TIMOTEO JIMENEZ CARVAJAL, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

AFFIRM and Opinion Filed June 16, 2010
 
 
 
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
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No. 05-09-00076-CR
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TIMOTEO JIMENEZ CARVAJAL, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
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On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 4
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F-07-59775-K
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices O'Neill, Francis, and Murphy
Opinion By Justice O'Neill
        Appellant Timeteo Jimenez Carvajal appeals his conviction for murder. After a jury found appellant guilty, it assessed punishment at ninety-nine years' confinement. In two points of error, appellant contends (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence, and (2) the evidence is factually insufficient to support the jury's finding against him on the issue of self- defense. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
        The grand jury indicted appellant for killing Lorena Perrusquia by stabbing her with a knife. She suffered 34 knife wounds. Appellant claimed self-defense. At trial, the State presented evidence that appellant was romantically interested in Lorena. Appellant often gave Lorena money hoping she would have sex with him, but she never did. On the night of the offense, Lorena and her friend Veronica Rodriguez went to appellant's apartment to drink beer and so Lorena could ask appellant for money to get a new cell phone. Although the women had been drinking all day, Rodriquez testified that they were not intoxicated. When Lorena asked appellant for the money, appellant told her he would give her money tomorrow. Lorena told appellant if he did not give her the money, she would find a man who would. Appellant went into the kitchen, returned with a knife, and immediately began stabbing Lorena. Rodriquez testified she tried to help Lorena by throwing bottles and a chair at appellant. Rodriquez then ran next door and called police. When police arrived, appellant admitted killing Lorena. He claimed he did so because he did not want anyone else to “have” her.
        Appellant testified at trial to an entirely different chain of events. Appellant said he and Lorena were not friends, he did not know her well, and she was a “bad” lady. He claimed Lorena had stolen from him and had assaulted him in the past. On the night of the offense, Lorena was at appellant's apartment talking to one of his roommates. She left, but returned later that night with Rodriquez and knocked on the door. Appellant testified that when he began to open the door, Lorena pushed it open, knocking him down. She entered the apartment and then opened the balcony door for Rodriquez. The two women demanded money. Appellant said he did not have any money, and the two women began to “beat him up” hitting him with a bottle and knocking him over. Appellant lost control and grabbed a kitchen knife and began stabbing Lorena. He does not know how many times he stabbed her. Appellant denied telling police he killed the victim because he did not want anyone else to “have” her. Instead, he claimed he told the officer he was defending himself. According to appellant, he suffered a head wound from the attack and was bleeding heavily. However, no injury was noted at the time of appellant's arrest. The defense presented pictures taken at the jail, one week after the offense, showing a wound on appellant's head.         On cross-examination, appellant's description of the events became confused. He testified that when the women attacked him, he was sitting at the dining room table listening to music. He said he wanted to turn the music down, but the women told him they would kill him if he did so. When asked to explain why there was a case of beer when police arrived, he said “this other man” handed the beer to the two women. He then stated the women “first drank a few [beers] and then started to attack” him. When asked to explain how he got the knife, he testified that after the women began attacking him, he was able to pull himself away, run to the kitchen, and get the knife. Although appellant claimed he only stabbed Lorena while she was on top of him attacking him, he could not explain why she had stab wounds on both her abdomen and her back. He indicated he does not recall the entire attack because he “lost consciousness.”
        The jury, rejecting appellant's claim of self-defense, found him guilty of murder. It assessed punishment at ninety-nine years' confinement. This appeal followed.
        In his first point of error, appellant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence. Prior to trial, appellant filed a motion seeking to suppress the oral statement he made to police at the time of his arrest. He complained because he was not given the Miranda warnings before he gave the statement and the statement was not recorded. Both of appellant's complaints are premised on his contention the statement was the product of “custodial interrogation.”
        At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Officer Antonio Aleman testified that when he arrived at the scene he saw a woman, later identified as Rodriguez, yelling and screaming outside appellant's open apartment. He looked in the apartment and saw appellant washing his hands. He also saw blood all over the apartment and the deceased lying in a pool of blood. The officer asked appellant what he was doing and told him to raise his hands and come toward him. Appellant began to walk toward the officer, who was still standing in the doorway. Appellant told the officer that he had stabbed and killed the woman and that if he could not “have” her, no one could. Aleman placed appellant in handcuffs and then escorted him to the squad car. Aleman did not ask appellant any questions about the offense in the squad car, but appellant began telling the officer what he had done. Appellant told the officer Lorena had come over with Rodriguez to drink. She asked him for some money for her rent. Appellant said he would give her money for sex, but she refused. Appellant nevertheless began to rub her shoulders. When Lorena told him she had a younger man, appellant said he lost control, picked up a knife, and started to stab her. Appellant repeated the story several times. The only questions Aleman asked appellant during this exchange were routine book-in questions about his name, address, date of birth, etc. Aleman explained he did not ask any questions about the offense because that is the job of the homicide detectives.
        On appeal, appellant contends the book-in questions constituted custodial interrogation. “Custodial interrogation” is questioning initiated by police after a person has been “taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). In addition to actual questioning, “interrogation” can encompass police speech and conduct which “the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.” Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980). Questioning which occurs as a normal incident of arrest and custody is not interrogation. Id.; see McCambridge v. State, 712 S.W.2d 499, 505 (Tex.Crim.App.1986); Edwards v. State, 813 S.W.2d 572, 578 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, pet. ref'd).
        To show the statement he made was the product of custodial interrogation, appellant relies on the questions Aleman asked him in the squad car. Appellant does not dispute Aleman asked only routine book-in questions, but nevertheless asserts Aleman should have known the questions would elicit an incriminating response. We disagree. In fact, it appears appellant's statement was not the result of these questions or any other conduct by Aleman, but rather was spontaneously volunteered. See Roquemore v. State, 60 S.W.3d 862, 868 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (no custodial interrogation when statement spontaneously uttered in squad car). We conclude appellant's statement was not the product of custodial interrogation. We overrule appellant's first point of error.
        In his second point of error, appellant contends the evidence is factually insufficient to show he did not act in self-defense. The State has the burden of persuasion when self-defense is raised. Saxton v. State, 804 S.W.2d 910, 913-14 (Tex. Crim. App.1991). The State meets this burden by proving its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 913. When a defendant challenges the factual sufficiency of the jury's rejection of self-defense, we review all the evidence in a neutral light and determine whether the State's evidence taken alone is too weak to support the finding or whether the proof of guilt, although adequate if taken alone, is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589, 593 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); see also Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 129 (Tex. Crim. App.1996). We give due deference to the fact finder's determinations concerning the weight and credibility of the evidence. Swearingen v. State, 101 S.W.3d 89, 97 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). We will reverse only to prevent manifest injustice. Id.         At trial, appellant claimed he stabbed Lorena because she and Rodriguez attacked him and attempted to rob him. Appellant's claim was directly contradicted by Rodriguez's eyewitness testimony, as well as the statement he gave to Officer Aleman at the time of his arrest. Moreover, the physical evidence showed that appellant stabbed Lorena numerous times, inflicting 34 knife wounds. After reviewing all the evidence in a neutral light, we cannot conclude the evidence is too week to support the jury's guilty verdict or the verdict is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. We overrule appellant's second point of error.         We affirm the trial court's judgment.
                        
 
 
                                                          
                                                          MICHAEL J. O'NEILL
                                                          JUSTICE
 
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47
090076F.U05