GERALD CODY JONES, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

AFFIRMED; Opinion Filed January 12, 2010.
 
 
 
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
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No. 05-09-00144-CR
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GERALD CODY JONES, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
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On Appeal from the County Criminal Court No. 6
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. MB07-84990-G
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OPINION
Before Justices Moseley, Richter, and Francis
Opinion By Justice Moseley
        A jury convicted Gerald Cody Jones of evading arrest or detention and assessed punishment at twenty-five days' confinement in the county jail and a $500 fine. In a single point of error, appellant contends the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. We affirm.
        In reviewing a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we examine the evidence to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Vodochodsky v. State, 158 S.W.3d 502, 509 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). We review all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and assume the trier of fact resolved conflicts in the testimony, weighed the evidence, and drew reasonable inferences in a manner that supports the verdict. See Rollerson v. State, 227 S.W.3d 718, 724 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant intentionally fled from R. Ocnaschek, a person he knew was a peace officer attempting lawfully to arrest or detain him. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 38.04(a) (Vernon Supp. 2009).
        The jury heard testimony from two witnesses, and appellant. Billy Rountree testified that at 9:15 p.m. on December 16, 2007, he was driving onto the access ramp from Town East Boulevard to Interstate-635 when a truck approached him from behind at a high rate of speed. The truck missed colliding with Rountree's vehicle, but it hit the retaining wall, spun around across two lanes, and ended in a ditch. Rountree stopped his vehicle and ran to the truck, dialing 911 on his cell phone. He went to the passenger-side door, but it was jammed. He pulled the door open and appellant, who was in the passenger seat, began yelling for Rountree to shut the door. Then, appellant got out of the truck and demanded Rountree get off the phone. Rountree testified appellant's breath smelled of an alcoholic beverage, and he had slurred speech. Appellant knocked the phone from Rountree's hand, then hit Rountree in the head, knocking off his hat. Appellant jumped back into the truck as the driver got it started again. The vehicle drove away, eventually stopping in a nearby bank parking lot. Appellant and the driver got out of the truck and walked toward a restaurant. As they tried to go into the restaurant, a police officer grabbed them.
        Mesquite police officer R. Ocnaschek heard the police dispatcher put out a call about a possibly intoxicated person who had committed an assault. Ocnaschek testified that because he was near the restaurant's location where the suspects were spotted, he decided to go there and help other officers. By the time Ocnaschek arrived, the two suspects had left their vehicle. As he drove toward the back of the restaurant, Ocnaschek saw appellant and another man. Ocnaschek, who drove a marked patrol car and wore a police uniform, rolled down the window and ordered the men to stop. Appellant looked at Ocnaschek, but continued walking quickly toward the restaurant. Ocnaschek activated his overhead lights and continued yelling at both men to stop. When appellant and the other man ran, Ocnaschek jumped from his vehicle and chased them. As appellant and the other man tried to enter a side door of the restaurant, Ocnaschek grabbed them and physically restrained them. Another officer arrived and helped handcuff both men. Ocnaschek testified he believed appellant and the other man were suspects in a crime, and he sought to question them by commanding them to stop. Appellant and the other man were the only individuals in the parking lot at the time Ocnaschek first arrived.
        Appellant denied that he yelled at or hit Rountree, testifying he never saw Rountree that evening. Appellant also denied fleeing from Ocnaschek. Appellant testified he was in the front passenger seat and his friend was driving. Their vehicle was in the center lane of Interstate-635, and not on the access ramp, when another car swerved in front of them. The driver lost control, hit a wall, spun across the lanes, and stopped on an embankment facing downward. The airbags deployed, so the driver could not turn the car's wheels. The driver got the vehicle started, then drove down the embankment, over a hill, and over a curb into the back part of a bank parking lot. Both appellant and the driver got out and walked to a nearby restaurant. The driver had called his sister to come get them, and they intended to wait for her inside the restaurant. As appellant and the driver neared the restaurant's door, an officer pulled up and yelled at them to stop. Appellant and the driver turned from the door and began walking toward the officer. A second officer grabbed appellant from behind, slammed him to the ground, and handcuffed him. Appellant testified he had consumed five or six beers that day over a five-hour period.
        Appellant now contends the evidence is insufficient because the State failed to prove that Ocnaschek's attempt to detain him was “lawful.” Appellant asserts Ocnaschek never provided “specific, articulable facts” that implicated appellant in any criminal conduct. The State responds that the evidence is sufficient to support appellant's conviction.
        The evidence presented showed appellant fled from Ocnaschek, who was in his police uniform and driving a marked patrol car, although Ocnaschek commanded appellant to stop. Ocnaschek told the jury he believed appellant was one of the suspects described in the police dispatcher broadcast about an intoxicated person who may have also been involved in an assault. Although appellant testified he did not flee from the officer, the jury was free to accept or reject any or all of the evidence presented by either side. See Wesbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103, 111 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). It was the jury's function to resolve any conflicts in the evidence. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.04 (Vernon 1979); Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
        Viewed under the proper standard, we conclude the evidence is legally sufficient to support appellant's evading arrest or detention conviction. See Vodochodsky, 158 S.W.3d at 509; Rollerson, 227 S.W.3d at 724. We overrule appellant's sole point of error. In his prayer, appellant asks this court to find the evidence factually insufficient. Because appellant failed to address this issue within the body of his brief, he has waived the issue on appeal. Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(h).
        We affirm the trial court's judgment.
 
                                                          
                                                          JIM MOSELEY
                                                          JUSTICE
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47
090144F.U05