LORENZO DEWAYNE JOHNSON, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

AFFIRM; Opinion Filed December 20, 2010.
 
 
 
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
............................
No. 05-09-00133-CR
............................
LORENZO DEWAYNE JOHNSON, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
.............................................................
On Appeal from the 363rd Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F08-51506-PW
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OPINION
Before Justices Morris, Moseley, and Myers
Opinion By Justice Myers
        Lorenzo Dewayne Johnson was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. In three issues, he argues that the jury improperly rejected his affirmative defense, the evidence is insufficient, and the trial court erred in refusing to allow him to introduce into evidence the redacted portion of a video recording. We affirm.
Background
        Shortly after arriving at work on the morning of November 15, 2007, Detective Roberto Arredondo, Jr., a homicide detective with the Dallas Police Department, learned that a triple shooting and homicide had occurred at an apartment complex in Dallas, Texas. Arredondo and another detective drove to the crime scene.         Earlier that morning, at approximately 5:25 a.m., a 911 caller reported hearing gunshots at the apartment complex. At 6:18 a.m., a resident in that same complex called 911 and reported that a shooting victim, later identified as Vincent Corley, had come to the caller's apartment across the breezeway from apartment 177, where the shooting occurred.
        During the course of his investigation, Arredondo discovered that Corley had received a gunshot wound to the head, but was in good condition. A second gunshot victim, Christopher Dickerson, received a gunshot wound to the spine and was paralyzed from the chest down. The third victim, Brandon Brown (the complainant), was found dead in the bathroom. According to the testimony of the medical examiner, Tracy Dyer, Brown died from a gunshot wound to the head.
        Arredondo testified that shell casings were found in the apartment. One of the casings was a .25 caliber shell casing; the others were 9mm shells. The detective said that someone had “wiped down” certain areas in the apartment. There were a couple of surveillance televisions in the apartment and some two-by-fours that appeared to have been used as door braces. These discoveries led Arredondo to suspect the apartment could have been used as a “drug house.” As the investigation continued and police interviewed survivors and pursued other leads, they identified appellant and a man named Eric Harris, also known as Black, as suspects. Both Corley and Dickerson had picked appellant and Harris out of photographic lineups. Harris was apprehended on January 25, 2008. He did not give a statement.
        On February 12, 2008, detectives learned that appellant had been apprehended in Minneapolis, Minnesota. Arredondo and another detective, Eddie Lopez, flew to Minneapolis to interview appellant. Appellant waived his Miranda rights and gave a statement, which was videotaped. During the trial, a redacted version of the video recording was admitted into evidence and played for the jury.         During the interview, appellant told Arredondo he used crack cocaine and that he and Harris had gone to apartment 177 to purchase marijuana. Appellant said that for hours he and the others were drinking, smoking, rapping, and “having a good time.” Harris then went into the bathroom and returned with a pistol. Harris told appellant to tie up the others with duct tape. Appellant said the drugs in the house included marijuana, some Ecstasy pills, and bottles of liquid PCP. Appellant admitted he picked up a .380 semi-automatic handgun that did not have a clip in it because it looked “cute” and he “liked it.” He also admitted to taking money from the other men at gunpoint. Appellant told Arredondo that he left the apartment twice before the shootings, carrying stolen property to his car. Appellant also said that Harris told him to “wipe down” the apartment, and appellant wiped down all of the areas that Harris told him to wipe down. As he left the apartment and walked to his car, appellant heard gunshots, a pause, and then more shots. He contended this shooting was unexpected. Harris then got into appellant's car and appellant drove him to Harris's girlfriend's house. Appellant said he did not ask Harris what happened because he did not want to know. Appellant also denied knowing that a shooting was going to occur. Although he at first denied being in the bathroom where the shootings occurred, appellant later admitted that he had been in the bathroom and had pointed a gun at the people in there. When Arredondo told appellant that two of the individuals were still alive, he said “they should be able to tell you I didn't shoot them.” Appellant also told the detective that, after the shootings, he did not leave town until he went to Minneapolis for drug treatment. Appellant was arrested at the drug treatment facility in Minneapolis.
        Christopher Dickerson testified that he was in a wheelchair and paralyzed from the chest down because of the shooting. Dickerson knew Harris because he bought Ecstasy pills from him. On the night of the offense, Dickerson and Brown were already at the apartment when Corley arrived. They “smoked a little,” and Corley went to bed. Shortly before midnight, appellant and Harris came to the apartment to purchase some marijuana. Dickerson testified that he had never seen appellant prior to that evening. Later, Harris went to the bathroom. Dickerson entered the bathroom after Harris exited, but something appeared to be wrong, so Dickerson turned around and opened the bathroom door. When he did, Harris was pointing a pistol at him.
        Appellant brought Dickerson to the living and dining area, and Harris ordered him to take off his clothes. Appellant pointed two revolvers at Brown and told him to disrobe. The men took Dickerson's and Brown's money and cell phones, and appellant tied their arms with tape. While Dickerson and Brown were on the floor, Harris went into the bedroom and woke up Corley, who was brought into the living area at gun point and stripped. Appellant bound Corley's arms with tape. Appellant and Harris then marched the three men to the bathroom.
        Dickerson recalled that appellant and Harris “wiped the apartment down” with sponges. Dickerson heard Harris say something to the effect of, “[W]e going to clean this up and we going to let DPD clean up the rest.” Harris told Dickerson that he and his friend had “fucked up.” Dickerson believed Harris was angry because he had received only twenty-four Ecstasy pills when he thought he should have received twenty-five. Dickerson said he had children and that Harris “didn't have to do us like that,” but appellant said, “let's shut [them ] up,” and he wrapped tape around their mouths. Appellant did not say much; Harris appeared to be in charge. Dickerson testified that appellant put their clothes in “a laundry bin that we put trash in,” and carried it to the car. Appellant left the apartment twice. Dickerson told appellant there was a bag that contained marijuana and PCP in his car, so appellant went to the car and retrieved it.
        The three bound men were lined up across the tub with their hands tied behind their backs. They were covered with a blanket. Harris asked them if they were ready to die. Dickerson heard two clicks, and Harris told appellant to “move with that broke ass gun.” Dickerson thought it was Harris who started shooting. Dickerson heard five shots, and the third shot hit him. Dickerson remained conscious, but his body felt flushed. He stayed slumped over in the tub until he heard appellant and Harris run out the door. Dickerson called out to Corley and Brown. Corley jumped up and went to the nearby apartment 178 to call the police. When Corley returned to pull Dickerson from the apartment, they discovered that Brown was dead. Dickerson saw Harris with two nine millimeter automatic handguns. Dickerson said that appellant had a revolver, and he may have been carrying a .357 or a .38 caliber weapon. At no time during this episode did it appear to Dickerson that appellant was being threatened or pressured to participate.
        Vincent Corley testified he was staying at the apartment and, on the night of the offense, he returned to the apartment where he smoked marijuana, “drank some beer,” and “went to sleep.” After falling asleep, Corley remembered being tapped on the head with a pistol by Harris. Harris told Corley to get up and go to the living room. Harris had two automatic pistols. After reaching the living room, Corley noticed that Dickerson and Brown were on the floor and bound with duct tape. Appellant was pointing a revolver at Brown. Corley had never seen appellant before, and he believed that Harris and Dickerson knew each other.
        Harris appeared to be in charge, and he told Corley to disrobe. Harris told appellant to tie up Corley with duct tape, and Corley's hands were tied behind his back and his mouth was taped. Harris and appellant then gathered up the victims' clothes, money, phones, drugs, and other items. Their clothes were thrown in a trash can. Harris told Dickerson that he had “fucked up.” Dickerson was on the ground pleading with Harris. Corley heard Dickerson tell Harris that “he could have whatever he wanted. It didn't have to be like this.” Appellant “never said . . . one word,” according to Corley.         While Harris held the three men at gunpoint, appellant took the stolen items outside to a car. Corley also saw Harris “wiping” things down. After the property was removed from the apartment, Corley heard someone say, “[W]e cleaned up this party, we're going [to] let DPD clean up the rest.” The three bound men were then taken to the bathroom, where they were told to bend over the tub. Corley said a blanket was thrown over his head, and he heard Harris tell appellant either that he knew “what to do” or he knew “what time it is.” Corley heard three shots. The next thing he remembered was hearing Dickerson call his name. Corley ran across the hall to call the police. Corley had been shot in the head but the bullet “bounced off [his] skull.”
        Police found four spent shell casings in the bathroom. According to testimony from Dineen Corden, a Dallas crime scene detective, and Charles Clow, a firearms and tool mark examiner with the Southwestern Institute of Forensic Sciences, three of the casings were 9mm Luger shells, and the fourth was .25 auto caliber. The bullet recovered from Brown was “consistent with a .38 or .357 caliber bullet,” according to Clow. Clow also noted that the “.38/.357” bullet was “consistent with . . . having been fired by a revolver,” but he acknowledged that there are .38 and .357 caliber semi- automatic weapons.
        Andre Sims testified that he lived in Minneapolis and that appellant's brother Vincent had called him to arrange for appellant to travel to Minneapolis for drug treatment. On February 11, 2008, Sims picked up appellant at the bus station in Minneapolis. Appellant appeared to be under a “lot of stress.” When Sims asked appellant “how things were going,” appellant said, “[T]hings are fucked up. We robbed some drug dealers and they came out shooting and we shot back.” Sims, who was then on parole, subsequently reported this conversation to his parole officer. Sims later gave a written statement in which he stated that appellant told him “that it was him and two other guys who did this.”         Appellant testified that he phoned Harris on the night of the offense to buy marijuana. Harris, who supplied the neighborhood with crack cocaine and marijuana, told appellant that he did not have any marijuana, but he would take appellant to a place where he could purchase it. Appellant picked up Harris and they drove to the apartment, arriving sometime around midnight. Appellant did not see Harris with a firearm. After arriving at the apartment, Dickerson answered the door. Appellant saw Dickerson, Brown, and a third person playing dominoes. There was a handgun on the table. Appellant sat down, drank, and smoked marijuana with them, after which he bought $25 worth of marijuana. Later, the third person left, and Harris and Brown went to buy cigars. Harris appeared to be more friendly to Brown “than he was with everyone else.”
        Harris and Brown returned approximately thirty minutes later. Corley was asleep, and everyone else was “having a good time” smoking marijuana and listening to music. While appellant and Harris played dominoes, Harris kept looking over at where Dickerson and Brown were sitting. Up to that point, appellant saw Dickerson with two guns--a small .380 handgun and another handgun. Appellant told Harris that he was ready to leave, and Harris said he was going to first use the bathroom. When Harris exited the bathroom, appellant heard him say “you know what time it is.” Harris then said, “Get up.” When appellant stood up and turned around, he noticed that Harris was holding two guns.
        Harris then told Dickerson, who was standing in front of him, to take off his clothes, and told appellant to wake up Brown, who was asleep on the sofa. Appellant did this, and Harris told Brown to take off his clothes. Harris found some tape and told appellant to tie up Brown and Dickerson. According to appellant, Harris told Brown that he was “sorry that he has to do this.” Harris also told Dickerson that he had “fucked up,” and that “you don't do me like this.” Harris complained that Dickerson had “shorted” him one Ecstasy pill.         While appellant was tying up Dickerson, Harris woke up Corley. Harris returned with Corley, ordered him to take off his clothes, and told appellant to tie him up. By this point, appellant knew Harris intended to rob the victims and was “trying to take everything.” But appellant did not think Harris was going to shoot anyone.
        Harris asked Dickerson where the marijuana was, and Dickerson said it was in the car. Harris told appellant to get Dickerson's car keys and go outside to retrieve the drugs. Appellant testified that he did not run away at this point because he had left his car keys in the apartment and slept in his car. Appellant feared Harris would easily find him and his life would be in danger. When appellant returned with the drugs, Harris told him to “take down” the security camera that was on the patio. They brought the victims into the bathroom. Harris told appellant to “wipe the table” and put the victims' clothing in a basket, and then take it outside to the car. When again asked by counsel why he did not try to flee, appellant said he had nowhere to go and feared that he would be easily found. He also stated that, if he had contacted the police, he feared that Harris would have killed him before the police apprehended Harris.
        After appellant wiped down the table and took the clothes to the car, he went inside and Harris told him to pick up the .380 handgun and a blanket. Appellant put the gun in his pocket and took the blanket into the bathroom. Harris told him to throw the blanket over the three men. At that point, appellant could not believe Harris was going to shoot the men, and he was too scared to do anything about it. Harris pulled out a gun and appellant heard a “click.” Appellant handed Harris the .380 handgun, and Harris said, “[G]et that raggedy ass gun away from me.” Appellant put the pistol in his pocket.
        When Harris's gun “clicked” a second time, appellant thought he was trying to frighten the victims by using an unloaded gun. Appellant said he was “headed out the door” when he heard the second “click.” When he heard the first gun shot, appellant ran towards the door and unlocked it. Realizing he did not have his car keys, appellant ran back to pick them up off the floor and heard two more shots. Once he got outside the apartment, appellant heard three more shots. As appellant ran to his car, Harris yelled for him to stop running. They walked to appellant's car and drove off.
        Appellant testified that Dickerson, Corley, and Brown were in the bathroom for “roughly”
five minutes before they were shot, although he told Arredondo it might have been more than fifteen minutes. Appellant explained the discrepancy by estimating that fifteen minutes elapsed between the time that Harris first pulled the pistols until they fled the apartment.
        After they fled the apartment, Harris asked for the .380 handgun, and appellant handed it to him. Harris told appellant that he needed to get rid of the pistols, and he ordered appellant to drive them to a house on Wilshire. Harris knocked on the front door and gave the pistols to someone in the house, “and ran right back to the car.” Harris then told appellant to drive to a house on Fordham, and along the way appellant stopped and picked up Saliah, a female friend. At the Fordham house, Harris told appellant to get the basket out of the car, and he gave appellant a Crown Royal sack that contained marijuana, pills, and some “wet.” Appellant did not know whether the sack was from the robbery, but he feared that if he refused it Harris would suspect he might contact the police. Appellant bought some crack and then checked into a motel with Saliah.
        Intending to sell some of the drugs back to Harris for money, appellant later drove back to the house on Fordham. When appellant and Saliah pulled into the driveway, Harris was walking out of the house to meet a car that had pulled in behind appellant. Harris got into the rear seat of the car and appeared to make hand gestures that suggested to appellant that he might be talking about killing appellant. Harris exited the car and called for appellant to get out of his car. Harris told appellant that “something” was “fucked up” because “somebody lived,” and the police were looking for Harris. Harris asked to borrow appellant's car because he needed to “move around.” Harris gave appellant and Saliah $20 and took them back to their motel room. Appellant did not see Harris again until they were jailed for the instant offense.
        Appellant insisted that, from the moment at the apartment where he turned around and saw Harris holding two firearms, he did nothing of his own volition. Appellant argued that he did only what he was told to do, and that he did not do it willingly. He denied that it was a planned robbery that went bad, and stated that he was also a victim. Appellant also denied having a loaded firearm or pointing a firearm at anyone on the night of the offense, and he denied pulling a trigger and shooting a gun during the offense. Appellant contended that he participated in the offense only because Harris was holding a gun, and because he feared being shot.
Discussion
 
Affirmative Defense
        In his first issue, appellant argues that the jury's rejection of his affirmative defense of duress should be reversed because the result is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust.
        When an appellant seeks review of a jury's failure to make a finding on which he had the burden of proof at trial by a preponderance of the evidence, such as an affirmative defense, “the correct standard of review is whether after considering all the evidence relevant to the issue at hand, the judgment is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence so as to be manifestly unjust.” Ex parte Schuessler, 846 S.W.2d 850, 852 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Meraz v. State, 785 S.W.2d 146, 155 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990)). The jury determines the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence. Bigby v. State, 892 S.W.2d 864, 878 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).         The court of criminal appeals' recent decision in Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 894-95
(Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.), overruled Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996), and concluded the Jackson v. Virginia standard is the only standard a reviewing court should apply in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support each element of a criminal offense that the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. The court, however, did not overrule Meraz. Justice Cochran's concurring opinion in Brooks noted that the factual sufficiency standard announced in Meraz is still appropriate for reviewing issues, such as affirmative defenses, on which the defendant had the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence:
 
What this Court did in Clewis was adopt the language of Texas civil factual sufficiency review without first determining whether there was a proper fit between those civil standards of review and the differing evidentiary standards of proof in civil and criminal cases. This mistake was quite understandable when Clewis was decided in 1996 because this Court had recently and properly adopted the Texas civil standards of legal and factual sufficiency for those few instances in criminal cases in which the burden of proof is a preponderance of the evidence, as occurs with affirmative defenses.
 
Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 924 (Cochran, J., concurring). We therefore conclude Meraz is still good law, and we apply that standard to this case.
        The trial court instructed the jury on appellant's affirmative defense of duress. Under the duress statute, it is an affirmative defense to prosecution that the actor engaged in the proscribed conduct because he was compelled to do so by threat of imminent death or serious bodily injury to himself or another. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §8.05(a) (West 2003). Compulsion exists only if the force or threat of force would render a person of reasonable firmness incapable of resisting the pressure. See id. §8.05(c); Edwards v. State, 106 S.W.3d 833, 843 (Tex. App.--Dallas 2003, pet. ref'd). Appellant had to prove his affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §2.04(d) (West 2003). To support the submission of an affirmative defense instruction of duress based upon compulsion, there must be some evidence of a specific, objective threat or serious bodily harm. See Edwards, 106 S.W.3d at 843; Cameron v. State, 925 S.W.2d 246, 250 (Tex. App.--El Paso 1995, no pet.).
        The evidence in this case was sufficient for the jury to reject appellant's affirmative defense. Although appellant testified that he feared Harris and thought Harris might shoot him if he did not participate in the offense, Dickerson testified that Harris did not threaten appellant at any time during the criminal episode. The jury also could have considered the fact that appellant had two opportunities to flee the crime scene when he went outside to his car, yet returned to the apartment. Appellant argued that he did not run away because he thought Harris would hunt him down and harm or kill him, yet appellant continued to live in the same neighborhood after the murder and did not try to hide from Harris. Appellant also deliberately sought out Harris shortly after the murder in an attempt to sell back to Harris some of the drugs that Harris had given appellant. The jury was in the best position to evaluate the credibility and demeanor of the witnesses when the testimony was delivered. See Edwards, 106 S.W.3d at 844. After reviewing the evidence in this case under the appropriate standard, we conclude the jury's rejection of appellant's affirmative defense of duress was not so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust. We overrule appellant's first issue.
 
Sufficiency of the Evidence
        In his second issue, appellant argues the evidence is factually insufficient to support his murder conviction because the State failed to prove he was guilty as the primary actor or as a party.
Brooks concluded the Jackson v. Virginia standard is the only standard a reviewing court should apply in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support each element of a criminal offense that the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 894-95. Under that standard, we examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment and determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899-900; Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We defer to the jury's determinations of the witnesses' credibility and the weight to be given their testimony because the jury is the sole judge of those matters. Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899-900; Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512, 517-18 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).
        The jury was instructed that it could find appellant guilty of capital murder in any of three different ways: (1) as a principal; (2) as a party under section 7.02(a)(2) of the Texas Penal Code; or (3) as a co-conspirator under section 7.02(b). The jury returned a general verdict. When, as in this case, the trial court's charge authorized the jury to convict on more than one theory, the verdict of guilty will be upheld if the evidence is sufficient on any one of the theories. Guevara v. State, 152 S.W.3d 45, 49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); Rabbani v. State, 847 S.W.2d 555, 558 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
        As explained in the trial court's charge, a person commits the offense of capital murder if he intentionally commits murder in the course of committing or attempting to commit robbery. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 19.03(a)(2) (West 2003). A person commits robbery if, in the course of committing theft, he intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another. See id. § 29.02(a)(1).
        Under the law of parties, appellant would be guilty as a party to the offense if he, acting with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, solicited, encouraged, directed, aided, or attempted to aid the other person to commit the offense. See id. § 7.02(a)(2). Furthermore, a party is criminally responsible for the conduct of another “[i]f, in the attempt to carry out a conspiracy to commit one felony, another felony is committed by one of the conspirators, all conspirators are guilty of the felony actually committed, though having no intent to commit it, if the offense was committed in furtherance of the unlawful purpose and was one that should have been anticipated as a result of the carrying out of the conspiracy.” Id. § 7.02(b).
        In determining whether appellant participated in the offense as a party, we may examine the events occurring before, during, and after the commission of the offense, and may rely on actions of the defendant that show an understanding and common design to commit the offense. King v. State, 29 S.W.3d 556, 563 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Edwards, 106 S.W.3d at 842. Although mere presence is not enough, presence is a circumstance tending to prove guilt, which, when combined with other facts, may suffice to show the accused was a participant. See Beardsley v. State, 738 S.W.2d 681, 685 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987); Edwards, 106 S.W.3d at 842.
        Viewing the evidence in this case under the appropriate standard, we conclude that it was sufficient to support the conviction. Appellant drove Harris to the apartment and assisted him in duct-taping and robbing the victims, and in “wiping down” the apartment. Appellant saw Harris holding two pistols. Dickerson could see appellant pointing two revolvers at Brown, and appellant told Brown to take off his clothes. Corley likewise noticed that appellant was pointing a gun at Brown. Dickerson testified that appellant and Harris took his money, clothes, phones, and drugs. Dickerson also recalled that appellant gathered the victims' clothing and property and took it to his car. Dickerson testified that appellant and Harris marched the three victims to the bathroom. Appellant covered them with a blanket and handed a gun to Harris. Dickerson heard two “clicks” and then heard Harris tell appellant to “move with that broke ass gun,” suggesting it was appellant, not Harris, who first pulled the trigger. Corley testified that Harris told appellant either that he knew “what to do” or knew “what time it is,” and then he heard three shots. Appellant fled the murder scene with Harris and the stolen property. Other testimony indicated that, based on the shell casings and bullets recovered from the deceased and the crime scene, at least three weapons were used in the offense.
        The evidence in this case was sufficient to prove appellant's guilt as either a principal or a party to capital murder. Furthermore, the jury could have reasonably concluded Brown's murder was committed in furtherance of the robbery, and that the murder was a foreseeable and probable consequence of the robbery. We overrule appellant's second issue.
Appellant's Statement
        In his third issue, appellant argues that the redacted portion of the DVD video recording of his statement to Arredondo was admissible under the rule of optional completeness.
        During the trial, the State offered into evidence a DVD video recording of Arredondo's interrogation of appellant. This video recording was admitted into evidence during Arredondo's testimony, and was played for the jury. A portion of the video, however, was not heard by the jury. The jury saw about two minutes of the video with the volume to the video turned off, and during this redacted portion of the video appellant can be heard stating that he had been charged with a robbery offense that he did not commit, that he was convicted, and he served five years in prison for the offense.   See Footnote 1          
        Later in the trial, during the State's redirect of Sims, the prosecutor elicited the fact that appellant had been convicted of robbery and sent to the penitentiary. On cross-examination, the defense attempted to introduce into evidence a certified copy of the judgment and sentence from that prior robbery conviction. The trial court sustained the State's objection that Sims was “not the proper person to be entering that.”
        A few moments later, just before appellant testified, the State objected outside the jury's presence to appellant going “behind the [robbery] conviction” until admissibility of such testimony could be determined. The defense then attempted to offer into evidence the portion of the video that had not been heard by the jury. Counsel stated that the redacted portion of the video “alluded to and described the fact that the defendant had been convicted of robbery, served time, and there was an explanation of those circumstances.” Citing rules of evidence 106 and 107, counsel asked the court to allow the jury to hear the redacted portion of the video. The prosecutor responded that defense counsel had objected to the portion of the video that contained the prior conviction,   See Footnote 2  that a defendant's statement was only admissible to use against him, and that appellant's self-serving statement was inadmissible. The trial court overruled defense counsel's objection and stated that appellant could not describe what he told the police regarding the explanation for his robbery conviction. Counsel then argued appellant's explanation of his prior robbery conviction supported the affirmative defense of duress because it went to appellant's state of mind “at the time the [instant] offense took place.” The trial court likewise overruled this objection.
        Toward the end of appellant's testimony on direct, defense counsel renewed his request, outside the jury's presence, to allow the redacted portion of the video to be heard by the jury. After the trial court overruled this objection, appellant told the jury he admitted to Arredondo that he had been convicted of felony robbery and served time in prison for the offense. When defense counsel asked appellant whether he was “very emotional” when he spoke to Arredondo about the robbery conviction, appellant responded, “Yes, sir.” Later, after appellant testified and shortly before both sides rested, the trial court permitted the defense to introduce the judgment and sentence from the robbery conviction into evidence. After both sides rested and closed, the defense again asked the trial court to allow the redacted portion of the video to be heard by the jury, and this objection was also overruled.
        We review a trial court's decision to admit or exclude evidence under an abuse of discretion standard. Willover v. State, 70 S.W.3d 841, 845 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). The trial judge's overruling of appellant's objection under the rule of optional completeness would constitute an abuse of discretion only if the judge's decision lies “outside the zone of reasonable disagreement.” Walters v. State, 247 S.W.3d 204, 217 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
        The rule of optional completeness permits the introduction of otherwise inadmissible evidence when the evidence is necessary to fully and fairly explain a matter “opened up” by the adverse party. See id. (citing Tex. R. Evid. 107). The plain language of rule 107 indicates that in order to be admitted under the rule, the omitted portion of the statement must be “on the same subject” and must be “necessary to make it fully understood.” Sauceda v. State, 129 S.W.3d 116, 123 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). The purpose of the rule is “to reduce the possibility of the jury receiving a false impression from hearing only a part of some act, conversation or writing.” Walters, 247 S.W.3d at 218. However, “Rule 107 does not permit the introduction of other similar but inadmissable evidence unless it is necessary to explain properly admitted evidence.” Id.
        .[S]elf-serving declarations of the accused are ordinarily inadmissible in his behalf, unless they come under some exception, such as: being part of the res gestae of the offense or arrest, or part of the statement or conversation previously proved by the State, or being necessary to explain or contradict acts or declarations first offered by the State.. Singletary v. State, 509 S.W.2d 572, 576 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); see also Allridge v. State, 762 S.W.2d 146, 152 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988); Ziolkowski v. State, 223 S.W.3d 640, 650 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 2007, pet ref'd).
        In this case, however, there has been no showing either that the redacted portion of the video recording was “on the same subject” or that it was necessary to correct a false or incorrect impression of the evidence. The unredacted portion of the video pertained only to appellant's knowledge of the instant offense; there was no mention of other criminal convictions. Nor did the jury hear any facts that would have misled them regarding appellant's prior conviction. Evidence of that prior robbery conviction was introduced later in the trial. “Rule 107 is designed to guard against the possibility of confusion, distortion, or false impression that could be created when only a portion of evidence is introduced.. Crosby v. Minyard Food Stores, Inc., 122 S.W.3d 899, 903 (Tex. App.--Dallas 2003, no pet.) (citations omitted). .The so-called rule of optional completeness takes effect when other evidence has already been introduced but is incomplete and misleading.. Jones v. State, 963 S.W.2d 177, 182 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 1998, pet. ref'd). Thus, the trial court did not err in concluding appellant was not entitled to introduce the redacted portion of his videotaped statement. See Allridge, 762 S.W.2d at 153 (defendant's self-serving hearsay confession was not admissible under rule 107 because the State had offered a later confession which “did not mislead the jury or leave the jury with only a partial or incomplete version of the facts”); Pratt v. State, 748 S.W.2d 483, 486-87 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, pet. ref'd) (defendant's questioning of an officer about probable cause in his affidavit did not open the door for the State to admit the entire affidavit under rule 107). Accordingly, we overrule appellant's third issue.
        We affirm the trial court's judgment.
 
                                                          
                                                          LANA MYERS
                                                          JUSTICE
 
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47
090133F.U05
 
Footnote 1 The redacted portion of the video appears between the 09:11 and 09:13 time markers on the DVD.
Footnote 2 Prior to trial, the defense filed a motion in limine regarding extraneous offenses, and, just before Arredondo testified in front of the jury, counsel moved to suppress appellant's statement to Arredondo because there was no probable cause to arrest appellant. The trial court overruled the motion to suppress.