ROBERT LEE JR., Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

AFFIRM; Opinion issued January 13, 2010
 
S
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
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No. 05-08-01215-CR
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ROBERT LEE JR., Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
.............................................................
On Appeal from the 401st Judicial District Court
Collin County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 401-81208-06
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OPINION
Before Chief Justice Wright and Justices FitzGerald and Murphy
Opinion By Chief Justice Wright
        Robert Lee Jr. appeals his conviction for forgery. After the jury found appellant guilty, it assessed punishment at two years' confinement, probated for five years, and a $5000 fine. In two issues, appellant contends (1) the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support his conviction, and (2) the trial court erred by admitting certain evidence during the guilt-innocence phase of his trial. We overrule appellant's issues and affirm the trial court's judgment.
 
Background
        Tiffany Maurer, an Ace Cash Express employee, testified appellant presented her with two WalMart money orders, each for $1000, for her to cash. Maurer, who had worked for Ace for over four years, received WalMart money orders on many occasions in the past, but the money orders appellant gave her did not resemble any of the other WalMart money orders she had seen. Maurer explained that MoneyGram and WalMart work together to issue money orders and the money orders have a security feature referred to as a heat seeking mark or a thermal mark that changes colors when you rub or touch the spot. When Maurer checked the thermal marks on the money orders appellant presented, they did not change colors. She also noticed that the money orders were green, which was a different color than other such money orders she had seen, and the verification numbers on the back of the money orders were incorrect. Maurer's manager, Alice Ferguson, called MoneyGram to verify the money orders. As she did so, Maurer spoke with appellant. When Maurer asked him where he got the money orders, he told her they were from renters of a house he owned.
        Ferguson testified that when she called to verify the money orders, she was told they had been previously cashed. Ferguson asked Maurer to stall appellant and Ferguson contacted the police.
        Tonya Burns, a customer service representative for WalMart, testified that she has taken money orders and made money orders available for WalMart customers for twenty-two years. According to Ferguson, WalMart money orders have never been green. She also testified that WalMart money orders always have a water crescent on the bottom right-hand side. When you put the crescent between your index finger and thumb and hold it closely, it will disappear and then come back. In her experience, she had never had a crescent that did not change colors.
        Officer Ray Wildes testified he responded to Ferguson's call to the police. When Wildes arrived at the Ace Cash Express, he spoke with appellant in an attempt to learn if appellant had any reason to believe the money orders were fraudulent. Appellant told Wildes that appellant had received the money orders as prepayment for some website work he obtained through a posting on guru.com. Wildes then spoke with Maurer and learned that appellant had told her appellant received the money orders as payment for rent. When Wildes asked appellant why he told Maurer he had received the money orders as rent, appellant told him that Maurer had “taken him off guard.” Wildes became suspicious about appellant's conflicting stories and asked him about his computer work. Appellant told Wildes that he had done work on ten to twenty websites and that one such website was Elance.com. According to appellant, he did the database work but his name did not appear on the website. Wildes spent twenty to thirty minutes on his cellular telephone in an attempt to validate a signature on a website or have appellant give a description of a website or provide the name of someone who could validate such work. Although Wildes gave appellant the opportunity to validate his website work, appellant did not offer a name or other proof and finally told Wildes to “forget it.” When Wildes looked at the money orders closely he noticed that the lower case B on both the money orders and appellant's driver's license was written very distinctly and was “an exact match.” At that point, Wildes arrested appellant.
        Appellant testified that after graduating from college with a degree in computer engineering he worked for Bank One for a year and then “elected go become a commissioned officer in the military.” After leaving the Navy, he returned to Bank One and worked there for about four years. He then moved to First USA bank, and then to JP Morgan Chase. During his time at the banks, he did not handle money or money orders and did not receive any training regarding money order or check fraud. Appellant explained that he posted his resume on guru.com to obtain freelance work for some extra money. He was contacted by Richard Kennedy via email about doing some website work. Appellant estimated the work would be about $4000 to $6000 and asked for a ten- to twenty-percent down payment. Appellant later received a UPS package that contained four $1000 money orders and a letter. According to appellant, when Wildes asked him where he obtained the money orders, appellant told Wildes he received them as payment for freelance website work. Appellant testified he did not “recall” talking with Maurer about where he got the money orders, and did not recall telling her that he had received them as rent.
        After he was arrested, appellant learned the money orders had been purchased in Troy, Missouri and were mailed to him from a health clinic in Canada. Appellant denied either purchasing the money orders or mailing them to himself. Appellant introduced a series of emails showing correspondance between appellant and Kennedy, the managing director of Richie & Ken, in which appellant agreed to do website work. Although appellant asked for a ten to twenty percent down payment on a four-to-six thousand dollar job, Kennedy emailed appellant on December 15th and informed appellant Kennedy had mailed $2000. Appellant could not explain why Kennedy mailed more than the requested ten percent or why he said he had mailed $2000 when he actually mailed $4000 in money orders on December 13th. Appellant also admitted he did not know Thomas Anderson, the author of the letter that was enclosed with the money orders. And, appellant could not explain why the packaging from UPS contained a different company name than the company he agreed to do website work for. Finally, appellant had no explanation for why Kennedy never contacted him about the website work not being done in spite of the $4000 payment, nor why he did not report Kennedy to the police for sending forged money orders.
        After hearing this and other evidence, the jury found appellant guilty of forgery. This appeal followed.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
        In his first issue, appellant contends the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support his conviction. When reviewing a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we examine the evidence to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Vodochodsky v. State, 158 S.W.3d 502, 509 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). We review all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, and assume the trier of fact resolved conflicts in the testimony, weighed the evidence, and drew reasonable inferences in a manner that supports the verdict. See Rollerson v. State, 227 S.W.3d 718, 724 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). It is not necessary that every fact point directly and independently to an accused's guilt, but it is enough if the conclusion is warranted by the combined and cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances. Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
        In a factual sufficiency review, we view all of the evidence in a neutral light to determine whether the fact-finder's verdict of guilt was rationally justified. See Roberts v. State, 220 S.W.3d 521, 524 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 282 (2007); see also Marshall v. State, 210 S.W.3d 618, 625 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 87 (2007). Unless the record clearly reveals a different result is appropriate, we must defer to the fact-finder's determination concerning what weight to give to contradictory testimony. Lancon v. State, 253 S.W.3d 699, 705 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
        To support appellant's conviction, the State was required to show beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant, with intent to defraud or harm another, passed a forged money order to Maurer that purported to be the act of another who did not authorize the act. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 32.21 (Vernon Supp. 2009). In the case of forgery, the culpable mental state requires proof of knowledge that the instrument is forged. Williams v. State, 688 S.W.2d 486, 488 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). Such intent is almost always established by circumstantial evidence. See De La Paz v. State, 279 S.W.3d 336, 349-50 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Williams, 688 S.W.2d at 488.
        Appellant does not dispute that the money orders were forged. Rather, he contends the State failed to show that he knew they were forged, the indictment is defective because the name on the indictment does not match the identity of the alleged victim, and the State failed to show the money orders were the purported act of another because he signed his true name. After reviewing the record, we cannot agree.
        As discussed above, appellant gave conflicting answers about where he obtained the money orders. The jury could infer appellant's guilty knowledge from his conflicting stories regarding where he obtained the money orders, and what he told to Maurer and Wildes. See Kemmerer v. State, 113 S.W.3d 513, 516 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. ref'd) (jury could view appellant's changing versions of child's death as evidence of intent to inflict injury). Additionally, the jury could consider appellant's inability to explain the “oddities” in his version of how he obtained payment for the website work, and the conflicts with the physical evidence he provided. See Guevara v. State, 152 S.W.3d 45, 50 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (implausible explanations are probative of wrongful conduct and are circumstantial evidence of guilt). Considering the totality of the evidence, we conclude a jury could have reasonably determined appellant knew the money orders were forged. Further, the record shows the State introduced evidence that appellant presented the money orders, purporting to be the act of WalMart, not appellant's act. Thus, appellant's arguments that the State failed to show the money orders were the purported act of another because he signed his true name and the name on the writing does not match the identity of the alleged victim lack merit. Finally, although appellant contends the evidence shows he did not know the money orders were forged and Wildes did not adequately investigate appellant's version of where he obtained the money orders, these arguments are directed to the weight and credibility of the evidence, which is the jury's province. After reviewing the evidence under the appropriate standards, we conclude the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support appellant's conviction. We overrule appellant's first issue.
 
Evidentiary Complaint
        In his second issue, appellant contends the trial court erred by allowing the State to present evidence showing the circumstances surrounding his discharge from the Navy during the guilt- innocence phase of the trial. We review such complaints for an abuse of discretion. See McDonald v. State, 179 S.W.3d 571, 576 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). If the trial court's decision was within the “bounds of reasonable disagreement,” we do not disturb the ruling. See Apolinar v. State, 155 S.W.3d 184, 186 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
        Rule of evidence 107 provides that when part of an act is given in evidence by one party, the whole on the same subject may be inquired into by the other to the extent it is necessary to make it fully understood or to explain the act. See Tex. R. Evid. 107. Rule 107 is one of admissibility and permits the introduction of otherwise inadmissible evidence when that evidence is necessary to explain fully and fairly a matter “opened up” by the adverse party. Credille v. State, 925 S.W.2d 112, 116 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, pet. ref'd). The purpose of the rule is to reduce the possibility of the jury receiving a false impression from hearing only part of some act. Id.
        Here, the record shows appellant volunteered information that suggested he was a commissioned Naval officer and that he was unaccustomed to being detained by the police. Appellant's testimony “opened up” the matter of the circumstances of his discharge from Navy, thereby permitting the State to elicit additional evidence to explain fully and fairly the circumstances. See Tex. R. Evid. 107; Credille, 925 S.W.2d at 116 . Thus, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the complained-of testimony. We overrule appellant's second issue.
        Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
 
 
                                                          
                                                          CAROLYN WRIGHT
                                                          CHIEF JUSTICE
 
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47
081215F.U05