JULIAN LEON BRYANT, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

AFFIRMED as Modified; Opinion Filed December 1, 2009.
 
 
 
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
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No. 05-09-00035-CR
No. 05-09-00036-CR
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JULIAN LEON BRYANT, Appellant
 
V.
 
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
 
.............................................................
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause Nos. F06-23050-JH, F08-46781-TH
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
 
Before Justices Bridges, Lang, and Lang-Miers
Opinion By Justice Lang-Miers
 
 
        Julian Leon Bryant appeals his five and seven-year prison sentences following adjudication for failure to stop and render aid and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, a knife. In three issues, appellant contends the sentences are grossly disproportionate to the crime and inappropriate to the offender, and the order of deferred adjudication in cause no. 05-09-00035-CR should be modified to reflect the proper statute for the offense. The background of the case and the evidence adduced at trial are well known to the parties, and therefore we limit recitation of the facts. We issue this memorandum opinion pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1 because the law to be applied in the case is well settled. We affirm the trial court's judgment as modified in the first case, and we affirm the trial court's judgment in the second case.
        In his first two issues, appellant contends the sentence in each case is grossly disproportionate to the offense and inappropriate to the offender in violation of the United States and Texas Constitutions. See U.S. Const. Amend. VIII, XIV; Tex. Const. Art. I, § 13. Appellant asserts the sentences are severe and unnecessary because the trial court had several other options available rather than assessing prison terms. The State responds that appellant failed to preserve his complaints for appellate review, and the sentence is not disproportionate to the offense and circumstances.
        Appellant did not complain about the sentences either at the time they were imposed or in his motions for new trial. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1); Castaneda v. State, 135 S.W.3d 719, 723 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.). Even constitutional rights may be waived. Rhoades v. State, 934 S.W.2d 113, 120 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); Castaneda, 135 S.W.3d at 723. Moreover, the trial court imposed punishment within the statutory range for the offenses. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. §§ 12.33, 12.34, 22.02(a) (Vernon 2003 & Supp. 2009); Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 550.021 (Vernon Supp. 2009); Kirk v. State, 949 S.W.2d 769, 772 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1997, pet. ref'd).
        We conclude the sentences are neither disproportionate to the offenses nor do they violate the United States or Texas Constitutions. See Jackson v. State, 680 S.W.2d 809, 814 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (as long as a sentence is within the proper range of punishment, it will not be disturbed on appeal). We resolve appellant's first and second issues against him.
        In his third issue, appellant contends the trial court's order of deferred adjudication should be modified to correct the statute under which appellant was indicted in the failure to stop and render aid case. The State agrees with appellant that the order of deferred adjudication should be modified to reflect the correct statute.         Once the trial court adjudicated appellant's guilt, the deferred adjudication order was no longer in effect. See Taylor v. State, 131 S.W.3d 497, 502 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); McCoy v. State, 81 S.W.3d 917, 919 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2002, pet. ref'd). A trial court's judgment adjudicating guilt expressly sets aside the underlying deferred adjudication order and declares it to be “of no further force and effect.” See id. Therefore, there is no longer an order in effect requiring modification.
        To the extent appellant complains about the trial court's judgment adjudicating guilt, we sustain his third issue on appeal. The record shows appellant was convicted of an offense under section 550.021 of the Texas Transportation Code. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 550.021. The trial court's judgment adjudicating guilt, however, recites the statute for the offense as “550.021 Penal Code.” Thus the trial court's judgment adjudicating guilt is incorrect.
        In cause no. 05-09-00035-CR, we modify the trial court's judgment to show the statute for the offense is section 550.021 of the Texas Transportation Code. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(b); Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27-28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Asberry v. State, 813 S.W.2d 526, 529-30 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, pet. ref'd).
Conclusion
 
        In cause no. 05-09-00035-CR, we affirm the trial court's judgment as modified. In cause no. 05-09-00036-CR, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
 
                                                          
                                                          ELIZABETH LANG-MIERS
                                                          JUSTICE
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47
090035F.U05