acted unreasonably or arbitrarily or without reference to any guiding rules or principles. In re K.B., 106 S.W.3d 913, 915 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.). The trial court has discretion to resolve conflicts in the evidence as long as some evidence supports the decision. In re D.R., 193 S.W.3d at 924-25.
        The State filed its petition to modify disposition alleging D.H. violated the conditions of his probation by (1) failing to attend, participate, and successfully complete the Department of Juvenile Services juvenile sexual offender treatment program and (2) failing to follow the program rules and successfully complete the inpatient sex offender treatment portion of the boot camp. At the hearing on the State's petition, Destry Hawthorne, a juvenile probation officer in Grayson County, said D.H. was originally adjudicated for engaging in delinquent conduct in 2005. The victim was D.H.'s seven-year-old sibling. The State's first motion to modify was filed in February 2007 when D.H. evaded arrest by the Sherman Police Department. When D.H. was sixteen years old, he had several violations of probation, including having “inappropriate sexual behavior” with his thirteen-year-old girlfriend which resulted in the State filing its second motion to modify in April 2008. In April 2009, the State filed its final motion to modify when D.H. was pulled from boot camp for an “incident” with a female staff member. According to Hawthorne, D.H. failed to complete the sex offender treatment program. Hawthorne had concerns about whether D.H. would receive adequate care, supervision, and protection if released to go home. He was also concerned that D.H., if released, would be a danger to himself and others because (1) D.H.'s original victim was only seven years old at the time of the offense and (2) D.H. revealed during the course of his treatment that he had sexually assaulted a number of other victims.
        As for the incident with the female staff member, David Gray, a drill instructor at the Grayson County Boot Camp, discovered D.H. had performed an unauthorized search of the internet for personal information on Rose Mercado, a female drill instructor at the boot camp. In addition, D.H. performed an unauthorized search for Mercado's personal information on the Texas Juvenile Probation Committee website. When Gray realized what D.H. had done, he then searched the computer and discovered other violations, including a search of how to “hack a TI 83 graphing calculator.” At the time D.H. searched for Mercado's personal information, D.H. was only authorized to be using the computer to check in library books for inventory purposes.
        Markita Johnson, D.H.'s case manager for the Department of Juvenile Services, said D.H. committed inappropriate boundary violations with boot camp staff. She and other staff members warned D.H. on at least two prior occasions about the inappropriate behavior. When asked to specify what the inappropriate behavior was, Johnson said D.H. showed his penis to Mercado, sent her messages, wrote her letters, and attempted to access Mercado's personal information, including her address. Furthermore, D.H did not successfully complete the sex offender treatment program.
        Bill Mory is a licensed sex offender treatment provider who contracts his services with the Grayson County Department of Juvenile Services. Mory described the treatment program D.H. attended which included individual treatment, group therapy, and polygraphs. According to Mory, D.H. was candid about his victims during the polygraph, revealing he had at least ten victims, one of whom was in diapers at the time of the assault. Seven victims were more than two years younger than D.H. and had been victimized prior to D.H. being on probation. The assaults involved oral sex and fondling; Mory was not sure whether penetration occurred during the assaults. Mory said D.H.'s “very inappropriate” behavior while in boot camp-inappropriate fantasies about and inappropriate contact with a female staff member followed by his searching the internet for personal information on that staff member-were “highly concerning.” Mory also stated D.H. had anger issues although he made some progress in that area.
        The record shows D.H was warned at least two times about his inappropriate behavior, specifically about not having fantasies about or contact with Mercado. D.H. nevertheless showed Mercado his penis and attempted to send her messages and letters. In addition, he performed unauthorized searches of the internet for personal information about her. Furthermore, the evidence shows D.H. failed to successfully complete the sexual offender treatment program as required. In light of the record before us, we cannot conclude the trial court abused its discretion in finding D.H. violated his probation as alleged in the State's petition to modify disposition. We overrule D.H.'s second point of error.
        We affirm the trial court's order modifying D.H.'s disposition.
 
 
                                                          
                                                          MOLLY FRANCIS
                                                          JUSTICE
 
090657F.P05